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Abstract 
 The Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin added the concept of genocide to our 
vocabulary barely seventy years ago. In the ensuing decades, ‘genocide’ has become a 
highly politicized term employed in discussions of ethics, law, and history. This 
dissertation investigates what I described as the ‘politics of genocide’ or the historical 
evolution of the concept, rather than the practice, in political discourse. It argues that 
from Raphael Lemkin’s initial writings, to the United Nations Genocide Convention, to 
contemporary invocations of the concept, genocide transformed from a once-broad 
notion, incorporating many different political communities and forms of violence, into an 
exclusive reference for mass physical violence directed at stable religious, racial or ethnic 
groups. This normative understanding of genocide obscures a more complex picture of 
contemporary political violence that includes colonial histories, institutional conditions, 
and technological innovations. The dissertation examines the discourse of genocide by 
tracing the transformation of three distinct parts the concept: groups, destruction, and 
intention. Each chapter is dedicated to one of these parts and evaluates how they 
transform over time in relation to events such as the Vietnam War, the birth of human 
rights, and new technologies. Ultimately, the dissertation contends that genocide enables 
the formation of new forms of international governance, which erode traditional 
structures of sovereignty and limits the recognition of many episodes of mass violence. 
The discourse of genocide has thus become a large part of an emergent and exclusionary 
form of politics. 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction 
“New conceptions require new terms.”1 
Raphael Lemkin 
 
“Today it is impossible to say for certain why people are really punished: all concepts in 
which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has 




The Origins of Genocide 
 Genocide. Few words resonate with the horrors of the past century like this one. 
You hear of genocide in the news or see the word on an activist’s sign and, before you 
realize it, a process of empathic identification starts to take place. Names like Sudan, 
Rwanda, and Germany or pictures of concentration camps and emaciated bodies may 
enter your consciousness. Accompanying these names and images may be a sensation, 
perhaps inexpressible, that something terribly wrong is taking place, a sense of frustration 
with the state of the world. Indeed, few words can be simply whispered and produce such 
stilling discomfort. Few words signal ethical and political crisis in such a powerful way. 
 Of course, the word ‘genocide’ does not possess any secret power nor does it 
function the same way in every context. Rather, ‘genocide’ resonates and unsettles 
because it draws upon a network or assemblage of relations, institutions, expectations, 
and sensations that generate these and other reactions. This network is a political and 
historical product, much like the concept of genocide itself, and it is this network that 
shapes the enunciation or semiotics of the concept in contemporary politics. While the 
efficacy of the concept of genocide depends on this assemblage, the assemblage is also a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals 
for Redress (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944): 79. 
2	  Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989): 80, emphasis in the original.	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result of explicit efforts to popularize the concept, to design the concept of genocide in 
order to ascribe significance to a new set of horrific events. The articulation of the 
concept of genocide, what I call the politics of genocide, is thus multiple in form and 
function.3 For the study of genocide this creates a problem: if we examine the politics of 
genocide, the history of the promotion of this concept as well as the effects of this 
promotion, where do we begin? How do we enter the politics of genocide? Although the 
concept developed in the historical context of the Nazi state’s effort to exterminate the 
Jews, Sinti and Roma, and other groups, the word has since come to describe numerous 
other episodes of mass violence. How do we account for these disparate invocations of 
genocide? Furthermore, if the concept depends on a heterogeneous assemblage of 
political statements and events then at what point do we start to describe the birth or 
formation of the politics of genocide? What forms of exclusion are bound up with this 
decision?  
 We might begin our history of genocide in June 2002, when the last Basarwa 
were removed from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) by the government of 
Botswana and relocated to a settlement called New Xade.4 The Basarwa had been legal 
residents of the CKGR since the formal creation of the state of Botswana in 1961. In fact, 
they had inhabited the desert and plains for centuries before the state, or even the idea of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 David Peterson and Edward Herman use this term in their book The Politics of Genocide in order to 
describe a different set of concerns about the inequalities fostered by American imperialism. While some of 
their concerns overlap with the issues discussed in this dissertation. I speak of a broader constellation of 
political forces and discourses in referencing a politics of genocide and am not interested in the unilateral 
politics of the American uses of the term. Indeed, if figures such as Samantha Power often resort to rubrics 
of American exceptionalism in  calling for genocide prevention, Peterson and Herman appear to simply 
reverse this move by decrying the US on the basis of exceptionalism. In both accounts, the US remains an 
exceptional figure in the discursive history of the concept. David Peterson and Edward Herman, The 
Politics of Genocide (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2010). 
4 The term Basarwa is one of several names for this group of people others include San, Khwe, Sho and 
Bushman. Each designation has a complex, pejorative colonial history. Rupert Isaacson, “Last Exit from 
the Kalahari: The Slow Genocide of the Bushmen/San,” openDemocracy, August 27, 2002, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ecology-summits/article_267.jsp. 
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the modern state, came into existence.5 During the 1980s, prospectors discovered 
kimberlite deposits, a good indicator for the presence of diamonds, in a section of the 
CKGR near Gobe. By 1997, the government of Botswana had begun a formal relocation 
campaign in order to pressure the Basarwa to abandon the reserve presumably to access 
these diamond-rich areas.6  
 These relocation efforts incited considerable protest from international 
development and humanitarian organizations such as the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD).7 The attention garnered by this ‘blood diamonds’ 
controversy persuaded the state to temporarily end the relocation campaign. However, the 
government turned to other tactics to compel the Basarwa to leave including secretly 
sealing the only borehole that provided the Basarwa with fresh water, revoking Basarwan 
hunting licenses, and intimidating members of the group.8 After five years of 
unsuccessful attempts to ‘motivate’ the Basarwa, the government restarted the relocation 
campaign and the last Basarwa were evicted from the CKGR in 2002.9  
 During the next decade the struggle over the Basarwa’s relocation revealed much 
about the complex connections between transnational advocacy networks, domestic legal 
systems, corporate interests, historical narratives, private militias, post-colonial 
expectations, and discourses about genocide. Soon after the relocation, several hundred 
Basarwa sued the government of Botswana in the High Court of Botswana for the illegal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Basarwa partitioned and distributed this territory according to their own set of rules, divisions, and 
groupings. Isaac Ncube Mazonde, “The Basarwa of Botswana: Leadership, Legitimacy and Participation in 
Development Sites,” Text, Cultural Survival, (March 25, 2010), 
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/the-basarwa-botswana-leadership-legitimacy-
and-participation-development. 
6 Isaacson, “Last Exit from the Kalahari.” 
7 Isaac Ncube Mazonde, “The Basarwa of Botswana.” 
8 Isaacson, “Last Exit from the Kalahari.” 
9 Survival International, “Bushmen,” accessed March 17, 2015, 
http://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/bushmen. Survival International. 
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relocation. The suit was organized by First People of the Kalahari, a local Basarwan 
initiative, but was funded by larger international humanitarian collectives such as 
Survival International.10 The purpose of the suit was simple: get the court to legally 
require the return of the Basarwa to the CKGR. Many commentators in the international 
press felt this strategy was a dead end. Botswana is one of the few ‘development success 
stories’ in Southern Africa largely because of the diamond industry, beef industry, and 
foreign direct investment.11 The state’s ‘success’ was thus closely tied to its subservience 
to international economic interests. More importantly, Debswana, the company that was 
permitted to prospect for diamonds in the CKGR, was co-owned by the DeBeers 
corporation and the government of Botswana. So, the state had a direct incentive to 
ignore the Basarwa. This economic incentive combined with a ‘weak’ judicial system, 
‘corrupt African leadership,’ and Tswanan ‘ethnic hostility’ against the Basarwa 
supposedly ensured a favorable outcome for the government.12 If the interests of the state, 
ethnic dominance, and international finance coincided, what chance could the Basarwa 
possibly have?  
 Much to everyone’s surprise in both 2006 and 2011 the High Court of Botswana 
and the Botswana Court of Appeals declared the relocation of the Basarwa unlawful.13 
Unfortunately, neither decision significantly impacted governmental policy. Instead, the 
state licensed further boring operations throughout the CKGR while refusing to facilitate 
the Basarwa’s return. In the meantime, the Basarwan population living at New Xade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 
11 Despite being the ‘jewel of Africa’ Botswana’s economic indicators say little about the condition of 
people throughout the country. Scott A. Beaulier, “Explaining Botswana’s Success: The Critical Role of 
Post-Colonial Policy,” Cato Journal 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 232. 
12 Kirthi Jayakumar, Liam Anderson, and Rom Bhandari, “Evicted from Ancestral Lands: Botswana’s 
Basarwa Minority,” March 21, 2013, http://thinkafricapress.com/botswana/evicted-ancestral-lands-
botswana-basarwa-minority-bushmen. 
13 Survival International, “Bushmen.” 
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became subject to slow death and social deterioration as an inconsistent supply of food, 
medicine, and clothing, the influx of disease, and the tolls of economic 
disenfranchisement did their work. The government also sponsored new education 
programs at New Xade aimed at ‘developing’ the Basarwa by persuading them to pursue 
more ‘traditional’ educational and professional activities.14 Over the past decade, the 
Basarwan population has dwindled.15 
 In newspapers, editorials, and courtrooms the dispute over the relocation of the 
Basarwa was centered on questions of legality, territory, and constitutional rights. 
However, these questions were supplemented by a growing concern that the Basarwa 
were victims of ‘genocide.’ Indeed, the treatment of the Basarwa was often described as 
an act of genocide in the editorials and pamphlets of humanitarian groups such as 
International Funders.16 Journalist Rupert Isaacson, who published one of the first stories 
in European media markets on the Basarwa’s predicament, described the situation as one 
of “slow genocide” citing the much longer colonial (and postcolonial) legacy of 
discriminating against nomadic societies.17 In the same vein, the Public Law and Policy 
Group, an international legal aid organization, identified the forced removal of the 
Basarwa as a form of “cultural genocide.”18 Survival International similarly referred to 
the situation in separate documents as “perilously close to genocide” and “tantamount to 
genocide.”19 These groups explicitly chose to adopt the term ‘genocide’ to expand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “Botswana Opens a Path for Bushmen to Study at University - Taipei Times,” July 25, 2010, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2010/07/25/2003478743. 
15 Survival International, “Bushmen.” 
16 Ibid. 
17 Isaacson, “Last Exit from the Kalahari.” 
18 Evelyn Arce-White, “Funding Indigenous Conservation: International Funders for Indigenous Peoples 
Strive to Protect Pristine Environments” (International Funders: For Indigenous Peoples, Summer 2005), 4. 
19 As cited in “Row over Bushmen ‘Genocide,’” BBC, November 6, 2005, sec. Crossing Continents, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/4404816.stm. 
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awareness and sympathy for the Basarwa in the hopes that these sentiments would 
mobilize greater intervention from the international community. 
The use of ‘genocide’ incited a series of controversies. Many domestic Botswanan 
groups, including the Basarwan affiliated Kuru Family of Organizations, felt the word 
was inappropriate given the treatment of the Basarwa.  After all, they argued, there were 
no mass killings and the Basarwa had not been forced to abandon their cultural or ethnic 
identity. Other groups counseled against the use of the concept because of the 
comparatively small size of the Basarwan population (relative to the ‘genocide’ in 
Darfur) and the fear that the label ‘genocide’ would trivialize more significant events. Of 
course, the government of Botswana denied the charge.20 However, others pointed out 
that the government had every incentive to deny the accusation since they oversee and 
administer New Xade. Nonetheless, government representatives repeatedly responded to 
allegations of genocide by insisting that the Basarwa’s relocation was a ‘voluntary 
decision’ thereby sidestepping any possibility of intentional misconduct.21 The 
controversy over the ‘genocide’ continues to this day while the Basarwa linger at New 
Xade.  
 Alternately, the history of the concept of genocide might begin on July 10th, 1915, 
the day Henry Morgenthau Sr., the US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, sent an 
urgent cable to the State Department in Washington. Over the preceding months, 
Morgenthau had accumulated evidence of a systematic effort to destroy the Armenian 
minority throughout the Ottoman Empire. In his cable, Morgenthau wrote: “I am 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 “BOTSWANA: Government Denies Diamonds behind Basarwa Removals,” IRINnews, November 11, 
2002, accessed March 17, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/36107/botswana-government-denies-
diamonds-behind-basarwa-removals. 
21 John Simpson, “Bushmen Fight for Homeland,” BBC, May 2, 2005, sec. Africa, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4480883.stm. 
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confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as 
this. The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when 
compared with the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915.”22 Morgenthau’s letter 
registered shock that: “When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these 
deportations, they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood 
this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal 
the fact.”23 Unbeknownst to Morgenthau, the State Department was already aware of the 
situation. In fact, in May 1915 the State Department received a copy of a joint Allied 
condemnation of the Ottoman Empire. The Allied statement read plainly: “in view of 
these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization the Allied governments 
announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible …all 
members of the Ottoman government.”24 Morgenthau’s pleas for US action fell on deaf 
ears and he resigned his commission. 
 Seventeen years later, a Polish jurist by the name of Raphael Lemkin produced a 
paper for a conference in Madrid on International Penal Law. In his paper, Lemkin 
argued that the events in the Ottoman Empire were “not particularly a question of public 
danger, but of a broader concept, general danger, that we want to [now] call transnational 
danger.”25 Transnational danger required the creation of a new category of crime because 
it superseded the authority of a single state. Inspired by the massacre of the Armenians, 
Lemkin developed the categories of ‘crimes of vandalism’ and ‘crimes of barbarity.’ He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story: A Personal Account of the Armenian Genocide 
(Cosimo, Inc., 2010): 221. 
23 Ibid, 213. 
24 Armenian National Institute, “France, Great Britain and Russia Join Declaration,” May 24, 1915, 
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.160/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html. 
25 Raphael Lemkin, “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against 
the Law of Nations” (Prevent Genocide International, October 14, 1933), 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm. 
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would later revise and combine these categories in order to create a more familiar 
concept: genocide. 
 Fifty years later, Benjamin Whitaker, the Special Rapporteur to the United 
Nations Sub-Commission On Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities26 
presented the sub-committee with a report on genocide. This report listed the massacre of 
the Armenians in the ‘historical survey’ of genocide.27 A scandal ensued. In 1985, the 
sub-committee elected to resolve the ‘Whitaker controversy’ with a statement: “the view 
was expressed by various speakers that such massacres indeed constituted genocide, as 
was well documented by the Ottoman military trials of 1919, eyewitness reports and 
official archives. Objecting to such a view, various participants argued that the Armenian 
massacre was not adequately documented and that certain evidence had been forged.”28 
Following this statement, the sub-committee decided against making any final judgment 
on the matter and refrained from sending Whitaker’s document to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights.29 
Twenty-two years later, a bill was proposed in the House of Representatives that 
would officially recognize the Armenian genocide. In response, the Turkish government 
recalled its ambassador to the United States. Numerous politicians, pundits, and military 
officials suggested that Turkey might further respond by restricting US access to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This is a subcommittee of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. It is tasked with ensuring 
proper application of the United Nations Genocide Conventions.  
27 Benjamin Whitaker, “Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide” (Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, July 2, 1985), 8. 
28 As quoted in William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 2nd edition (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012): 558. 
29 Interestingly, Whitaker’s report also included as a new genocide the 1972 slaughter of Hutu’s by Tutsi’s 
in Burundi. The report counseled extensive action by the UN in the hopes of preventing future problems. 
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airspace thereby hampering ongoing American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.30 In a 
statement in the winter of 2008, Senator Barack Obama declared a “firmly held 
conviction that the Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point 
of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of 
historical evidence. The facts are undeniable. An official policy that calls on diplomats to 
distort the historical facts is an untenable policy.”31 However, on April 24th 2009, 
Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, President Obama refrained from using the word 
‘genocide’ in his official statement commemorating the Armenian Genocide.32 The 
popular fact-checking site Politifact lists this as a “promise broken.”33 
 Finally, at least for now, we could start with the cholera epidemic that began in 
rural Haiti in October 2010. This epidemic killed over six thousand people, infected 
thousands more, and continues to impact the state to this day. In October 2011, the 
Brazilian organization Faculdade de Direito de Santa Maria (FADISMA) filed a petition 
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights alleging that the United Nations 
was “undoubtedly and seriously negligent” in its handling of the epidemic and further 
contended that the UN should be “blamed for an ‘involuntary genocide’.”34 According to 
FADISMA, in 2004 the UN Security Council had voted in favor of Resolution 1542, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “Turkey Recalls Ambassador to U.S. Over Armenian Genocide Bill,” Associated Press, (October 11, 
2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/10/11/turkey-recalls-ambassador-to-us-over-armenian-
genocide-bill. 
31 Barack Obama, “Barack Obama on the Importance of US-Armenia Relations,” January 19, 2008, 
http://armeniansforobama.com/armenian_issues.php. 
32 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement of President Barack Obama on Armenian 
Remembrance Day,” Whitehouse.gov, April 24, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/embeds/footer. 
33 “Recognize the Armenian Genocide,” PolitiFact, accessed March 17, 2015, 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/511/recognize-armenian-genocide/. 
34 Faculdade de Direito de Santa Maria, “Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Concerning the Violation, by the United Nations Organization, of the Human Right to Life and Humane 
Treatment, Enshrined in Articles 4 and 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man” (Faculdade de Direito de Santa Maria, October 
2011), 15. 
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which created the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This 
mission was intended to assist, rebuild, and stabilize Haiti. Part of MINUSTAH’s 
mandate included “the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable 
diseases in all of its peacekeeping missions.”35 To this end, MINUSTAH established a 
base for airlift operations in rural Haiti near the town of Mirebalis. The base was situated 
150 feet above a nearby reservoir that served as the primary water source for Mirebalis. 
During the summer of 2010, Nepalese peacekeepers were sent to Haiti to assist in 
stabilizing the country in the wake of the January 2010 earthquake.36 According to 
FADISMA’s documentation, many of the peacekeepers at Mirebalis, under the direction 
of UN supervisors, regularly used a nearby pit to dispose of human waste. Cholera, which 
was present in fecal matter, seeped into the local water sources, due in part to the decay 
of the infrastructure and the lack of waste management facilities, and eventually infected 
the local population.37  The disease quickly spread. The earthquake had destroyed local 
water transportation and treatment systems so conditions were primed for a water-born 
epidemic. However, FADISMA alleges that ‘negligence’ precipitated the outbreak 
because the UN was aware that Nepal was experiencing an ongoing cholera epidemic. In 
spite of this knowledge, the UN failed to screen the Nepalese peacekeepers before they 
were transferred to Haiti. Apparently, the earthquake-emergency led MINUSTAH to 
suspend inspections for infectious agents.38 According to FADISMA, MINUSTAH could 
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36 Georgianne Nienaber, “Cholera Petition Suggests UN Caused ‘Involuntary Genocide’ in Haiti,” LA 
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have and should have avoided exposing the Haitian population to cholera.  
The UN obviously contests the accusation of ‘genocide.’ According to a 2011 UN 
report, the epidemic “was caused by a confluence of circumstances…and was not the 
fault of, or deliberate action of, a group or individual.”39 Yet, this report confirmed the 
human and geographic origin of the outbreak, the lack of proper sanitation at Mirebalis, 
the biotype of the infection, and the lack of appropriate health inspection protocols at 
Mirebalis thereby validating much of FADISMA’s story.40 Certainly, the number of 
‘unintentional’ circumstances in this context is considerable: bacteria, weather, 
infrastructural decay, water flow, global travel patterns, earthquakes, states of exception, 
and disorganization. The UN reply recognizes only a selection of these factors as a 
‘confluence of circumstances.’ By contrast, FADISMA expands the list to include 
organizational mistakes, but neglects many other ‘unconsidered’ circumstances such as 
inequitable development policies, legacies of colonialism, Western supported petty 
dictatorships, structural adjustment policies, plate tectonics, and, of course, feces.41 Thus, 
even when FADISMA deploys the concept of ‘genocide’ it emphasizes only a small 
subset of influential circumstances.  
What is the value of starting with these examples? How could they help us think 
about that ensemble of statements, enunciations, and affectations that form the politics of 
genocide? How might they complicate our understanding of the political responses to 
genocide traditionally proposed by humanitarian movements, states, and international 
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institutions? If, as I have already suggested, the concept of genocide emerges from within 
a larger political assemblage then there is, strictly speaking, no single origin to the 
concept of genocide nor are different invocations of genocide grappling with the same 
thing or idea. What each case illustrates is an example of how the concept of genocide 
operates in this assemblage. Each example shows how the invocation of genocide occurs 
in connection to a complex, multiple, and non-linear history. What ties these stories 
together is the fact that in each case the invocation of ‘genocide’ constitutes a mode of 
politicization that constructs a set of links between an unethical event and set of political 
expectations or demands. Each sample highlights the effort to link the concept of 
genocide to new episodes of destruction and sets up a political conflict over the 
expansion of the concept, a battle over the limits of genocide as a discourse in global 
politics. 
 
The Standard History of Genocide 
The Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin developed the concept of genocide barely 
seventy years ago. He defined genocide as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming 
at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration 
of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and 
the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, 
liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.”42 
Only a few years later, genocide became an artifact of international law with the creation 
of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
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Genocide (UNGC). Over the next half century, genocide became a dominant category 
framing various events of mass violence and inciting political response to atrocity. This 
constitutes nothing short of a veritable explosion in political discourse and it begs the 
question: how do we account for the privileged place the concept of genocide has in 
humanitarian and political discourse?43  
The dominant explanation for this process appears in the work of figures like 
Samantha Power and Jay Winter.44 These authors offer what might be called a 
‘progressive explanation’ of the history of the concept. Their explanation links Lemkin’s 
development of the term in the midst of the Second World War to the slow expansion of 
international society and human rights consciousness. This account maintains that the 
concept was popularized during the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg 
when Lemkin persuaded Allied prosecutors such as Robert Jackson and Harley 
Shawcross to include the word ‘genocide’ in the formal indictment of the Major War 
Criminals.45 Only two years after the conclusion of the trial, the progressive explanation 
continues, the international community recognized the imperative of preventing the 
annihilation of national groups and made genocide a formal part of international law with 
the adoption of the UNGC in 1948.46 The UNGC redefined genocide as “any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious 
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44 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
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bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.”47 Unfortunately, this explanation continues, the 
failure of the US to ratify the UNGC undermined the convention’s credibility and, even 
after the Proxmire Act was finally enacted in 1988, American reservations and attitudes 
continued to hamper international response to genocide. It wasn’t until the Rwandan 
Genocide and the transparent failure of the West to intervene that genocide found lasting 
traction in international consciousness. Then, the explanation clarifies, the popularization 
of the concept was a byproduct of the fervent labors of human rights advocates who 
consistently fought for the expansion of international law in the face of apathetic states 
that refused to intervene in humanitarian crises out of self-interest.48 
 According to this narrative, the critical task of genocide prevention now involves 
working on ‘political will’ to stimulate public demands to oblige powerful states to 
respond to genocide. The primary means for achieving this goal is a campaign centered 
on more ‘communication,’ ‘information,’ and ‘awareness’ concerning genocide, a 
persuasive effort that relies on the production of a brutal menagerie of thanatographic 
images and rhetorics. The ‘lesson’ of this media is quite simple: this is what genocide 
looks like, this must be stopped, all we lack is the political determination, and so you 
should speak out. The history of the concept of genocide is thereby tied to the recognition 
of genocide’s existence in the world, the expansion of international consciousness about 
the status of human welfare, and the role of democratic political agency in overcoming 
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this predicament.49 
There are many problems with this account. First, the narrative offers no explanation 
of how or why genocide became a popular political concept at all. Instead, the 
explanation presumes that the concept’s utility or self-evident importance in light of the 
Nazi crimes led to change thereby substituting historical contingency for moral and 
logical necessity. Second, it fails to interrogate the concept of genocide as a term that 
draws on certain discourses about humanity, identity and the state and sets aside the 
question of why these discourses make ‘genocide’ appealing in contrast to other terms 
such as ‘crimes against humanity’ or ‘universal human rights.’ Third, the history offered 
by this explanation is simply too linear. From the moment Lemkin developed the 
concept, the international community is presented as progressively becoming more 
receptive to humanitarian ideals as the world witnesses more and more grotesque human 
behavior. Implicitly, this narrative treats humanitarian ideals and violent imagery as 
possessing some kind of intrinsic persuasive force. This assumption justifies ignoring the 
bumpy, complex and discontinuous transformations of concept of genocide in global 
politics while justifying a series of unforgiving and cynical judgments about the 
international community’s response to atrocities. These judgments cast the problem of 
genocide as one of ‘political will’ and ‘non-intervention’ while setting aside complex and 
vexing questions like how genocides emerge in the first place. Indeed, this explanation 
frames the problem of genocide in a fundamentally reactive way. The narrative is always 
centered on how we failed to prevent genocide, but never about the creation of genocide 
since the latter might disturb the structure of a progressive history. The argument that 
domestic publics need to speak out in order to force states to intervene also relies on the 
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claim that genocide is never spoken about in public. In a textbook example of the 
Foucaultian ‘repressive hypothesis,’ the statement that genocide has been systematically 
repressed belies the fact that we talk about it frequently, that ‘genocide’ has lately 
become a mainstay language in humanitarian politics.50 Fourth, the explanation refers to 
only a select group of well-documented historical genocides. In Power’s work, for 
instance, the Armenian, Nazi, Cambodian, and Rwandan genocides are discussed in great 
detail along with genocide in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia.51 Other episodes of 
historical mass murder such as the destruction of indigenous peoples in the Americas, the 
massacres in Indonesia in the 1960s or the extermination of the Herero and Nama peoples 
in German Southwest Africa, events that challenge the progressive arc of this narrative, 
receive little or no attention. The dominant explanation thus selects specific cases of 
genocide according to intuitive sensibilities about what events matter to a global public. 
Lastly, this explanation never discusses the historical debates and contestations over of 
genocide. Instead, the history is framed as a fight between two sides over the response to 
genocide. This framing positions the concept of genocide as a priori productive. In this 
way, genocide, as an object of knowledge, is accepted in ‘good faith’ as a kind of 
‘common sense’ without investigating the implications of different interpretations of 
genocide. In sum, this explanation, which claims to answer the question of how genocide 
became such an important concept, presupposes the utility and importance of the concept 
while offering a history of the concept’s origin that actively erases the historical 
transformations or becoming of the concept. I argue that these transformations are critical 
for understanding how genocide became into an expression for politicizing various forms 
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of violence, privation, and destruction. 
 
The Normative Understanding of Genocide 
Many of the problems with the progressive explanation derive from the tacit 
assumption that genocide is a self-evident concept. This assumption neglects the fact that 
concepts never exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are a set of historical references and 
practices of articulation that change over time. I refer to the assumption that genocide is a 
self-evident concept that can be objectively defined as ‘the normative understanding of 
genocide.’ The normative understanding of genocide is not a single definition of the 
concept, but a form of discursive practice that presumes that the concept of genocide may 
be defined by more or less objective criteria, has stable political implications, and can be 
used to differentiate and compare episodes of human misery.52 Some features of the 
normative understanding of genocide include an assumption that the production of 
knowledge about genocide happens in a neutral fashion, that invocations of genocide 
ought to prompt specific forms of political action, and that genocide is subject to precise 
definition, categorization, systematization and application. I argue that the normative 
understanding reproduces dominant forms of power by conceptualizing genocide in 
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hegemonic terms. In this way, the normative understanding transforms genocide into a 
concept demarcated by an unquestionable ‘common sense’ and a faith that the invocation 
of the concept will lead to a politics defined by ‘good sense’ 53 The normative 
understanding appears in numerous forms in academic writing, court systems, histories, 
and activist movements. Unfortunately, the normative understanding also lends support to 
a mode of interventionist politics that I argue generates new problems for global politics. 
More importantly, the reproduction of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ limits the 
intelligibility of the concept of genocide to specific episodes, forms, and modes of 
destruction and violence.  
 I am not the first one to identify the existence of the normative understanding of 
genocide. Indeed, many scholars in the emergent field of critical genocide studies have 
called attention to the normative deployment of the concept of genocide.54 Dirk Moses, 
for instance, illustrates how the study of genocide paradigmatically appeals to the 
example of the Holocaust in order to advance a normative account of mass death.55 
Moses links this paradigm to the historical and disciplinary neglect of colonial and settler 
genocides. Christian Gerlach, in contrast, views genocide as a term tied to nationalist 
identity projects, which support conservative, exclusionary projects.56 Gerlach’s research 
abandons the constraints of the term genocide for the broader, arguably more complex 
category of ‘extremely violent societies.’ Jacques Semelin similarly decides to focus on 
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‘massacre’ as a more concrete epistemological object than genocide while retaining 
genocide as a broader umbrella term.57 According to Semelin, this provides scholars with 
greater flexibility because they avoid the onerous moral baggage linked to the concept of 
genocide. Martin Shaw likewise identifies genocide as an abstract idea without specific 
content and criticizes overtly deterministic interpretations of the concept.58 Shaw draws 
attention to how the proliferation of new categories such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ or 
‘ethnocide’ reflect a lack of engagement with the multiplicity of forms of violence 
potentially brought together by genocide.59 In a slightly different vein, Scott Straus, 
David Moshman, and Ernesto Veredja have all called attention to the contestable or 
ambiguous nature of the concept of genocide.60 However, these scholars make note of 
this contestable character in order to call for the creation of a clearer, more stable 
research agenda. In some respects, despite the critical engagement with the concept of 
genocide, the tendency of this scholarship is to reproduce aspects of the normative 
understanding of genocide by calling either for a refinement of genocide as an epistemic 
object or for the moral sanctity of the concept in contemporary politics. In this respect, 
critical genocide studies opt to indict a particular understanding or definition of genocide 
rather than the broader discursive practice (which includes numerous possible definitions 
of genocide) that I call the normative understanding. By analyzing this larger ensemble of 
statements and forces surrounding genocide, this project not only shows the limits of 
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specific definitions of genocide, but the force competing conceptions of genocide have in 
a broader political field. Put differently, the value of this project is that it treats the 
normative understanding less as a regulatory concept, which describes the limits of 
genocide and more a disparate, yet recently emergent practice with productive effects in a 
variety of social contexts. Indeed, in some respects the focus on the limits of the UNGC 
definition of genocide or an imagined ‘standard’ definition reflects an unwillingness to 
take seriously the multiple invocations of genocide already at work within political 
discourse.  
 Fortunately, there is a long history within academic, legal, and popular contexts of 
experimenting with the concept of genocide in novel fashions, of plugging the concept 
into distinct circumstances or linking genocide with different problems. I call this series 
of alternative invocations of genocide the ‘minor’ tradition. By ‘minor’ I refer to 
invocations of the concept that do not consider the term self-evident or rely on normative 
judgments regarding the proper use of the term.61 The minor tradition twists, stretches, 
experiments, and deploys the concept of genocide in new ways. The minor is 
quintessentially inventive and, unlike the normative understanding, does not attempt to 
systematize the concept. As such, no stable set of criteria describes the exact parameters 
of the minor tradition. Instead, the minor tradition involves a disparate set of the battles, 
contestations, and conflicts over the term, attempts to apply the concept to new groups or 
forms of destruction, and to use ‘genocide’ to expand the limits of political intelligibility. 
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The minor tradition exposes how the normative understanding of genocide relies on a 
problematic, often exclusionary deployment of the concept. It highlights the contingent 
and problematic nature of the concept genocide as well as the practical consequences it 
has for politics. In the worst case, the normative understanding of genocide intersects 
with forms of social abandonment that aggravate the deprivation and destruction of forms 
of life not considered worthy of being subject to ‘genocide,’ a determination that the 
‘minor’ tradition calls into question. The minor traditional also stresses to the ways in 
which the normative understanding of genocide has transformed the discourse of 
genocide into a tool for crafting new forms of exclusionary proto-nationalist identity that 
fuse collective injury to territorial rights.62 Investigating the emergence of the concept of 
genocide, the forms of attachment it creates to structures of political thought and practice, 
is thus all the more important because even the most noble aspirations regarding the 
prevention of genocide may foreclose political alternatives and deepen inequity.  
 At the outset, I want to reiterate that the normative understanding of genocide is not a 
single definition of genocide, but a type of practice that subscribes to the self-evidence of 
genocide and predicates politics on this understanding.  As I previously argued, a 
diversity of ‘normative understandings’ of the concept exist and they emphasize different 
historical events, variables, and behavioral theories.63 Nonetheless, this diversity is 
founded upon a belief in the self-evidence of genocide that bypasses any explanation for 
how and why the concept circulates or any need to inquire about the productive effects of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 23-24. 
63 In some respects, the normative understanding marks the moment when genocide became an object of 
knowledge in social science and humanities and, as such, became subject to a new series of epistemological 
interventions. Nonetheless, genocide is a strange object even when read in this context because it contains a 
certain combination of moral urgency and epistemic indeterminacy that make the call to normative 
judgment more potent. 
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this discourse. The general project of this dissertation is to examine the concept of 
genocide with more care, relaxing the normative impulse, in order to explore how the 
concept forms relations over time and see how these relations implicate contemporary 
politics.  
 But why would such an analysis be valuable? Particularly one that admits 
messiness, conflicts, and complexities or focuses more on the imitative replication or 
reproduction of a concept rather than the graphic and horrifying events it describes. At 
first glance, the sheer moral significance of an event like genocide, ‘the crime of crimes,’ 
seems to outweigh any quibbling over the definition of the concept. Furthermore, isn’t a 
stable definition of the concept essential for international litigation or social scientific 
enterprise? These are important questions, but they start from the assumption that the 
concept of genocide already has a relatively stable meaning.64 This assumption, which 
derives in part from the existence of the UNGC, has several problems. First, the concept 
of genocide’s evolution in formal disputes has been a nearly continuous part of its 
development, even after the ratification of the UNGC, as scholars and international courts 
continue to rework the term and apply it to different circumstances. The heated debate 
over the inclusion of ‘cultural genocide’ in the UNGC attests to the significance of these 
kinds of conflicts.65 Second, beyond this explicitly legal setting, genocide has undergone 
a process of mutation as it has detached from one context and connected with others. This 
less formal process of conceptual evolution forms an equally important if neglected part 
of the story of how genocide became an important political concept. Third, this 
assumption presumes that language remains constant across disparate circumstances. In 
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this sense, it assumes that genocide operates as a kind of ideal-type language when the 
concept actually emerges in disparate and heterogeneous forms. Taking genocide as a 
term to describe mass atrocity thus accounts for only one subset of the disparate places 
genocide appears in political life. 
 Indeed, in both formal and informal contexts, the concept of genocide retains a 
definite element of ambiguity that has practical consequences for the negotiation of the 
politics of genocide. For instance, consider the application of the label ‘genocide’ to a 
political event. Numerous examples in the past two decades suggest that this is an 
incredibly fraught process. From the Clinton administration’s systematic unwillingness to 
use the term in response to the killings in Rwanda, to the Bush administration’s 
declaration of the genocide in Darfur (a designation later called into question by the UN’s 
Commission of Inquiry), labeling has become an important, yet politically dubious 
exercise.66 This ambiguity is multidimensional since it involves haziness about ongoing 
events, conceptual confusion about the semantic content of genocide, and uncertainties 
regarding the performative force of the concept once invoked.67 The ambiguity of 
genocide thus operates on several levels. In contrast, the normative understanding of 
genocide views the enunciation of genocide as a straightforward process where calling 
something genocide is simply stating ‘the facts’ and demands subsequent international 
intervention. This knee-jerk reaction neglects how political discourse amplifies the 
production of certain subjectivities, relations or domination. As examples such as the 
deployment of UN forces to Srebrenica indicate, the unintended consequences of 
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humanitarian intervention can intensify hostilities or accelerate political violence.68  
 Moreover, if the normative understanding’s ‘objectivity’ emerges from socially or 
historically encoded beliefs then a set of dominant assumptions influence any campaign 
to label an event as genocide so that an episode of violence becomes ‘actionable’ only 
when it conforms to a group of implicit presuppositions. This exclude a priori many 
forms of gratuitous social destruction, which do not resemble the normative 
understanding’s vision of genocide. Furthermore, these presuppositions link our image of 
genocide to older, sometimes outdated conceptions of identity or political violence. As a 
result, the evolution of new techniques of violence, a process constantly underway, may 
outpace a stale, normative understanding that ties genocide to the past. For example, 
images of the Nazi genocide with its bureaucracy, ghettoization, and gas chambers 
generated a set of expectations about what genocide would look like that made it more 
difficult to see the budding potential for genocide in Rwanda despite the fact that Rwanda 
was later determined to be one of the fastest processes of mass killing in recorded 
history.69 In this case, Eurocentric assumptions and development prejudices rendered 
claims regarding the veracity of violence in Rwanda less credible. The presuppositions 
surrounding the normative understanding of genocide foreclose a more complex picture 
of the genocide in question and make it difficult to see that the emergence of genocide is 
always already a multidimensional process.70  
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 The normative understanding makes genocide actionable not only with respect to 
the present or future, but also in connection to the past. The importance of memorial 
politics, which takes the form of historical archives, personal testimonies, national 
museums, and international financial debts, have grown alongside the politics of 
genocide. While states have always safeguarded certain mytho-poetic narratives, 
genocide offers a new site of collective identification that narrates the historical 
relationship between state power and group identity.71 Since genocide is often a 
retrospective determination, the concept plays a powerful role in reconstituting identity 
by offering a motif for understanding the past defined by unforgiveable pain or trauma 
and linking this pain to obligations in the present.72 In this way, the normative 
understanding freezes the relationship between historical injury and political obligations 
by treating historical episodes of mass violence as morally superseding all other 
considerations. As a consequence, writing national (or global) history in the terms of 
genocide has become a popular exercise. This mnemonic practice often incubates new 
types of social exclusion by recasting the descendants of former genocidaires as pariahs 
unworthy of political consideration. The rapid transformation of ‘victims into killers’ 
demonstrates how the normative understanding of genocide can exacerbate rifts and 
antagonism thereby extending cycles of retribution by turning the past into a moral 
affront to the present.73 
 At the same time, genocide denial, buttressed by normative understandings of 
genocide that limit the concept to so-called ‘major genocides,’ works as a strategy for 
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setting aside the political claims of indigenous, enslaved, and colonized peoples.74 In this 
sense, the normative understanding, which proactively decries genocide, often remains 
silent about the ongoing relationship between historical genocides and the present. This 
illustrates how the normative understanding is caught up in the reproduction of political 
domination because the urgency of ‘remembering’ some episodes of genocide stands in 
stark contrast to the inertial forgetting of others. Indeed, these three practices: labeling 
contemporary events; intervening in genocide; and classifying the past, set the stage for a 
different mode of political conflict in both domestic and global contexts. In each case, the 
normative understanding restricts the conceptual evolution of genocide with problematic 
consequences. Exploring the concept of genocide in a broader assemblage is thus integral 
to thinking through this ‘turn to genocide.’ 
The resistance to thinking about genocide beyond the normative understanding is 
quite plain. Even genocide scholars who critique the definition offered by the UNGC 
remain inspired by the prospect of the normative understanding of genocide and the 
politics that follow.75 The normative understanding is viewed as essential for identifying, 
prosecuting, and preventing genocide since any ambiguity regarding the term may open 
the door for grotesque manipulation. Others argue that preserving a restricted definition is 
necessary to avoid using the term inappropriately and depreciating ‘real episodes of 
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genocide.’76 However, both of these arguments rest on a historical fallacy that the 
concept of genocide has been relatively unchanged. Many scholars who make this 
argument leverage the force of law, but nonetheless highlight the considerable 
interpretive difficulties that the UNGC continues to pose.77 We might refer to this as the 
‘common sense’ appeal of the normative understanding. 
In contrast, many scholars and activists also endorse the normative understanding out 
of a sense of moral urgency. Corey Robin’s provides an excellent summary of this moral 
sentiment:  
“It threatens something too vital, too fundamental. It puts at risk one of the 20th century’s 
most precarious moral ideas: the notion that despite no longer having an objective or 
shared foundation for our sense of what is good or right or just, we do know what is evil. 
And because we know that, because there is no dispute that genocide is not merely evil 
but the ultimate evil-the summum malum, as the political theorist Judith Shklar would 
have called it- we can build our politics and our morals with some assurance that we are 
doing the right thing, or at least not the wrong thing.”78  
 
What Robin captures is the lingering sense that the normative understanding serves as a 
kind of last resort or final foundation for contemporary political life. We might refer to 
this as the ‘good sense’ appeal of the normative understanding. Here too, the historical 
variation of the concept of genocide calls into question the apparent moral clarity 
provided by the concept. More importantly, using the normative understanding of 
genocide as a kind of new foundation for political life raises the question of how the form 
and content of the normative understanding subsequently shape political subjectivity, 
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desires, and expectations. Far from a bulwark against mass violence, the use of genocide 
as a foundation for politics, as the final chapter explores in great detail, reflects a cynical 
or nihilistic development within contemporary politics where the call to protect values 
paradoxically arises from their failure. This cynical or nihilist reaction tends to view 
genocide exclusively as a thematic of universal tragedy and ignores the multiplicity of 
efforts to deploy the concept of genocide to contest inequities and politicize conditions of 
misery. In short, the nihilist reaction disregards the emergence of genocide as a concept 
with a capacity for affirmation.79   
 Indeed, if the history of the concept were examined with greater scrutiny, scholars 
might discover that since the 1940s genocide has appeared in numerous civic struggles, 
books, myths, courtrooms, pamphlets, museums, movements, artworks, fantasies, and 
military campaigns. These plural invocations of the concept problematize the normative 
understanding’s development of genocide as a reference to only a few episodes of mass 
violence that primarily took place in Nazi Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and Rwanda. 
They point to the possibility for alternative styles of thinking and engaging genocide and, 
as a consequence, different potentials for political life.  These plural invocations of 
genocide pose a threat to advocates of the normative understanding because they 
destabilize the discursive, epistemological, and moral hegemony of the concept. 
Consequently, the normative understanding works to police the boundaries of the 
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concept, to regulate these ambiguities, and to prevent conceptual experimentation.80 This 
exercise appears unproblematic because it is informed by a form of unspoken ‘sense’ that 
unconsciously guides the development of the normative understanding by making 
everyday observations about genocide seem natural, intuitive and generalizable. The 
plural invocations of genocide not only clutter the clarity and precision of this exercise, 
they also attest to other senses of genocide, senses that offer different values, different 
ways of considering the intelligibility and significance of an event.  
 However, the existence of plural invocations of genocide also provokes a further 
question: given this plurality, how did a normative understanding of genocide develop at 
all? I contend that the normative understanding reflects a set of dispositions about the 
legal definition of the concept of genocide (and the importance of law more generally), 
an unquestioning faith in the power of epistemological clarity and transcendent morality, 
and, lastly, an attempt to undermine the explosive implications that the concept of 
genocide has for the organization of global politics at the broadest levels. Indeed, perhaps 
above all else, the normative understanding constitutes genocide as a site for the 
development of new modes of political governance or control by delimiting the set of 
conditions under which we can claim that a grievous, destructive atrocity took place. In 
this regard, the normative understanding constitutes a biopolitical or thanatopolitical 
discourse that governs life by exerting control over the aesthetics of when a group’s life 
or death becomes significant. By doing so, the normative understanding resonates with a 
larger project of integrating episodes of mass death into a progressive story about the 
present, but also solidifying the control of this present. Unsurprisingly, advocates of the 
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normative understanding frequently revert to a cynical refrain about the complexity, 
contingency, and uncertainty of social life and strive to eliminate these conditions in 
favor of a politics of immediate comprehension and intervention, a politics without 
conflict or dispute, a politics without politics.  
 
Overview of the Project 
 The basic purpose of this dissertation is to study the assemblage that produces, 
reiterates, and rearticulates the concept of genocide and flesh out the implications of this 
assemblage for contemporary politics. To do so, the dissertation explores the production 
of the concept of genocide as a form of knowledge in order to discover what Michel 
Foucault called the “rules of formation” that emerge for making statements about 
genocide.81 In this regard, the project approaches concepts as more than flimsy human 
devices for representing the world and, instead, treats them as generative of political 
relations. In a sense, a concept is a machine composed of different constitutive parts and, 
just like a machine whose different levers or pulleys cooperatively enable it to perform a 
specific, a concept’s parts enable it to describe an event or formulate a problem.82 These 
parts include schemata, relations to other references and ideas as well as modes of 
articulation, sounds, vocalizations, and spaces of articulation. The efficacy of a concept is 
bound up with the interaction of these parts. However, tracking these disparate 
components of the concept is a difficult task. To simplify the project, the dissertation 
examines a survey of three different parts or components of the concept genocide: the 
group, destruction, and intent. These parts consistently reappear as features of the 
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articulation of genocide while varying in form, content, and relation to broader political 
context. While these parts are certainly not exhaustive of the concept genocide they 
nonetheless constitute critical dimensions of the concept, which appear in determinate, 
institutionalized, and normalized forms. Furthermore, it is the interaction between these 
different parts that I argue distinguishes genocide as a concept by rendering intelligible a 
new set of political problems.83 
 The different parts of the concept undergo historical change and variation. They 
interact in new ways, refer to novel events, and generate alternate aesthetics for 
expressing the concept. For example, the part of genocide dealing with ‘destruction’ 
transforms with the development of new tools of violence or shifts in the understanding 
of what constitutes ‘violence.’ The ongoing variation of the concept’s parts changes the 
articulation and significance of the concept. What individualizes a concept is thus an 
emergent property of the interaction of the parts. Following Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, I refer to this emergent dimension of a concept as its ‘consistency.’84 A 
concept’s consistency is not reducible to any part of the concept, but instead expresses a 
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sense regarding the existence of a problem that traverses different invocations of the 
concept. In the discipline of International Relations, for instance, ‘power’ is a concept 
characterized by consistency. Despite widespread disagreement over the definition or 
meaning of power, statements invoking the concept of ‘power’ mark a problem. The 
problem incites discourse, but also has an objective existence independent of any 
particular instance of this discourse. This is why problems endure in disciplinary history 
despite numerous attempts to resolve them. In the case of genocide, the interaction of the 
parts enables the concept to articulate a new kind of horrific event or problem. By making 
a problem intelligible, the concept enables the creation of new techniques, practices, and 
mechanisms of political activity. In this sense, a concept’s consistency is productive of a 
set of differential relationships that redistribute the social field and generate new forms of 
politics. 
 Concepts also have a kind of independent agency in political life. While a concept 
is a linguistic construction that survives by being continually reproduced as a set of 
sounds, utterances, and expressions, a concept also touches upon concrete events in a 
mind-independent world. The concept is thus always synthetic: forging connections 
between expression and the world. The interaction between the linguistic and extra or 
pre-linguistic aspects of the concept is a dimension of concepts, which I, following Gilles 
Deleuze, refer to as ‘sense.’85 Sense is not a term for a specific faculty such as sight, 
sound or prioperception. Rather, sense refers to the formation of intelligibility. Sense 
produces the conditions for the articulation of discourse by linking together a series of 
heterogeneous elements. It is the genetic element underlying the emergence of 
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consistency.86 In the case of concepts, sense does the work of entering the different parts 
of the concept into connection with one another. This process occurs beneath the 
thresholds of consciousness by linking disparate elements, series or themes together. 
Indeed, there is nothing natural about connecting notions such as ‘destruction’ and 
‘groups’ to one another, but sense links these elements in order to express a problem. 
These links develop as a product of a series of contingent encounters and slowly mold 
into intelligible forms that can later be institutionalized or normalized. For instance, 
Lemkin’s development of genocide, which links together groups, destruction, and desire, 
emerges from a transformation in sense connected to his discovery of a certain disparity 
or dissonance in the juridico-political order. In particular, Lemkin articulates a sense of 
disjunction between the fact that a person could legally be held accountable for the 
murder of a single person, but not for the murder of a group. The formation of the 
problem hinges on the intelligibility of this disparity, a sense of the law’s capacity to 
punish at one scale, but not at another. This disparity led Lemkin to a sense of law and 
social order being ‘out-of-joint’ and experiment with entering different social phenomena 
into communication with one another. Certainly, the articulation of this problem responds 
to an event, in this case the atrocities in Armenian, but concepts also facilitate the 
formulation of this event into a political problem.87 The politics of concepts thus hinges 
on the effort to institute an exclusive sense as ‘natural,’ by setting the terms and 
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conditions of political discourse.  
 The focus on sense further complicates this study in two ways. First, as a product 
of a contingent encounter, the creation of sense involves an unaccountable dimension. 
Abrupt swerves, shifts, and transitions in the logic of sense and the significance of 
concepts are therefore inevitable and important in any history of a concept. Yet, these 
changes often elude simple explanation. Sometimes what now appears as nonsense was at 
one time sense and, at others, what appears sensible was utter nonsense. The fact that one 
regime of sense emerges from a prior period of non-sense means that the product, sense, 
does not resemble its conditions of possibility, nonsense. Practically, this means tracing 
the history of the concept has to attend to divergent senses rather than assuming a 
singular sense guides the concept to a better end. Second, sense is necessarily in a process 
of variation because it emerges in response to concrete changes in the world. The 
apprehension of these events by sense consequently concerns how events are given as 
much as what events are given. This demonstrates that the battle over different 
understandings of genocide cannot be reduced simply to a question of which groups are 
or are not recognized as subjects of genocide, but also at a deeper level to changes in the 
formation of political intelligibility over time. As a consequence, the normative 
understanding works not only to exclude some episodes of genocide from political 
discussion, but, more importantly, to institute an exclusive form of sense to register 
genocide in political experience.  
 Since transformations of sense emerge in the context of a larger political 
assemblage a linear account of these changes will not explain the birth or transformation 
of the politics of genocide. The survey of the concept of genocide offered by this 
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dissertation is thus driven by episodes and moments, discursive formations and structures 
of sense rather than linear history: it is inclusive of events, but also attends to changes in 
unarticulated perceptions. What this dissertation ultimately demonstrates is that the 
emergence of the concept of genocide responds to a horrific, destructive event that poses 
a new problem for politics and engendered a crisis of sense. Genocide, as a concept, 
formalizes this problem and expresses this sense. In contrast, the normative 
understanding of genocide freeze sense and, in doing so, exercises a power of decision on 
what forms of life count as politically valuable. Fortunately, the dissertation argues that 
the concept of genocide marks the invention of form of sense that break with these 
decisions by politicizing the emergence of new forms of destruction in global politics.  
 The dissertation proceeds in four chapters. The next three chapters each deal with 
a specific ‘part’ of the concept of genocide: the group, destruction, and desire. Each 
chapter examines different interpretations of genocide, from Lemkin’s creation to 
contemporary invocations, in order to try and discover how this part operates by linking 
together different ideas, histories, events, or motifs in the process of ‘making sense’ of 
genocide. The goal of each chapter is to peer into the process of how unarticulated 
presuppositions play a formative role in shaping scholarly and political enunciations of 
genocide. Each chapter likewise describes a series of problems that emerge from different 
invocations of the term and illustrates how these problems impact global governance, 
humanitarian intervention, and everyday political life. The final chapter addresses the 
politics of genocide more broadly. It describes the development of a cynical refrain 
structured by a nihilistic engagement with the concept of genocide. The chapter 
demonstrates how this refrain derives from a specific regime of sense. Using the work of 
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Gilles Deleuze, the chapter contends that this sense is still in an incipient form and can 
thus continue the work of challenging a particularly stale understanding of genocide. 
More specifically, it argues that the concept of genocide expresses a sense of political 
experience that is not merely tragic, but horrific, emphasizing the contingency and 
destructiveness of political entanglements. It explores the value of this sense of the 
horrific for engaging in global politics. As such, genocide constitutes a new motif for 
thinking through ethical receptivity in a world continually inventing new modes and 
processes of destruction. 
The next chapter begins by discussing the ‘group’ part of genocide. It argues that 
the notion of the group distinguishes genocide as a specific type of crime. The chapter 
demonstrates how the importance of the group reflects a broader shift in political life to 
prioritize identity as a foundation for community. Moreover, the chapter reveals how 
different iterations of the notion of the group reproduce particular tropes of identity in 
order to ground their determination of the subject of genocide. The chapter thus opens 
with a discussion of Lemkin’s initial efforts to describe the notion of the group and his 
moves from the language of ‘social collective’ to ‘national minority.’ It illustrates how 
Lemkin’s notion of the group depends on an aesthetic regiment that views groups as 
contributing to world culture and discusses Lemkin’s efforts to ground group identity in 
terms of analogy. The chapter shifts from Lemkin’s work to the development of the 
UNGC and likewise tracks a change from analogous understanding of identity to an 
allegedly objective series of predicates of identity. This change, the chapter argues, 
comes with a series of restrictions designed to inoculate the great powers from their own 
policies of colonial and totalitarian domination. From there, the chapter moves to 
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contemporary efforts to think group identity as a form of social construction and as a 
statistical category. In each, the chapter discerns a reformulation of identity in terms of 
resemblance. The chapter summarizes the relationship between identity and genocide by 
isolating how the motif of identity delimits the set of groups who can invoke or claim 
status as a subject to genocide. The chapter concludes by describing on how these limits 
inform practices of contemporary humanitarian intervention and relief work.  
The second chapter addresses the question of destruction. The chapter begins by 
discussing Lemkin’s early writings on the relationship genocide, war, and homicide and 
his elaboration of different ‘techniques of destruction.’ These writings disclose Lemkin’s 
penchant to think of destruction as a multifaceted process rather than a discrete or 
isolated act. The chapter compares these to several different drafts and the final text of 
the UNGC in order to describe the dramatic reduction in the number of acts considered 
constitutive of genocide. This reduction, the chapter argues, results from an attempt to 
insulate the set of biopolitical tools previously described by Lemkin from political 
scrutiny. The chapter thus describes how the text of the UNGC filtered into genocide 
research in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s in the form of the normative understanding, 
which typically thought of genocide as mass physical killing. The chapter argues that the 
normative understanding conceals a productive or germinal dimension of destruction, 
which Lemkin sought to describe with the concept of genocide. It also contrasts the 
normative understanding with the minor tradition, which redevelops notions like cultural 
or social destruction. The chapter concludes by illustrating how the productive dimension 
of destruction implicates the politics of genocide and how the normative understanding 
inadvertently renders invisible this emergent dimension of genocide.  
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 The fourth chapter examines the notion of intent. In particular, the chapter focuses 
on how the politics of genocide focuses on the construction of intent across different 
periods of genocide scholarship. Intent, the chapter contends, brings together a set of 
epistemological, causal, and moral relationships in order to define a subject of genocide. 
In the context of genocide, this chapter argues intent establishes a mechanism for 
supporting the designation of crime, but it also elides the complexity of any event of 
genocide. As a consequence, the concept of genocide gets connected to specific leaders, 
mad men, lunatics, or dictators who unilaterally exterminate entire populations rather 
than the transformation of political conditions of which these are contingent 
actualizations. Like the previous chapters, Lemkin’s work on the nature of ‘planning’ 
offers a starting point for describing the work of intent. His theories are compared with 
the subsequent development of the UNGC and later normative schemas of intent and 
intentionality. More broadly, the chapter engages how the normative understanding 
facilitates a recent transformation in the politics of genocide from an interest in 
preventing genocide to preempting genocide. This agenda, in turn, supports a new series 
of security and governance practices such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with 
indeterminate consequences on global politics. The chapter concludes by showing how 
genocide functions to produce new forms of global governance and security politics. 
The final chapter of the dissertation describes the cynicism and passive nihilism 
of the politics of genocide, which structure many aspects of the contemporary responses 
to mass atrocity. The chapter contends that the cynical dimensions of the political of 
genocide derive from a specific structure of sense, which imparts value and significance 
to political relations. The chapter turns to Gilles Deleuze’s work The Logic of Sense in 
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order to describe the formation of sense and the way in which sense constitutes the 
intelligibility of events. Drawing from this account, the chapter links Lemkin’s 
development of the term to the emergence of a novel-sense event. Genocide, the chapter 
argues, hails this event as well as its horrific capacities to transform social and political 
relations into a site of their unmaking. In this regard, the chapter views horror as a sense 
constitutive of genocide. Read in this light, the normative understanding works to 
disavow and secure the sense of horror linked to genocide. However, by doing so the 
normative understanding strips the event of its productive dimensions and, inadvertently, 
sealing its own failures to generate a new form of politics. This failure, the chapter 
laments, explains the perpetual difficulty the normative understanding confronts in the 
problem of mass violence. In contrast, the chapter argues the sense of horror at work 
should serve as a call for the invention of new forms of political experience and caution 
regarding the most basic of political categories. In the context of genocide, it argues, this 
would involve an openness to the potential for genocide to actualize in previously 
unforeseen ways and, in some respects, to view this as a vital part of the architecture of 
any biopolitical or thanatopolitical condition. The chapter concludes by illustrating how 
this shift in sense would change the intelligibility of genocide in the context of climate 
change, planetary urbanization, and the industrial production of meat. 
 
Genocide and International Relations 
Before continuing it is important to ask what the value of this project is for the 
study of international politics especially because of the marginal life genocide has had as 
a topic in International Relations. Many of the scholarly ‘precursors’ to International 
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Relations, from Machiavelli and Kant to E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, commented on 
the dangerous implications of horrific political violence long before the creation of the 
concept of genocide. In chapter VIII of The Prince, for example, Machiavelli warns about 
the dangers of treachery and cruelty and argues against including men who commit such 
deeds in the canon of exceptional princes.88 Similarly, in his elaboration of the perpetual 
peace, Kant indicts the disturbing developments of “wars of extermination,” which 
unsettle the prospect of cosmopolitanism and republicanism to the core.89 Still more 
recently, Hans Morgenthau critiqued the appearance of ‘technologically dehumanized’ 
warfare. In one edition of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau writes that war was 
becoming a fight for “a ‘way of life,’ and “the distinctions between fighting and disabled 
soldiers, combatants and civilians-if they are not eliminated altogether- [will be] 
subordinated to the one distinction that really matters: the distinction between the 
representatives of the right and the wrong philosophy and ‘way of life.”90 Morgenthau 
felt the growth of this form of war “was bound to be morally dehumanized” and to 
expand indefinitely.91 While all of these thinkers wrote prior to the popularization of the 
concept of genocide, they each maintained a sense of concern about the potential for 
violence to affect populations in horrific ways.  
The turn to structural accounts of the international system appears to break with 
this trend. By establishing an epistemology predicated on a strict separation of ‘domestic’ 
and ‘international’ systems, structuralism introduced a criterion hypothetically capable of 
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discriminating between different types of state activity. The consequence of this 
development was that the general possibility of war, as conflict between autonomous 
sovereign states, became the purview of International Relations and other forms of state 
activity became domestic matters. In fact, Kenneth Waltz explicitly used the purges of 
Hitler, Stalin, and the Khmer Rouge to exemplify the importance of this disciplinary 
separation. In a late piece, Waltz writes: “Stalin’s purges eliminated five million 
Russians, and Hitler exterminated six million Jews…we easily lose sight of the fact that 
struggles to achieve and maintain power, to establish order, and to contrive a kind of 
justice within states, may be bloodier than the wars among them.” However, Waltz 
continues “the use of force, or the constant fear of its use, is not sufficient grounds for 
distinguishing international from domestic affairs….the difference between national and 
international politics lies not in the use of force but in the different modes of organization 
for doing something about it.”92 Here, Waltz admits the gruesome nature of these affairs, 
but insists on an essential difference between domestic conflict, which can appeal to a 
legitimate and lasting authority and the ‘self-help’ international system that has no 
ultimate authority. The different modes of organization establish the boundary between 
the domestic and international and allegedly require separate forms of inquiry.93  
 While criticizing Waltz has itself become a fashionable disciplinary practice, his 
discussion here reveals the limits of traditional International Relations as it relates to 
genocide. Crafting a strict epistemological separation between the domestic and 
international arenas makes it more difficult to consider how these domains implicate one 
another. With respect to genocide more specifically, Waltz’s argument rests on what 
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Martin Shaw has aptly highlighted as the fallacy of the domestic-international 
distinction.94 The problem with the domestic fallacy is that it offers an impoverished 
account of what constitutes and separates the domestic and international spheres. The 
fallacy ignores how virtually all episodes of historical genocide involve the imbrications 
of both, how they develop within a global context, what role they play in empire and 
nation building projects, their relationship with war, and, more importantly, how they 
involve complex associations of foreignness, difference, and danger.95 This is to say 
nothing of the complexities of an event like the Atlantic Slave Trade, in which genocide 
becomes a principle form of interstate economic activity or the conquest of the Americas 
where the communities destroyed are discounted from Waltz’s ontology. Moreover, the 
realist insight that states fail to act on genocide out of self-interest and the irrelevance of 
morality in power politics overlooks the ways in which genocide emerges as a practice of 
political domination.96  
 The neglect of genocide extends well beyond structural realism. Liberal accounts 
of international politics, while emphasizing the growth of trade, regime development, and 
international cooperation, tend to adopt a progressive account of institutions based on 
their repudiation of genocide and other human rights violation. This engagement, which 
emphasizes the transformative efficacy of liberal institutions, offers little commentary on 
genocide itself and reproduces many of the aspects the progressive history that were 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. More importantly, liberal commentary on 
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genocide rests on two myths. First, it treats liberal institutions as historically based in the 
condemnation of the Nazi experience when, in fact, genocide and crimes against 
humanity were secondary if not peripheral considerations for the Allies in the period of 
postwar institutional development.97 The liberal legacy of opposing genocide is thus a 
contemporary discourse on liberalism as opposed to something there from the beginning. 
Second, liberal accounts overemphasize the attractiveness of humanitarian ideals and 
ignore the relations of power that make concepts attractive in the first place. Thus, while 
some liberal IR theory discusses genocide it tends to do so as part of a larger story of the 
strengthening of the international system in order to emphasize how we have overcome 
or will overcome genocide.98 Even constructivist accounts that treat language, ideology, 
and identity as determinants of international politics tend to reduce genocide to a kind of 
perversion of the growth of international norms and identity. 
 This dissertation, in contrast, argues that IR offers an excellent point for exploring 
the political work of the concept of genocide. First, the creation of the concept of 
genocide and the popularization of this concept occurs in a global context and in 
reference to the elaboration of distinct political imaginaries and global governance 
agendas. In addition, the history of international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations, and humanitarian organizations in the twentieth century invariably evolved 
in relationship to this concept. The remaking of the international as a moral arena in the 
late 1970s, in particular, entails a rediscovery of genocide as a political problem in 
connection the outbreak of mass killing in Cambodia, East Pakistan/Bangladesh, and 
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Uganda.99 In tandem with the outrage over the Vietnam War and the Nixon scandal, these 
episodes animated a search for a moral framework for foreign policy that found 
sustenance in anti-genocide discourse. At the same time, the emergence of Holocaust 
consciousness in the US somewhat separately became a backdrop of American foreign 
policy and was closely entangled with the popular understanding of genocide. In this 
setting, genocide was folded into the broader human rights agenda as part of a uniform 
effort to introduce a new normative framework for global politics.100 The reemergence of 
the rubric of genocide in the 1970s thus needs to be situated in broader changes in the 
conceptualization of ethics as a guiding principle of international politics.  
Second, the phenomena described by the concept of genocide have always 
contained an international or global dimension. Genocide invariably involves questions 
of bounding practices, power, encounters, and state or empire building. From the colonial 
genocides of the Herero and Nama, to the more contemporary genocide in Cambodia, 
global pressure and identity politics play a powerful role in both the framing and 
actualization of these events.101 Even traditional questions of realist power politics have 
been explored as developing a ‘great game’ of genocide between competing powers that 
mimic and replicate one another’s population control policies.102 International politics is 
thus uniquely suited to think about different dimensions of genocide, which are easily 
overlooked in a focus on single states or episodes. Moreover, the emergence of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which underscores the importance of the UNGC in 
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contemporary international law, also suggests genocide has a newfound importance in 
global governance. 
Third, the emergence of the concept of genocide has shaped not only political 
discourse, but also political subjectivity. The identities and obligations of numerous states 
are now connected to the history of genocide. Great experiments in forging new political 
relationships, discussion, and statecraft have appeared in response to genocide. If nothing 
else the power of this concept to remake the relationship between peoples and history, to 
reframe the terms of political life, testifies to a new element of global politics worthy of 
investigation not only as a terrain for conflict, but as symptomatic of deep 
transformations in the articulation of political desire. If so then determinations of 
genocide are not neutral acts, but caught up in a process of deciding when political 
conflicts can and should to take place. What forms of life may be considered valuable or 
defendable. In this sense, the concept of genocide not only connects us to an intimate 
aspect of our identities grounded in historical injury, but also constitutes a battleground 
over the intelligibility and significance of cruelty and death as well as their implications 
for whatever politics are to come. 
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Chapter 2: Groups 
 This chapter discusses what I refer to as the ‘groups’ part of the concept of 
genocide.103 From Raphael Lemkin’s first efforts at formulating the concept, to the 
creation of the UNGC at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, to contemporary debates 
over the classification of the killing in Darfur, the concept of genocide consistently 
emerges in relation to a notion of the ‘group.’ Consequently, the struggle over what 
groups can be or have been subject to genocide is one of the most visible sources of 
conflict surrounding the concept.  Over time, different interpretations of the concept have 
offered distinct standards, criteria, or rubrics for determining when, where, and what 
groups can be recognized as subject to genocide. This chapter explores two dimensions of 
the group part of the concept. First, it analyzes how the notion of the group became 
historically consolidated in the normative understanding of genocide. Second, it 
investigates what investments, political and otherwise, are at stake in thinking of 
genocide as a crime of groups. In general, this chapter argues that the turn to groups 
reflects a broader turn to ground politics in terms of static identity. Unfortunately, this 
development, the chapter argues, depoliticizes genocide and reifies structures of power in 
ways that have severe implications for genocide response and redress efforts. 
 Indeed, the creation of the normative understanding of genocide entails placing 
specific limits on the concept. These limits allegedly safeguard the sanctity of the 
concept, giving it proper form and substance, and ensure that any determination of 
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genocide triggers immediate political intervention. However, the practice of enumerating 
these limits also entails excluding specific groups, and the relations that constitute them, 
from the concept. The determination of what groups may legitimately be represented (or 
represent themselves) as subject to genocide is thus part and parcel of determining what 
forms of life register as politically valuable. These limits not only structure the concept of 
genocide by linking it to explicit characteristics or attributes of a group, such as its racial 
or religious identity, but also involve ‘implicit presuppositions’ that determine the form 
and significance of groups a priori.104 This chapter illustrates how these rules and 
implicit presuppositions develop historically through different iterations of the discourse 
on genocide. In doing so, it exposes the limits of the normative understanding of the 
group and demonstrates the implications of these limits for the politics of genocide.105 
While genocide scholars have long identified the disadvantages of an unlimited 
definition of genocide with respect to the group,106 they often fail to interrogate the 
problems associated with forming a finite conception of the group. This failure is 
understandable because many genocide scholars require a normative definition of the 
group to differentiate criteria, select cases, set up hypothesis, or test causal variables. 
However, genocide scholars often ignore to examine how this scholarly practice also 
constitutes a small, but powerful decision on the importance of certain forms of group 
life. While the force of such a decision rarely affects macropolitics, it frequently folds 
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problematic assumptions about social life into the study of genocide. Questions regarding 
the origin of the ‘group’ thus remain unthought within genocide studies and the politics 
of genocide more broadly. These include questions about why, historically, genocide 
became a crime of groups and how this history impacts contemporary images, 
representations, and narratives of genocide. It also includes the question of what about 
the structure, nature, or function of groups distinguishes their destruction as being worthy 
of a distinct conceptual category. Put differently, the incitement to discourse in terms of 
groups and forms of knowledge and desire underlying the commitment to group identity. 
The chapter demonstrates how the concept of genocide operates as a mechanism of 
knowledge in a complex system that justifies a sovereign decision on the legitimacy, 
coherence and content of group life and, in doing so, determines what forms of life are 
politically valuable. The chapter thus argues that the turn to identity results from a desire 
to render acts of mass violence intelligible and governable thereby disavowing the 
unruliness and complexity of destructive events. However, this insistence on identity 
produces certain paradoxes because the logic of identity, with its emphasis on the 
permanent character of the group, clashes with the possibility introduced by the concept 
of genocide that groups are fundamentally historical, fragile, and subject to 
disappearance. This tension, the chapter argues, conditions contemporary responses to 
genocide and poses a significant limit to any scholarly effort to predetermine the meaning 
of this concept.  
This chapter addresses these issues in five sections. The first section offers the 
historical examples of the Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in 
order to illustrate the consequences of the normative understanding of genocide. In 
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particular, the section demonstrates how a restricted notion of the group produces 
inconsistencies in the global response to mass violence and organizes humanitarian 
spaces in an exclusionary manner. The second section begins to unfold the discursive 
history of the group by examining Raphael Lemkin’s theory of the ‘collective’ or 
‘national minority.’ This section argues that Lemkin’s vision of the group emerged 
through his engagement with cultural theories of minority life in early 20th century 
Poland as well as his extensive historical reading. Despite these influences, Lemkin’s 
construction of the group is highly original. Far from adopting an essentialist vision of 
identity, Lemkin thought of groups as unique entities with distinctive contribution of 
groups to world culture. Lemkin’s notion of the group is thus surprisingly open and 
porous in contrast to later accounts of genocide. Nonetheless, Lemkin directly links his 
notion of the group to a set of normative assertions about identity. In doing so, Lemkin’s 
writings simultaneously lay the groundwork for and challenge the normative 
understanding of the group. The third section traces the changes in the articulation of the 
group from Lemkin to the UNGC. In an abrupt rewriting of the concept, this section 
argues the UNGC replaced Lemkin’s theory with a set of static categories of identity 
(race, religion, ethnicity, and nationality) that predetermined what groups could be 
subject to genocide. These categories rendered genocide a non-issue amongst the great 
powers by effectively granting them (and many other states) legal impunity from 
prosecution on the basis of genocide. The UNGC also directly linked genocide to specific 
identity-based crimes of the past. In a sense, the UNGC constructed genocide in order to 
ground judgments about the past rather than enable prosecutions of mass violence in the 
future. In this regard, the notion of the group at work in the UNGC is, to an extent, self-
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sabotaging. The fourth section addresses two different scholarly responses to the deficits 
of the UNGC’s approach to the group. One approach uses the social construction of 
identity to rethink the group while the other turns to broad statistical aggregates to avoid 
essentialist categories. However, in each case, the reconstruction of the group introduces 
a new set of static identity categories in order to determine what groups are subject to 
genocide. As a result, these responses, which claim to improve on the UNGC’s 
definition, reify exclusive forms of group identity in order to describe genocide. The fifth 
section investigates the consistent relationship between the normative understanding of 
the group and exclusive conceptions of identity in the politics of genocide. It argues that 
the focus on the group distinguishes the concept of genocide as a new form of crime that 
is distinct from other concepts, but does so only by freezing the relationship between 
identity and history. This creates a problem since a static conception of group identity, 
which tends to think identity as ideal, eternal and permanent, stands in tension with the 
historical nature of the crime of genocide, which admits the possibility of a group’s 
destruction or disappearance. As a result, the politics of genocide builds a form of 
lateness into responses to mass violence. Moreover, forms of group life, which do not fit 
within the narrow categories of the normative understanding of genocide, are invariably 
excluded from the protections of the politics of genocide.  
 
Group Problems 
At some level, everybody knows that genocide is a crime of groups. The Nazis 
targeted the Jews, the Ottomans destroyed the Armenians, the Hutus persecuted the 
Tutsis, and so on. Homicide, theft, and assault, like most crimes, target an autonomous 
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legal individual, but genocide is a crime against specific groups. Yet, this common sense 
understanding becomes problematic in everyday discourse and antigenocide practice. As 
I asked at the outset of this chapter, what about the destruction of a particular group 
makes it politically significant? Contrary to our dominant understanding, historians have 
demonstrated for decades that the most visible genocides often ignore group boundaries 
or destroy multiple groups. For instance, the Nazi Genocide, likely the most well known 
genocide, involved murdering communists, social democrats, dissenters, homosexuals, 
the mentally ill and other undesirables as well as European Jews.107 The Ottoman 
persecution displaced critics of the Young Turks, Greek settlers, and other minorities. 
Hutu Nationals were quite willing to attack vulnerable Hutus and Twa alongside their 
Tutsi neighbors as well as clergy, relief workers, and Belgian peacekeepers. According to 
the normative understanding, genocide typically occurs when ethnic, racial, national or 
religious minorities are targeted by violence. But does the concept also extend to include 
peoples who exist in the liminal space between the self and the other, who get swept up in 
the destructive process of genocide, but do not fall within the identity categories that 
target a particular group? What happens if the enduring fiction that genocides destroy 
relatively homogenous group entities (and emerge from conflicts between such well-
constituted entities) encounters a more complex historical account of the diversity of 
groups killed in a genocide? More pertinently, what happens when political interventions 
to stop genocide or rallying cries surrounding genocide treat genocide as a problem of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Although it is important to note that the Nazis internally differentiated Jewish communities as well. 
German Jews were purportedly more civilized than Polish Jews and so on indicating that internal 
differences were equally important as external identification with the Jews as an enemy in the creation the 
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clearly defined victim groups, united by a stable identity, and mobilize resources around 
this conception? 
Consider the discrepancy identified by Mahmood Mamdani regarding the recent 
declaration of genocide in Darfur. Everybody knows the common narrative in Sudan. 
More or less, extremist Janjaweed militants, supported by the government with 
armaments, finances and training, targeted vulnerable minorities in Darfur, killing 
hundreds of thousands in pursuit of ethno-religious dominance. However, while 
distinguished members of the press, the Save Darfur Movement, and Colin Powell were 
denouncing the Sudanese government and enumerating charges against Sudanese 
president Omar al-Bashir another set of mass killings was occurring in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). As Mamdani puts it:  
It’s tempting to think that the advantage of Darfur lies in its being a small, faraway place 
where those who drive the War on Terror do not have a vested interests. That this is 
hardly the case is evident if one compares the American response to Darfur to its non-
response to Congo even though the dimensions of the conflict in the Congo seem to give 
it a mega-Darfur quality: the numbers killed are estimated in the millions rather than the 
hundreds of thousands; the bulk of the killing, particularly in Kivu, is done by 
paramilitaries trained, organized and armed by neighboring governments; and the victims 
on both sides- Hema and Lendu- are framed in elective rather than individual terms, to 
the point that one influential version defines both as racial identities and the conflict 
between the two as a replay of the Rwandan genocide. Given all this, how does one 
explain the fact that the focus of the most widespread and ambitious humanitarian 
movement in the US is on Darfur and not on Kivu.108 
 
 
The discrepancy Mamdani identifies between international reaction to Darfur and 
the DRC highlights one of the problematic consequences of the link between genocide 
and groups. In this case, Mamdani argues that the analogy between Darfur and the War 
on Terror in Iraq set in motion a group of orientalist prejudices and Western security 
practices that made the humanitarian agenda in Darfur an imperative. The conflict in 
Darfur, which was allegedly organized based on religious antagonism between Arabs and 
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Africans or Muslims and Christians, also chimed with the normative understanding of 
genocide since it conceptualizes identity in terms of static categories. Meanwhile, the 
ongoing killing in the DRC failed to resonate with the normative understanding of 
genocide. This non-recognition is partly a result of the multiplicity of groups involved in 
the conflict, which breaks with the dialectical nature of identity and conflict envisioned 
by the normative understanding. Simplifying a bit, we could say that the groups in Darfur 
were recognized as subjects of genocide and the groups in the Congo were not. This 
disparity results partly from the way the notion of the group operates in the politics of 
genocide and shapes international media and humanitarian sensibilities. The fact that the 
death totals in the DRC vastly exceeded those in Sudan, while not strictly determinate of 
genocide, indicates how important the construction of group identity is for mobilizing a 
response to genocide. Certainly, elements of this construction involve contemporary 
political factors, but the determination of what groups count as subject to genocide is of 
vital importance. As a result, the response to genocide is marked by the recognition or 
non-recognition of groups as subject to genocide.  
However, the problems created by the normative understanding of groups don’t 
end with the dilemma of international recognition and non-recognition. Rather, the link 
between genocide and the normative understanding of groups is productive of a set of 
procedures for intervening and stopping genocide. For instance, as has been well 
documented, the Rwandan genocide conformed to a narrative that scripted conflict in 
terms of protracted ethnic or racial conflict. The classical categories informing the UNGC 
and the normative understanding of genocide were thus at play in the discussions 
surrounding this event. These distinctions become productive in contexts such as refugee 
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aid and humanitarian relief. The victim/perpetrator opposition rests upon the notion of an 
ethnic minority being swept up in a destructive process, but it also supports an easy 
distinction or division for sorting the victims of genocide from their oppressors. 
Normative forms of ethnic and racial identity thus combine with categories like victim 
and perpetrator in a form of common sense, which is then folded into the practices of 
humanitarian and relief organizations. The problem is that these categories rarely map 
with the complexities of mass violence where group identities, boundaries, and processes 
of violence not only blur boundaries, but actively rearticulate them. While deploying the 
motif of the normative understanding supports calls to urgently intervene, this amounts to 
a form of emergency politics that often fails to consider the complexity of the situation.  
The combination of the normative understanding and common sense can be lethal. 
In the context of Rwanda in order to support the allegedly fleeing Tutsi populace, refugee 
camps were constructed along the borders of the DRC and Burundi in the aftermath 
(itself a problematic term) of the genocide. The normative understanding, subtended by 
the victim/perpetrator dichotomy, led to the widespread assumption that the populations 
fleeing Rwanda were Tutsi refugees escaping from Hutu Power. The refugee camps thus 
freely admitted incoming refugees as victims of the Hutu genocide. While many Tutsi’s 
did attempt to leave Rwanda, a huge portion of the refugees were actually Hutus fleeing 
from the advance of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The relief camps thus combined 
Hutu Nationalists and Tutsi populations. In many cases, the refugee camps actively 
supplied Hutu Nationalists with additional monetary and military support and essentially 
prolonged the genocide by turning relief camps into attractors for Tutsi victims. In this 
case, the prima facia determination of refugee status, buttressed by the normative 
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understanding of groups, led to the support of genocidaires and extended the killing 
process into the DRC.109 This example illustrates how the question of the group concerns 
not only the problem of recognition or non-recognition, but how the structure of genocide 
as a crime of groups participates in the production of political response. While it would 
be easy to write this off as a simple error on the part of refugee organizations under 
duress, the conditions of possibility for this ‘error’ lies in the structure of the concept of 
genocide, which creates the possibility of thinking genocide as an antagonistic 
relationship between ethnically antagonistic perpetrators and victims. Understanding the 
development of this structure requires investigating the origins of the normative 
understanding of groups with respect to the concept of genocide. However, explicating 
these processes requires a fuller understanding of the notion of the group intersects and 
combines with the other parts of the concept of genocide. 
 
Lemkin’s Groups 
In 1933, prior to his creation of the neologism genocide, Lemkin started to write 
about the protection of minority groups under international law. According to Lemkin, 
the existing system of Minority Treaties, which were designed around the notion of 
collective or national minority rights, had failed to adequately protect minority groups 
from state harassment. Lemkin tasked himself with finding a legal solution to this 
problem by developing new criminal categories to outlaw these practices. While 
Lemkin’s writings reflect early 20th century themes and motifs about social life, he 
exhibits a surprising porousness with respect to how he describes a minority group. 
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Exploring these early writings can thus influence how we interpret Lemkin’s later 
thoughts about genocide. Nonetheless, as Lemkin’s biographer John Cooper argues, 
Lemkin’s writings reflect the limits of his historical context.110 For instance, Lemkin’s 
visions of group life, political violence, and state structures were strongly shaped by his 
experience of the pogroms, life in rural religious communities, and his exposure to 
specific types of government. As a student, Lemkin was also extremely taken with the 
work of Herder and Lemkin’s insistence on the autonomy of cultural groups reflects this 
theoretical background. However, as Cooper argues, Lemkin’s primary theoretical 
influence was Simon Dubnov, a prominent Jewish historian and theorist of cultural 
autonomy, who Lemkin saw as a touchstone for his theory of cultural life.111 
Nevertheless, despite these influences, Lemkin’s writings offer a surprisingly porous 
account of group or social life.112 Indeed, Lemkin’s work is marked by a kind of 
empiricism, which describes forces of violence and elements of social life in a particular 
context.113 In this sense, Lemkin endorses an open and even pluralist vocabulary for 
thinking about the life of groups. His account thus offers fresh resources for thinking 
against the hegemonic terms of the normative understanding of genocide. Indeed, 
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Lemkin’s work has recently become a resource for many projects attempting to push the 
study of mass violence beyond the current limits of genocide studies. 
Lemkin’s first formal writing on the problem of the group was a paper addressed 
to the Madrid Conference on Revisions of Penal Law. In this paper, Lemkin appealed to 
the notion of ‘universal repression’ in which certain crimes are “considered so 
particularly dangerous as to present a threat to the interests, either of a material nature of 
a moral nature, of the entire international community.”114 In particular, Lemkin pointed to 
the limits of existing law with respect to what he called ‘collectives.’ Lemkin began by 
arguing that international law distinguished between protections for the rights of an 
individual and protection of the rights of an individual as a member of a collective.115 
Collectives, Lemkin claimed, were due special recognition under international law and 
afforded a different set of rights from an individual. Drawing on this distinction, Lemkin 
argued for the creation of a new criminal category that he labeled ‘acts of barbarity.’ He 
defined acts of barbarity as “attacks carried out against an individual as a member of a 
collectivity…offenses of this type bring harm not only to human rights, but also and most 
especially undermine the fundamental basis of the social order.”116 Lemkin further 
described crimes of barbarity as ‘acts of extermination’ directed against “ethnic, religious 
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and social collectivities.”117 These acts, he claimed, could typically be classified as a 
crime under existing domestic and international law. However, this classification was 
insufficient because crimes of barbarity were premised not on killing individuals, but 
destroying the collectivity itself. Lemkin characterized crimes of barbarity as 
“exceed[ing] relations between individuals…shak[ing] the very basis of harmony in 
social relations between particular collectivities.”118 Indeed, for Lemkin, these were 
crimes of a wholly different nature 
Lemkin saw the destruction of artistic and cultural heritage as an offense of 
similar importance and coined the phrase ‘crimes of vandalism’ to describe acts of 
destruction harming “the unique genius and achievement of a collectivity.”119 Vandalism, 
Lemkin felt, deprived the humanity of vital works of art, literature, and cultural heritage 
that constituted a kind of worldly property. The ‘transnational danger’ Lemkin associated 
with vandalism was a product of his belief that the unique features of a collectivity 
contributed to “the wealth of all humanity.”120 At this early point, Lemkin was grappling 
with the difficult task of establishing a new set of legal articles, outlining an ontology of 
social life, and joining the two projects. Lemkin’s theory of the ‘collectivity’ thus has 
plenty of loose ends and odd, almost paradoxical formulations. For instance, he offered 
no explicit definition or theory of what constitutes a ‘collective’ or subject group. Instead, 
Lemkin used terms such as ‘social,’ ‘religious,’ or ‘ethnic,’ inconsistently and, to a 
degree, interchangeably to describe the group. Nonetheless, two important features 
appear consistently in Lemkin’s discussion of the ‘collective.’ First, ‘collectives’ work as 
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mediating agents between individuals, states, and the broader category of humanity. In 
this regard, Lemkin suggests individuals make up collectives that, in turn, compose 
‘humanity,’ yet he also views collectives as irreducible to either the individual or 
humanity. Collectives are, for Lemkin, aggregates of quasi-determinate size, scope, and 
definition. Second, collectives have art, culture, and a feature Lemkin refers to as ‘unique 
genius’ as well as ethnic, social, religious, economic, biological and spiritual aspects. The 
collective is thus a catchall term, which captures a variety of properties of a group 
without defining a group by any one of these properties.  Lemkin’s collective forms 
around what might be described a ‘vague essence’ rather than an intrinsic feature or 
objective definition.121  
However, the vague essence also introduces a new problem for Lemkin because it 
makes it difficult to determine the conditions under which we can say a collective exists. 
Collectives drift on a chain of equivalences between art, culture, language, religion, 
ethnicity, or nationality. Indeed, Lemkin continually substitutes these terms for one 
another in such a way that it makes it difficult to know exactly what constitutes or 
distinguishes the group. I argue that what ultimately grounds or differentiates the group in 
Lemkin’s work is the intervention of sense. By this I mean Lemkin invokes an abstract, 
but real intuition regarding the existence of a group that ties together the otherwise 
apparently arbitrary features or characteristics of group life that he describes. In Lemkin’s 
work, sense operates in the background and divides or differentiates the vague essence of 
the group. Yet, at certain points in his writing, Lemkin explicitly refers to sense and the 
aesthetic in his description of the group. For instance, he states that the destruction of a 
collective produces a sense that the international order has been violated. In this context, 
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sense imbues the group with a place in international politics and international politics 
with a certain duty to protect group life. It is this sense, rather than the text of the law 
itself, that motivates Lemkin’s introduction of the crimes of vandalism and barbarity. The 
specific attribute or characteristic of the collective is, for Lemkin, less important than the 
intuitive judgment, guided by sense, that a collective’s ‘unique genius’ has been 
destroyed. In Lemkin’s early writings, the lack of a specific criterion for defining the 
group is thus resolved by the work of sense that designates when the loss of a group is 
significant. Perhaps unsurprisingly, an emphasis on sense reappears in Lemkin’s later 
writings on genocide. 
Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ in his 1944 publication Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe and begins chapter IX, ‘Genocide,’ with the statement that “new conceptions 
require new terms. By ‘genocide’ we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group.”122 At first glance, this quote seems to indicate that Lemkin abandoned the term 
‘collective’ for a more restricted definition of the group. However, Lemkin continues by 
stating that genocide: 
“is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilation the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration 
of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion and 
the economic existence of national groups….Genocide is directed against the national 
group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their 
individual capacity, but as members of the national group.”123  
 
Lemkin further complicates the picture by describing genocide as having two phases: 
“destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of 
the national pattern of the oppressor.”124 Lemkin never defines the term ‘national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 79. 
123 Ibid, 79. 
124 Ibid, 79, my emphasis. 
	   61 
pattern.’ However, in his uses of this term Lemkin emphasizes the multiple dimensions of 
the act of genocide.  
These observations influence how we should interpret his use of ‘national or 
ethnic group’ in two ways. First, as Lemkin’s theory of social life, despite his repeated 
reference to nations, includes a multiplicity of dimensions that do not have an objective 
status,125 we should interpret Lemkin’s understanding of the group as relational rather 
than essential. Second, as Lemkin suggests, a group’s ‘national pattern’ may be removed 
and replaced by another. Consequently, groups may be capable of changing as a result of 
political practices. Many readers of Lemkin may disagree with this interpretation because 
Lemkin at times refers to the ‘biological structure’ structure of the group. However, 
Lemkin does not use this term to refer to a unified biological or racial foundation for 
group life, although this is a common feature of many theories of his time. Rather, 
Lemkin invokes ‘biological structure’ to discuss the practices of eating, procreation, and 
care that facilitate the reproduction of a group’s life. This is apparent in his criticism of 
the concepts of ‘denationalizaton’ and ‘Germanization.’126 These notions, Lemkin argues, 
overemphasize citizenship and ignore the destruction of the ‘biological structure’ of the 
group. Nonetheless, Lemkin argues that they touch upon something critical since they 
engage with the cultural, economic, and social dimensions of genocide that impair the 
‘biological structure’ of groups.  In this respect, the ‘national pattern’ includes the 
reproduction of both biological and social dimensions of group life.  
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Lemkin also highlights the complexity of the ‘nation’ more extensively in his later 
discussion of the Nazi war effort. In this context, Lemkin opines that the Nazis 
discovered a form of warfare that targeted the nation rather than the state. By identifying 
the nation as an object of war, the Nazi genocide could target the enemy using a variety 
of “techniques of genocide” including political, social cultural, cultural, economic, 
biological, physical, religious, and moral practices.127 In his later writings, Lemkin would 
underline the point: “genocide is a gradual process and may begin with political 
disenfranchisement, economic displacement, culture undermining and control, the 
destruction of leadership, the breakup of families, and the prevention of propagation. 
Each of these methods is a more or less effective means of destroying a group.”128 In this 
quote, Lemkin affords equal importance to a variety of mechanisms that afflict different 
aspects of group life and jeopardize the reproduction ‘national pattern.’ Lemkin’s call to 
outlaw these practices only makes sense if these techniques intersect with a porous, 
multidimensional understanding of group life.  
Lemkin adds more complexity to his notion of the group in his call for new 
international penal law. In this argument, Lemkin claims that once “we conceive that 
nations are essential elements of the world community. The world community represents 
only so much culture and intellectual vigor as are created by its component national 
groups.”129 Lemkin continues by stating that a nation “signifies constructive cooperation 
and original contributions, based upon genuine traditions, genuine culture, and a well-
developed national psychology. The destruction of a nation, therefore, results in the loss 
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of its further contributions to the world.”130 Here, Lemkin’s description of ‘national 
groups’ appears to develop the unity and originality characteristic of nationalist discourse 
of the period. Yet, Lemkin’s language also remains reminiscent of his earlier discussion 
of the ‘collectives’ subject to crimes of barbarity and vandalism. To Lemkin, nations are 
important because they contribute something unique and are the progenitors of the 
distinctiveness of the world community. Far from a biological essentialism, Lemkin’s 
nations become significant insofar as they produce rather than are something distinctive 
for a world community. Lemkin continues these passages by saying “destruction [of a 
nation] offends our feelings of morality and justice in much the same way as does the 
criminal killing of a human being: the crime in one case as in the other is murder, though 
on a vastly different scale.”131 In other words, the destruction of the national group, for 
Lemkin, is analogous to the murder of a human being because murder destroys a unique 
individual just like the destruction of the group destroys a unique entity at a greater scale. 
This thread would continue into Lemkin’s late work: “the destruction of these groups has 
caused irretrievable losses because culture by its very nature can be neither restored nor 
duplicated.”132 In this statement, Lemkin privileges the feeling or sense of an offense 
against justice or morality in order to ground an analogy between an individual and a 
group as unique entities. Lemkin underlines what is lost in genocide by observing that  
‘national groups’ constitute irreplaceable resources for human culture. Lemkin’s 
reference to the national group here thus deemphasizes traditional aspects of nationalism, 
such as territorial or historical rootedness, in favor of prioritizing the nation’s productive 
value and an irreplaceable ‘spirit’ that contributes to the world. In other words, for 
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Lemkin, groups are important because of the unique or distinctive contributions they 
make to the world whose loss makes genocide into a sensible event. 
Lemkin’s theory of the group consistently refuses to ascribe an objective status to 
groups on account of a specific characteristic, attribute or property. Rather, Lemkin 
grounds his interpretation of the group in a sensorial or affective response. Indeed, as 
Lemkin put it in an earlier quote: the destruction of groups ‘offends a feeling of morality 
and justice.’ Lemkin’s rhetorical choice here is significant not just because it blends 
sentiment and reason, a common practice in discussions of international crime, but 
because of how sense or feeling substantiates and differentiates ‘national groups.’133  For 
Lemkin, it is the feeling of injustice that determines when the loss of a collective occurs. 
An operation of sense endows the group with a significance that renders its destruction a 
form of worldly loss. The structure of sense is critical in order for the destruction or 
disappearance of a group to appear or be felt as a form of loss.134 Just as with crimes of 
barbarity and vandalism, Lemkin’s definition of ‘genocide’ hinges on a structure of sense 
that renders the destruction of a group offensive. 
Lemkin’s invocation of sense has two important implications. First, it allows 
Lemkin to provide a theory of the group without referring to a specific predicate of 
identity. Second it means that Lemkin’s groups have only ‘vague essences’ and are 
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composed of innumerable social, economic, cultural, political, linguistic, and artistic 
dimensions. Lemkin’s work thus depends on sense to differentiate the group. This begs 
the question of what structures the work of sense in Lemkin’s writing. Lemkin’s texts 
offer several clues regarding the answer to this question. For instance, Lemkin will 
repeatedly include many different aspects of a group, change terminology, and discuss 
the afflictions of Poles, women, children, Lithuanians, priests, and other social groups 
without expressly clarifying why these groups are significant. In each of these cases, 
Lemkin draws upon an analogy with the individual. For instance, the afflictions of the 
Poles under the Nazi leadership affect them in the same way undue state power affects a 
household or, alternatively, genocide, as Lemkin states, is analogous with murder. 
Lemkin links the two terms of this analogy by referencing the feeling of offense. Put 
differently, Lemkin argues that the murder of an individual and the destruction of a group 
produce a common feeling of offense. This common feeling of offense grounds the 
identity of the crimes and enables Lemkin to make comparisons between them. The work 
of sense thus appears in connecting the form of the individual to the form of the 
collective or national group. In addition, Lemkin buttresses this analogy by appealing to a 
legal and moral motif for describing the group. He will, for example, discuss a group’s 
‘rights to existence’ as analogous to the ‘rights of individual’ or the ‘rights of man.’ In 
this respect, Lemkin posits a common form for group life built upon an individual and a 
group’s analogous relationship to law. Read through this lens, the work of sense in 
Lemkin’s writing searches for commonalities between groups and individuals, which can 
be grounded in accordance with the notion of a legal and moral subject. This form of 
sense grounds Lemkin’s suspicion that the word genocide carries an instantaneous moral 
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judgment, which communicates the unique loss of group life. Indeed, Lemkin’s work 
stands at a crossroads because it has affinities with strong normative judgment, but 
relaxes the standards for determining what groups may be afflicted by genocide. In this 
respect, Lemkin both initiates the development of the normative understanding of 
genocide and offers resources for its deconstruction. 
 
Conventional Groups 
The UN General Assembly adopted the UNGC on December 9, 1948. Despite 
appearing only four years after Lemkin’s invention of the concept of genocide, the 
UNGC dramatically alters the notion of the group by removing any reference to ‘national 
minority,’ ‘national pattern,’ or ‘social collectives,’ in favor of four specifically protected 
groups: racial, ethnical, national, and religious. The text of the UNGC offers no rationale 
for why these groups were recognized in the convention, simply stating that: “in the 
present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”135 In this 
section, I turn to the series of debates surrounding the formation and ratification of the 
UNGC in order to describe why these particular groups were singled out for protection by 
the UNGC. In doing so, I explore what assumptions or characteristic about these groups 
ultimately made them worthy of this form of political protection. 
The first legal uses of the concept genocide took place during the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following the defeat of Nazi Germany.136 In these high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 
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profile trials, the allies tried the Nazi leadership on four charges: crimes against the 
peace, crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. While genocide 
was not included as a charge, the concept of genocide was incorporated into the formal 
indictment for war crimes:  the defendants “conducted deliberate and systematic 
genocide, viz., the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian 
populations of certain occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes 
of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies, 
and others.”137 The concept of genocide first appeared in this context because the Allied 
prosecutors frequently consulted Lemkin, who had an extensive knowledge of the legal 
changes under the Nazi occupation. As a consultant, Lemkin was able to advocate for the 
use of the term genocide.  
The concept of genocide was thus used repeatedly throughout the Nuremberg 
tribunals and in the Denazification trials that followed. However, the use of the term was 
highly variable and different prosecutors, judges, and court systems invoked it to describe 
many different aspects of the Nazi atrocities.138 The circulation of the term during the 
Nuremberg tribunals produced a consensus that genocide aptly characterized the crimes 
of the Nazi state. By 1946, the growing consensus on the gravity of the Nazi crimes 
combined with the emergence of the genocide vocabulary led to a formal call at the 
United Nations for a convention outlawing genocide. This took the form of UN General 
Assembly Resolution 96, which called for the Economic and Social Council (ESC) to 
study and draft a formal convention against genocide.  
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The 1946 Resolution stipulated that “genocide is a denial of the right of existence 
of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual beings; 
such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great 
losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented by these 
human groups, and is contrary to the moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United 
Nations.”139 Here, the emphasis on the broad category of ‘human groups’ stands in 
contrast to the UNGC’s list of racial, religious, national and ethnical groups. The 
resolution’s effort to use broad, open categories is further evidenced by another line 
stipulating that: “many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, 
religious, political, and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.”140 There 
are two remarkable features of the 1946 resolution with regard to the notion of the group. 
First, the text marks a shift to enumerate specific privileged or protected groups rather 
than return to Lemkin’s more abstract language of collective and national minority. 
Second, the text nonetheless endorses open terminology when enumerating or listing 
these groups. Indeed, the final text of the UNGC ultimately replaces more open notions 
such as ‘human groups’ or ‘other groups’ with an exacting list of protected groups. The 
1946 resolution thus represents a transitional point between Lemkin’s comparatively 
open reflections on the nature of the group and the UNGC’s ultimate appeal to objective 
categories of identity. 
Following the 1946 resolution, the UN Secretariat established a small group of 
representatives who, in consultation with Lemkin and other experts on international law, 
created a draft of the convention. This draft was handed to the ESC, which convened two 
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separate comities, the Ad Hoc Committee and Sixth (Legal) Committee, to draft, revise, 
and finalize the UNGC. The history of the drafting process has now been well 
documented by a number of historians and legal scholars, but Leo Kuper’s early analysis 
of this process still offers excellent insight into the forces at work in creating the 
UNGC.141 In his reading of this history, Kuper notes that the Sixth and Ad Hoc 
committees achieved a quick consensus about the importance of protecting national, 
racial and ethnic groups, but that the inclusion of political, economic, religious, and 
cultural groups in the convention incited controversy. These arguments took place in the 
form of memoranda and plenary sessions and led to a host number of different proposals 
regarding the scope, authority, and elements of the convention.  
Kuper largely focuses his analysis on the debate over political and cultural groups 
since these categories appeared to generate the greatest degree of controversy at the ESC. 
The inclusion of the category of ‘political groups,’ for instance, was primarily contested 
by the Soviet Union whose representative claimed that ‘political groups’ lacked a 
scientific basis and could not be defined by any objective criteria. Furthermore, several 
representatives felt that ‘political groups’ were fundamentally voluntary associations 
produced by loose political and economic affiliations and consequently lacked the 
‘permanency’ and ‘involuntary’ character of racial, religious or national groups. Still 
other representatives thought that the inclusion of ‘political groups’ would undermine the 
viability of the UNGC since, they argued, many states would be unlikely to adopt the law 
if they felt it justified international intervention on the basis of their policies. 
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Representatives such as Hartley Shawcross, who ultimately disagreed with the notion of a 
convention altogether, countered these claims by arguing that “past crimes of genocide 
had been committed on racial or religious grounds, [however] it was clear that in the 
future they would be committed mainly on political grounds.”142 Concerns were also 
raised about the potential for any mass extermination to be justified as a ‘political 
necessity’ thereby gutting the UNGC of any meaningful force.143 In fact, the term 
‘political groups’ remained in the text of Convention until November 29th, 1948, only ten 
days before the ratification of the Convention, when the issue was raised again and a 
compromise was made to expunge the term from the text in order to ensure the 
Convention’s adoption by the General Assembly.144  
A similar question was raised with respect to the matter of cultural groups or 
cultural genocide. The earlier Secretariat Draft and Ad Hoc Committee Draft of the 
UNGC both contained lines specifically describing the destruction of language, 
monuments, schools, libraries and other ‘cultural objects’ as forms of genocide. While 
these drafts did not always refer directly to the category of ‘cultural group,’ they included 
acts directed against the social or cultural dimension of a group in their description of 
genocide. In this case, the Soviet representative pressed for the inclusion of cultural 
genocide as a formal part of the UNGC while representatives from Western democracies 
staunchly opposed it.145 The Soviet representative argued that, absent a cultural 
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dimension, the convention would be easy to circumvent because a state could simply 
appeal to the category of ‘culture.’ The British and American representatives countered 
this claim by arguing that culture was too ambiguous a category for formal inclusion in 
the law. In this respect, the debate over the inclusion of cultural and political groups 
mirrored one another.  
Kuper correctly identifies that the conflict over the inclusion of political groups 
and cultural groups reflects the anxieties of different representatives with respect to the 
colonial practices of their own states. The Soviet Union’s hostility to the inclusion of 
‘political groups’ and ‘economic groups’ grew from concerns that the practice of 
dekulakization could lead to prosecution on charges of genocide while the US and 
European states felt that the inclusion of ‘cultural groups’ would expose them to charges 
of genocide on the basis of colonial practices and segregation.146 Ultimately, Kuper 
argues, the decision to abandon both terms amounted to a kind of ‘grand bargain’ 
between the US, USSR and UK in order to facilitate the passage of the convention while 
ensuring legal impunity for their respective states.147 
The categories of religious and economic groups were also debated several times 
at the ESC, but were subject to less intense negotiation. For example, several 
representatives contended that the inclusion of religious groups was unnecessary because 
religion was a secondary dimension of national groups and thus undeserving of special 
consideration. In addition, the United States initially proposed including economic groups 
in the convention, but later withdrew the proposal due to the intractability of many other 
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representatives.148 While these initiatives were ultimately defeated, they illustrate a 
variety of different images of the group at work in the background of the UNGC. 
Regardless, a consistent feature of these meetings is an effort to conceptualize genocide 
as a crime afflicting only specific types of groups.149  
In contrast, many arguments advanced in the debates at the Ad Hoc and Sixth 
Committee sessions directly acknowledged the ambiguous nature of the concept of 
genocide and pointed out the difficulties of establishing a precise list of protected groups. 
A French representative, for instance, remarked that the term genocide could not be 
defined by etymological, legal, or objective criteria because the concept lacked a prior 
history. According to this line of argument, the drafting committees were entirely free 
from questions of precedent and, as such, arguments predicated on the meaning of 
particular words such as ‘racial,’ ‘ethnic,’ ‘religious’ were specious and without legal 
support.150 Other representatives argued that laws were subject to evolution and shifts in 
meaning so that the precise enumeration of groups would remain largely irrelevant to 
future uses of the convention. Still other representatives felt that genocide should be 
linked directly to a set of destructive ideologies rather than the destruction of the group 
per se in order to prevent a future outbreak of fascism. In particular, several 
representatives sought to tie genocide directly to the totalitarian structure of the Nazi 
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state.151 Considered together, these arguments evidence a surprising degree of awareness 
regarding the fictive and malleable dimensions of the concept of genocide and an 
appreciation for the inherent ambiguity that results from creating a brand new political 
concept. Moreover, they stand in stark contrast to the insistence of the American, 
European, and Soviet representatives that the inclusion of specific groups would either 
lead the General Assembly to abandon the convention or obligate problematic 
intervention to protect indeterminate groups. 
What is clear from this brief history is the dissensus surrounding the most basic 
terms of the UNGC. If Kuper’s contention is correct then, like any article of international 
law, the final draft of the UNGC was a product of a compromise amongst powerful 
states. This begs the question of why the list of groups ultimately protected by the UNGC 
enabled this compromise. Several observations are important in this respect. For example, 
the UNGC’s final text abandons Lemkin’s more open understanding of ‘social 
collectives’ and ‘national groups,’ the Nuremberg trials’ use of the term, and the 1946 
Resolution’s language of  ‘other groups’ and ‘human groups.’ In this respect, the 
compromise reflects a shift from an open notion of the group to a highly specific set of 
allegedly objective or essential group categories. In effect, the final text of the UNGC 
establishes distinct criteria or predicates for determining whether a group may be subject 
to genocide. As many genocide scholars have pointed out the UNGC wrote off the 
extermination of political groups, social groups, urban groups, and rural groups all of 
which remain without protection under the terms of the convention.152 However, the 
UNGC not only excludes these groups, it also reifies nationality, ethnicity (or 
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ethnicality), race, and religion as powerful categories in international politics and, in this 
way, constitutes them as standards for the expression of identity. In this regard, the 
UNGC encourages representations of atrocity to link violence to specific forms of group 
identity. The UNGC thus actively contributes to the production of group identity by 
providing a powerful frame for understanding political conflict and, more importantly, by 
creating incentives to represent groups exclusively in these terms. The UNGC’s notion of 
the group consequently reflects a series of deep, culturally bounded understandings of 
how social life takes shape and becomes worthy of recognition.  
This shift from Lemkin’s open notion of the group to the UNGC’s specific 
predicates of identity is an important step in the history of the group. When Lemkin first 
coined the term genocide he endorsed a messy notion of the group defined by analogous 
judgment. The UNGC, in contrast, altered the notion of the group by defining it in 
accordance with specific attributes or predicates of identity. In effect, essential templates 
replaced the more open dimensions of Lemkin’s notion for identity in order to explicitly 
define what groups may be subject to genocide. Put differently, the groups part of 
genocide, as articulated by the UNGC, treats identity as constituted by separate, 
determinate, and natural divisions. The UNGC thus abandons groups, which fail to align 
with the ciphers of ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality while rendering group identity 
unthinkable outside of these terms. In this way, the UNGC marks a significant 
development in the normative understanding of genocide because it links the group to 
rigid categories of identity, which ultimately shape subsequent generations of genocide 
scholarship. The ‘compromise’ between the great powers described by Kuper is thus, in a 
way, underwritten by a prior consensus on a specific template of identity. While it is 
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certainly worth studying the debates behind the compromise, the unexamined aspect of 
this compromise is the more subtle transformation of the notion of the group from an 
open association into a rigid set of predicates of identity, based in the European 
experience, that support the application of law in only isolated occasions. What is at stake 
in this transformation is a different structure of sense, which links the destruction of 
genocide to only particular, allegedly objective forms of identity. These kinds of group 
identity, in turn, frame what forms of violence are worth protecting against in 
humanitarian practice. 
 
The New Groups 
I am far from the first to recognize the limits of the UNGC’s definition of 
genocide. Beginning in the 1970s, a cadre of scholars started to realize the problems with 
the UNGC’s definition of genocide especially in light of the emergence of new episodes 
of mass violence. As the international community’s looming failure to stop atrocities in 
places like Nigeria, Cambodia, and Vietnam came to light, genocide scholars adopted 
more critical views of the UNGC’s notion of the group. In many ways, their insights 
highlight the weaknesses of the UNGC’s definition of group life and underscore the need 
for novel approaches to genocide research. In response to these weaknesses, two broad 
approaches have emerged that attempt to resolve the deficits of the UNGC definition of 
the group by providing alternative accounts of how genocide takes place. The first 
approach treats groups as social constructs rather than stable ahistorical entities. By 
focusing on the social basis of identity, scholars have expanded the definition of the 
group associated with genocide in order to compensate for the limitations of the UNGC’s 
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definition. A second approach opts to define genocide by the events or acts of mass 
violence rather than the groups targeted by such acts. This approach thus treats the 
perceptions of organizations, leaders, or mass movements as critical in determining the 
group subject to genocide. In this section, I will briefly examine the benefits of these new 
approaches vis-a-vis the UNGC’s definition by discussing a couple of examples of each 
approach. I will also illustrate how in spite of these improvements on the UNGC’s 
categories, the new approaches also reproduce normative understandings of genocide 
with problematic implications for the politics of genocide. 
Martin Shaw’s work on genocide provides an example of the social 
constructionist approach to the group. Drawing on his theories of the social dimension of 
war, Shaw criticizes approaches to the study of genocide that analytically separate it from 
war.153 Shaw maintains that war plays an important role in the emergence of genocide 
especially as changes in technology and ideology over the past several decades have 
increasingly targeted civilian non-combatants.154 Genocide, for Shaw, takes place when 
the violence of war afflicts civilian non-combatants en masse. In his critical reading of 
the UNGC, Shaw argues that modern developments in war- risk transfer, emergence of 
low-intensity conflicts, dispersion of war fighting into domestic settlements-have 
distanced contemporary genocide from the totalitarian, state-sponsored mass murders 
characteristic of the first half of the 20th century.155 At the same time, Shaw contends that 
social relations play a crucial role in constituting the groups destroyed by genocide. He is 
thus critical of the elaboration of new terms such as ethnocide, ethnic cleansing or 
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politicide for obscuring the multiple forms genocide may take.156 By treating identity as 
static rather than socially constituted, Shaw argues, many genocide scholars end up 
limiting themselves to only one type of political conflict between predetermined ethnic 
minority groups. As a result, genocide scholars tend to overlook the crucial relationship 
between military activity, social perception, and the emergence of genocide within the 
context of war. 
Shaw’s notion of genocide, drawing on Weber’s notion of ideas, explains how 
both the  victims and perpetrators of genocide are relationally constituted.157 According 
to Shaw, the group subject to genocide emerges within what he calls “the structure of 
conflict.”158 By ‘the structure of conflict’ Shaw means the relations between an armed or 
empowered military group and a relatively powerless or exposed non-combatant group. 
When recurrent patterns of political violence afflict and define a subordinate group, these 
relations, rather than predetermined identity categories, constitute a group as a subject of 
genocide. The ‘structure of conflict’ dovetails with the socially constructed nature of 
group identity by altering when and how a group becomes subject to genocide. The 
crucial feature for Shaw is a shift in the understanding of a victim group from a social to 
a political/military enemy.159 With this shift, Shaw argues a new series of relations and 
practices can be directed against a group. Genocide thus emerges at the nexus of changes 
in the practices of war and shifts in the interpretation of the social group. These changes, 
rather than the UNGC’s categories, more robustly describe the social relations or context 
that defines an event of genocide. For Shaw, both the relations of force between different 
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parties within a conflict and the extreme measures of violence deployed to eliminate one 
of these groups thus define the groups subject to genocide.  
According to Shaw, appreciating the social idea of the group resolves many of the 
problems of the UNGC’s restricted category of groups. For instance, it opens up the field 
of genocide studies to new episodes of group destruction that involve heterogeneous 
populations. A fundamental problem with predefining the types of groups that can be 
subject to genocide is revealed when Shaw demonstrates how acts of violence contribute 
to the creation of group categories. While this is a crucial insight, Shaw’s argument 
nonetheless returns to a normative understanding of the group. Specifically, Shaw 
interprets the ‘structure of conflict,’ and hence the possibility for social relations to 
become genocidal, in light of the presumably objective distinction between combatant 
and non-combatants. For Shaw, the structure of conflict emerges whenever a non-
combatant group, who remains according to his definition fundamentally vulnerable, 
becomes subject to military violence. The combatant non-combatant distinction is thus 
crucial for Shaw’s argument because it establishes the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of a ‘structure of conflict’ capable of differentiating war and genocide. This 
distinction is, however, an arbitrary and problematic one because it looks to a single 
‘objective’ element, armed power, to ground both the form and content of genocidal 
conflict. In this way, Shaw’s argument privileges a single objective relation of force to 
define the groups subject to genocide and consequently understands the ‘social 
construction’ of groups within a very narrow set of circumstances.160  
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However, Shaw’s argument neglects the fact that the combatant/noncombatant 
distinction is also a social construction.161 By treating this distinction as an objective 
condition for defining genocide, Shaw abandons the UNGC’s emphasis on stable 
predicates of identity and replaces it with an emphasis on a static set of social conditions. 
In a sense, Shaw’s position enables the substance of the group’s identity (race, ethnicity, 
and culture) open, but rigidly defines the form this identity must take. Shaw’s argument 
certainly provides novel insights into the emergence of genocide, but his position 
ultimately reintroduces the normative understanding of genocide that defines groups in a 
dialectical fashion via the ‘structure of conflict.’ Shaw’s argument consequently has two 
limitations. First, in many contexts the combatant/non-combatant line is indistinct, 
indiscernible, or altogether nonexistent. In these conflicts, social relations can be 
destructive, yet not conform to the image of the ‘structure of conflict’ at work in Shaw’s 
approach. Second, rather than provide a novel way of thinking of the group, Shaw 
abandons the UNGC’s categories for a new set of group identities defined by new war 
theory. In doing so, Shaw simply substitutes one set of normative concerns for another. 
To the extent that this is the case, Shaw’s insights about the structure of conflict 
contribute to a larger discourse seeking to make genocide and war governable through 
recourse to international institutions and morality.162 
The philosopher Claudia Card offers another example of a social constructionist 
approach to the notion of a group. Card’s work examines genocide in the broader context 
of a philosophical inquiry into evil, which she defines as “reasonably foreseeable 
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intolerable harms produced by inexcusable wrongs”163 Along with torture and terrorism, 
Card sees acts of genocide as “[in]defensible, even paltry, from a moral point of view,” 
and evil because they produce  a form of “intolerable harm.”164 Following Orlando 
Patterson’s work on slavery, Card defines genocide as an “extreme of social death.”165 
Social death takes the form of natal alienation, the loss of the relationships, context, and 
identity that support the creation of a meaningful life.  It is “social death [that] 
distinguishes the evil of genocide, morally, from the evils of other mass murders,” as it 
destroys “relationships, connections and foundational institutions that create community 
and set the context that gave meaning to careers, goals, lives and deaths.”166 Starting from 
this point, Card, like Shaw, is critical of essentialist notions of genocide. These notions, 
Card contends, treat identity as static reservoirs of meaning and miss the vibrant social 
relations that are critical to maintaining a group life. Essentialist conceptions of genocide 
thus actually obscure the evil of genocide, according to Card, because they ignore how 
genocide entails the loss of a social world. Like Shaw, Card’s work vastly expands the set 
of techniques constitutive of genocide beyond physical killing and shows the corrosive 
effects of a variety of social conditions on a group’s livelihood.167  
However, unlike Shaw, Card offers no theory of ‘social ideas’ to describe the 
construction of a group subject to genocide. Instead, Card assumes a meaningful social 
world is germane to a particular group and that its loss is not subject to external 
observation. Groups consequently define when they have been subject to destruction in 
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their own terms. Card’s theory privileges the perspective of those subject to genocide and 
endows it with a capacity to describe the traumatic loss of the social world. While both 
Card and Shaw explore the motley, thick, and complex process of constructing social 
identity, Shaw focuses more closely on acts of killing and military violence whereas Card 
emphasizes the loss of the texture and ties of a social world. In this regard, Shaw 
represents a ‘weak’ approach to social construction, primarily using it as a vehicle to 
describe the distribution and transformation of warfare, whereas Card represents a 
‘strong’ approach, turning the social world itself into the principle object of genocide.   
If Shaw’s argument grounded the social construction of the group in the 
combatant/non-combatant distinction, Card makes no such appeal to an extrinsic 
distinction. Instead, Card maintains the loss of the social world is largely perspectival. 
Acts of genocide consequently may differ between groups depending on how they depict 
and articulate the loss of a social world. Nonetheless, Card consistently returns to specific 
features of identity -place, history, and narrative- to describe how communities maintain 
a social world. However, Card’s argument overlooks an important part of Shaw’s, 
namely that acts of genocide contribute to the production of a social world. In other 
words, Card treats acts of genocide as corrosive on a predetermined social order rather 
than constitutive of a social world. In doing so, Card offers an image of social life as 
essentially harmonious and conflict free prior to the onset of genocide. Indeed, it is partly 
the innocence of the social world that prompts Card to turn to the vocabulary of ‘evil’ in 
order to make moral judgments regarding what constitutes an ‘intolerable act.’ Card’s 
argument treats groups as always already victims. Her overt references and analogies to 
physical pain (torture, terrorist bombings, etc.) likewise underscore that genocide is 
	   82 
understood exclusively in terms of physical trauma. In doing so, Card turns the porous 
notion of the collapse of a social world into a strangely physical definition of genocide 
that impacts the bodies of a victim group afflicted by inexcusable violence. Card’s claim 
to prioritize the narrative accounts of victims of the group thus stands in tension with 
many of her more descriptive observations about the function of physical violence in the 
breaking of a social world. Card’s turn to the vocabulary of evil marks a moment, similar 
to the use of the combatant/non-combatant division in Shaw’s work, where a specific set 
of objective relations delimit the conditions under which a group can claim to be a 
subject of genocide. In this respect, Card’s work reproduces the normative understanding 
of genocide in a similar fashion to Shaw by grounding her argument in an asocial 
relation. Consequently, Card replaces the stable predicates of identity with a set of 
objective actions that damage a social world while doubling down on the moral 
implications of these actions.  
Card and Shaw represent examples of a constructionist approach to the problem 
of groups. While decrying the essentialist dimensions of the UNGC, both reproduce a 
normative understanding of group identity by appealing to a set of allegedly asocial 
political structures or relations to describe the nature of genocide. This normative 
understanding reproduces a rubric of identity that defines groups  in terms of static 
circumstances, conditions or relations. As a result, groups subject to genocide get 
interpreted as homologous to one another and only when objected to after the 
development of specific political conditions. Card and Shaw thus both set significant 
limits on what groups can be subject to genocide. 
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 The social constructionist approach offers one solution to the problems of the 
group created by the UNGC definition of genocide. The second broad approach abandons 
the UNGC’s categories of ethnic, racial, religious or national identity in favor of studying 
phenomena of mass violence in larger aggregates. The purpose of this approach is to 
avoid getting bogged down in arbitrary debates over when and where violence against 
groups counts as significant and place genocide in relation to other events like war and 
conflict. The value of this approach is that it includes many episodes and forms of 
violence that would be excluded under the terms of the UNGC. However, the approach 
has two clear disadvantages. On the one hand, it eliminates any significance to the group 
qua group and lumps all the victims of violence into one category. This puts into question 
the specificity of the term ‘genocide’ vis-à-vis other categories like crimes against 
humanity or war crimes. On the other hand, scholars using this approach frequently 
invoke identity as an explanation for the emergence of mass violence. In doing so, they 
often endorse images of conflict as a byproduct of intractable identity-based conflict. 
This approach to the study of genocide thus reaffirms identity while, at the same, 
reducing the importance of highlighting group-based politics.  
Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr offer an excellent example of this second approach. 
Harff and Gurr’s now classic piece ‘Toward an empirical theory of Genocides and 
Politicides’ defines genocide as “the promotion and execution of policies by a state or its 
agents which result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group…[when] the 
victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics, i.e., 
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ethnicity, religion or nationality.”168 The standard of mass death thus displaces the focus 
on the particular ‘communal characteristics’ of the group in question. Harff and Gurr 
defend this definition as capable of analytically describing the majority of mass killing 
episodes in both ancient and contemporary history and providing a clear criterion for 
comparing genocides and politicides across time periods. Nonetheless, Harff and Gurr 
defend an image of the group defined by a set of communal characteristics such as 
‘ethnicity, religion or nationality’ and thus make an implicit presupposition about the 
importance of identity categories for determining the genocidal nature of mass killing 
events. The comparisons they make are thus marked by an imaginary that thinks of mass 
killing as based in intractable identity-based conflicts. In this way, Harff and Gurr invoke 
incredibly rigid accounts of group identity in order to explain the development of 
genocide while simply defining genocide retrospectively by the appearance of mass 
killing.  
Just like the social constructionist approach, Harff and Gurr’s argument removes 
any emphasis on particular types of group identity, but nonetheless inscribes genocide as 
a crime of identity. Harff and Gurr’s study thus rests on the assumption that all identity-
based forms of mass violence resemble one another in ways that provide important 
insights for the study of genocide and armed conflict. In Harff and Gurr’s argument 
group identity serves as little more than a placeholder for describing the emergence of the 
episodes of violence they seek to study. Harff and Gurr’s description of the world thus 
maintains that identity produces necessarily antagonistic conflicts. Their position makes 
it difficult to see these forms of conflict as the byproducts of social construction and 
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political conditions. In a sense, Harff and Gurr broaden the set of victims of genocide and 
politicide, but do so by framing the outbreak of violence as a byproduct of irrational 
responses to identity-based political commitments. In doing so, they reintroduce a 
normative understanding of genocide by using identity as an ascriptive explanatory 
principle that prefigures how, where, and why genocide occurs. As such, Harff and 
Gurr’s work supports the proliferation of a new series of techniques for preempting and 
governing the emergence of mass violence by engineering social identities away from 
their antagonistic structure.  
Benjamin Valentino’s work Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 
20th Century offers a similar approach to the study of genocide. Valentino argues that 
genocide and mass killing may be best understood from “a strategic perspective [that] 
suggests that mass killing is most accurately viewed as an instrumental policy- a brutal 
strategy designed to accomplish leaders’ most important ideological or political 
objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats.”169 Like Shaw, 
Card, and Harff and Gurr, Valentino criticizes the UNGC’s limited definition of groups. 
Valentino points to classes of victims, such as the Mischlinge, who defy simple 
categorization and the inclusion of multiple discrete groups in episodes of mass killing.170 
Moreover, Valentino challenges the focus on identity, social structures, and scapegoating 
as insufficient causal explanations of the outbreak of mass violence. Mass violence 
occurs, Valentino argues, at a particular moment when political elites decide that mass 
violence is an important tool to achieve a specific outcome. According to Valentino, 
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leaders, parties, or militias initially embark on projects of societal transformation and 
only later turn to mass killing and genocide as a mechanism for realizing these dreams.171  
Using this framework, Valentino identifies three different types of ideological 
regimes that participate in genocide and argues that they are responsible for the largest 
mass killing events in history: Communist regimes including the Soviet Union under 
Stalin, China under Mao Zedong, and Cambodia under Pol Pot; racial, ethnic, and 
nationalist movements such as Nazi Germany or the Young Turks in the Ottoman 
Empire; and, counter-guerrilla efforts such as the mass killing in Guatemala and 
Afghanistan. In each case, Valentino discerns an ideological agenda on the part elites for 
a grand project of social engineering. According to Valentino, famine, starvation, forced 
labor, and the displacement of minorities are incorporated into a prolonged process of 
reshaping society. When efforts to change society fail or are placed in strategic jeopardy, 
mass killing and genocide occur as a final strategic maneuver. The appeal of this 
understanding of genocide, according to Valentino, is that it includes many different 
forms of victimization (and hence different types of groups) while providing critical 
evidence about how mass killing events emerge against a backdrop of discrimination or 
dehumanization. Group identity is, for Valentino, incidental to the strategic decision to 
engage in acts of genocide and mass killing.  
Valentino’s approach parallels Harff and Gurr by setting aside the UNGC’s 
emphasis on ethnic, racial, national or religious identity in favor of focusing solely on the 
outbreak of mass killing. However, Valentino’s argument also parses the social field by 
treating ideology and social structure as less important elements of genocide. This has 
important consequences for his argument because he abstracts ‘strategic decisions’ from 
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the larger social context in which they take place. In doing so, Valentino has difficulty 
explaining how decisions become ‘strategic’ in the first place. Furthermore, Valentino 
reads the development of ideology and social engineering as exceptional to normal 
democratic political affairs. Consequently, Valentino explicitly states that democratic 
states are largely immune to episodes of genocidal violence. As such, Valentino starkly 
details the dangers of Nazism, Communist China, and the Soviet Union but leaves 
unexplored colonial genocide in the Americas, Australia, and Africa. Indeed, Valentino’s 
theory succumbs to the temptation to view genocide exclusively a byproduct of state 
action rather than an emergent dimension of a complex social formation in which 
violence becomes part of the making of new forms of identity.172  
An overt focus on a leader’s choices has several consequences for the study of 
genocide. First, it depreciates the social conditions within which these choices are made, 
ignores the discourses that make a ‘choice’ sensible, and neglects the fact that ‘leaders’ 
operate within a broader social milieu. Second, it overemphasizes states and 
organizations at the expense of thinking through the way in which mass violence has a 
vital performative function in the reformulation of identity. In this regard, Valentino’s 
argument loses the value of thinking in terms of group identity where acts of political 
control that fall short of mass murder have an similarly destructive effect on a subject 
group. Third, as Valentino admits, his definition of intentional killing requires must 
include forced deportation and labor or organized famine and disease. However, 
Valentino only examines these acts when leaders explicitly state or indicate that they 
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intend to create these effects.173 The end product is a story in which violence against 
specific groups appears as a fundamentally irrational byproduct of anomalous ideological 
investments on the part of rogue leaders. Valentino thus simplifies the complex relation 
between acts of control, political violence, and identity in favor of producing a 
supposedly rational account of strategic behavior.174 
What unites Valentino, Harff and Gurr, and many other scholars is a discontent 
with the terms of the UNGC. Social constructionists respond to this problem by 
highlighting the relational and constructed nature of identity, these scholars attempt to 
‘disidentify’ genocide by studying mass violence as a phenomenon independent of the 
group that it afflicts. In effect, this converts acts of mass violence themselves into an 
analytical device abstracted from the context in which it occurs. However, by abstracting 
violence from context, this approach substitutes an intrinsic feature of group identity 
(racial, ethnic, religious or national identity) for an arbitrary claim that genocide emerges 
as a byproduct of social engineering. In this sense, this set of scholars invoke identity as 
an explanatory principle for the irrational outbreak of violence while, at the same time, 
ignoring how group identity operates differently in discrete political contexts. As such, 
the notion of the group at work here supports condemnation of genocide in extremely 
limited circumstances. Moreover, by implication, the study of mass violence ignores how 
processes of social exclusion subtend the mass physical killing these scholars highlight 
and also how those processes of social exclusion themselves contribute to the 
reproduction of the identity of both victims and perpetrators. Writing out the dynamic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Valentino’s inclusion of the Khmer Rouge is somewhat strange in these terms for two reasons. First, the 
distance of the Khmer from traditional forms of communism as well as the appeal of the Khmer Rouge to 
ethnic group in the Khmer Empire. Second, the uniqueness of the Khmer’s ‘auto-genocide,’ which did not 
rely nearly as forcefully on traditional Marxist or Leninist categories. 
174 On the distinction between extensive and intensive see Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 289-294. 
	   89 
process that produces social violence, this scholarship begs the question why do groups 
remain so important to the study of genocide or mass killing at all? 
 
The Normative Understanding of the Group 
From Lemkin, to the UNGC, to contemporary scholarship the notion of the group 
has undergone significant transformations. In Lemkin’s case, the porous, cluttered 
‘national minority’ or ‘collective’ is analogized to the autonomous legal subject. With the 
UNGC, the group is defined by stable predicates or categories of identity. Later scholars, 
troubled by the limits of the UNGC, either seek to add complexity to the group by 
exploring its social construction or try to abandon the notion altogether. What remains 
consistent across all of these efforts is the attempt to produce a notion of the group in 
terms of identity. Indeed, the four different formulations of the group we have seen so far 
could be described as applying four different procedures to arrive at a stable relationship 
between identity and the notion of the group. For example, Lemkin ties the group 
together by using an analogy between the murder of a legal individual and the genocide 
of a larger collectivity, while the UNGC describes the group in terms of specific static 
categories of identity such as race and ethnicity. Similarly, more recent genocide scholars 
draw heavily on normalized rubrics of identity to explain the outbreak of genocide. 
Although the form, substance, and nature of identity differs in each account, the 
normative understanding of genocide consistently rearticulates genocide as a problem of 
identity  
The thematic repetition of the relationship between the group and identity begs 
two questions. First, how do different normative understandings link genocide and 
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identity in order to include or exclude distinct groups, events, or histories from the 
politics of genocide? Second, what productive effects does the link between identity, the 
group, and genocide have in the politics of genocide more broadly? Answering these 
questions requires a better understanding of the function of identity in the normative 
understanding of genocide or, put differently, what identity enables the notion of the 
group and the concept of genocide to do. I argue that identity offers the normative 
understanding of genocide a method for stabilizing or freezing a destructive event within 
a particular space and time. In other words, identity produces a rubric for thinking about 
genocide as an occurrence linked to a specific, determinable set of circumstances and, 
consequently, enables the construction of knowledge and morality surrounding genocide. 
Virtually every theory of genocide from Lemkin, to the UNGC, to contemporary theories 
repeats this series of theoretical gestures. Claudia Card, for example, defines the group by 
the loss of a social world and uses this distinction to extend genocide to colonial 
communities while explicitly rejecting corporate entities as subjects of genocide. Yehuda 
Bauer contends that the nature of anti-Jewish violence makes the Nazi Genocide the only 
real case of genocide.175 While Card and Bauer come to very different conclusions, the 
normative understanding of the group functions in a similar fashion in both accounts. 
This understanding ranges from a rigid, exclusionary even explicitly violent treatment of 
what constitutes a subject of genocide to more supple determinations of group inclusion. 
Each approach places the problem of identity at the center of its considerations and 
determines when identity becomes meaningful according to its own logic of sense. The 
normative understanding of the group, and the tensions between different normative 
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understandings, thus participate in the legitimation of different claims regarding the status 
of genocide. However, all of these claims also function as part of a broader assemblage or 
discursive network that increasingly prioritizes identity in global politics.  
In this network, the appeal to the rubric of identity is an artifact of power, which 
links the concept of genocide to a discrete series of historical events. Moreover, identity 
plays a crucial role in the politics of genocide because it distinguishes genocide as a form 
of crime from other criminal categories. Put differently, what separates genocide from a 
crime against humanity or mass murder is the element of identity. Identity is the 
difference that marks the concept of genocide as making a difference politically. 
Genocide consequently constitutes a different kind of politics on the basis of the 
difference identity makes. Without a claim about identity, the politics of genocide would, 
in a sense, lose its own identity or ground to make claims about the unique value of the 
destruction of a group. What differentiates the normative understanding is an effort to 
circumscribe the forms of life that may be subject to genocide. Identity becomes, in 
effect, a mode of policing invocations of genocide, but also a device for governing the 
relationship between the outbreak of mass violence and historical understanding. By 
framing genocide as an event that afflicts only particular regions, religions, or social 
structures, identity plays an inscriptive role in placing boundaries on when, where and 
how genocide can be said to have taken place. In effect, identity determines a priori what 
forms of difference may be subject to genocide and ascribes how this subjection takes 
place. Unsurprisingly, genocide discourse tends to ascribe value to dominant registers, 
forms, and terms of identity at the expense of forms of life, which elude easy 
categorization. As such, those forms of life that differ from the images and terms of the 
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normative understanding are abandoned, shunted into the generic rubric of crimes against 
humanity, or eliminated altogether from political consideration. In this sense, the politics 
of genocide is caught up in a sovereign decision on the value or nonvalue of group life. 
As the introduction to this chapter demonstrated, these decisions have real force in global 
politics as they turn international attention away from one crisis, such as the DRC, and 
towards another, such as Darfur. Moreover, they encourage subject groups to represent 
themselves within specific rubrics of identity in order to receive recognition in global 
politics. As the first chapter described with the case of the Basarwa, the modes of 
recognition at stake often have a corrosive effect on the reproduction of social life by 
forcing groups to document their lives in accordance with Western political categories. In 
this regard, the limits imposed by the normative understanding produce a unification of 
identity-based claims in global politics.  
However, the restrictions imposed on a group’s self-representation are only a 
single example of the productive effects of the link between identity and the group. In 
many cases, the connection between genocide and identity actively reconstitutes a 
group’s sense of self. By this I mean that the discourse on genocide displaces traditional 
narratives, practices, and rubrics of social life and becomes citational as part of a group’s 
lineage. In this way, the normative understanding freezes the relationship between group 
identity, a set of historical traumas, political responsibility, and contemporary social life. 
This practice not only stabilizes a group’s identity as victims of collective destruction it 
also advances an increasingly conservative image of politics as a site for the protection of 
predetermined identities rather than collective collaboration toward challenging political 
violence. For instance, demands to mourn or attend to the Nazi Genocide often 
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overshadow other episodes of mass atrocity on account of the special connection between 
Jewish identity, mass violence, and political responsibility. As a site of collective trauma, 
the Nazi experience has also, in many respects, produced a new set of terms of identity 
that so starkly structure contemporary Jewish American identity that Jewishness is often 
articulated more in relation to the Holocaust than religious practice. In other words, for 
many, to be Jewish is now to be first and foremost the subject of contemporary political 
violence. 
What this example illustrates is how the link between identity and genocide 
becomes a technology of biopolitical governance where the life or destiny of a group can 
be managed within a specific frame of historical injury. The reification of the relations 
between identity, history, and politics isolate genocide to particular groups (as victims) at 
particular times (or events) and assigns them a priority in global politics. This new 
understanding of genocide, in turn, organizes how a larger set of global institutions, 
regimes, and states interact with a group. Genocide thus becomes an inescapable rubric 
that limits the capacity of many groups to change since what defines them is an 
institutionally bounded set of practices that continually appeal to a fixed history of injury. 
In a sense, genocide becomes the identity of a group thereby displacing and rearranging 
innumerable facets of group life. To draw upon Wendy Brown’s brilliant discussion of 
how claims of injury work to depoliticize the relationship between identity and the state, 
genocide reproduces injurious relationships by transforming a people’s entire relationship 
with a given state into a history of violence thereby reconstituting the state as a veritable 
state of injury.176 This reconstruction immunizes broader political and social systems 
from scrutiny by sequestering the site of violation in a specific historical relationship 
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between a perpetrating entity (state or military) and a victimized identity (the group). In 
this way, the absence of international reflection on the crime of genocide is part of the 
makeup of the concept itself, which circumvents the broader reflection on the production 
of identity and the conditions of possibility for genocide by isolating acts of violence to 
select categories of identity and experiences of violence. 
Democratic states work especially hard to frame histories of violence out of their 
narratives of self because they pose a problem for the equality that founds the dream of 
liberal statecraft. The notion of identity thus plays a particularly important role in 
positioning the history of genocide vis-a-vis the democratic legacy. Indeed, in the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two, the precise limits set with respect to the 
International Military Tribunals and the Japanese War Crime Tribunals indicate a strong 
effort to annul the violence of Western liberal democracies and Communist projects by 
isolating the origins of genocide to an ‘uncivilized’ (read radical otherness) outbreak on 
the part of the Nazi movement. In this regard, Leo Kuper’s argument that Western states 
were unwilling to accept the language of ‘cultural genocide’ because it might expose 
them to scrutiny understates how critical limiting the concept of genocide was for the 
emerging political order. The normative understanding of genocide consequently 
functions not only to tie a group’s history to the outbreak of mass violence, but also to 
establish a narrative frame that connects genocide exclusively with the Nazi Genocide in 
order to advance broader global political visions about the democratic and communist 
project.  
The inclusion or exclusion of different groups thus hinges on the work of sense, 
which affords particular forms of life legibility in international politics. As such, the 
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forms of identity protected by the UNGC and defended by the normative understanding 
of genocide tend to reify preexisting conceptions of political life. In this way, the concept 
of genocide tends to politicize the destruction of groups that accord with common 
sensibilities about how social life is organized. Groups and events that do not fit within 
this frames or that fail to register as worthy of international recognition consequently 
disappear. Identities predicated on static, eternal, or largely unalterable relations 
consequently find a privileged place in the politics of genocide. However, I argue that 
these frames are contestable. The concept of genocide could also apply to broader, 
multidimensional, complex associations that form through the messy interdependencies, 
affinities, and assemblages that mark political life. Pushed in this direction, I contend that 
the concept of genocide might stretch to incorporate novel forms of political community. 
What limits this capacity is the work of sense, which constrains the concept of genocide 
to dominant registers of intelligibility. Sense anchors the concept of genocide in 
normative categories, which protect certain identities at the expense of others. These 
categories, in turn, limit the forms of political inquiry into genocide by reinforcing the 
importance of finding an intrinsic connection between identity and violence. This 
emphasis on the intrinsic importance of some forms of identity reflects a mode of 
political theology that both reproduces problematic constellations of international 
political power and sanctifies acts to save specific forms of life.  
The intrinsic form of identity protected by the normative understanding also 
produces a certain temporal tension in the heart of the notion of the group itself.  In 
particular, the intrinsic conception of identity affords groups a sense of permanence. The 
group’s identity, as understood by the normative understanding, functions as the common 
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feature that ties together all the members of the group. The intrinsic feature of identity 
thus serves as a kind of organic substrate that endows the lives of the members of a group 
with meaning, significance, and distinction. The destruction of a group consequently 
takes place when this identity gets placed into jeopardy. Indeed, since Lemkin’s time, 
genocide has been thought of as a dual phenomenon targeting the individual, but only in 
their capacity as a member of a group. Genocide, however, also involves the destruction 
of this group. The notion that a group could be destroyed implies a historical or temporal 
capacity for a group to disappear or cease to exist. The temporal uncertainty of the notion 
of destruction stands in direct tension to the permanence of the intrinsic form of identity.  
The normative understanding of genocide consequently endows groups with a 
permanence that makes it all the more difficult to apprehend their fragility, vulnerability 
or the possibility of their destruction.  
This structure creates several problems for the politics of genocide. First, intrinsic 
identity renders the loss of members of a group non-genocidal since the groups identity is 
preserved as long as one of its members remain alive. Put differently, a group can suffer 
tremendous losses before it crosses a threshold where the violence directed against it 
becomes genocidal. Consequently, as a product of the tension in the concept, 
determinations of genocide always arrive too-late occurring after serious peril has already 
struck a group. Second, static understandings of identity endow groups with a 
permanence that makes them seem less vulnerable to harm. The reproduction of identity, 
however, requires a sustained set of practices, habits, and social continuities that replicate 
themselves (while varying) over time. Violence in numerous forms can afflict a group 
and undermine this capacity for reproduction without the individual members of a group 
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necessarily succumbing to mortal danger. In a sense, the damages inflicted by destructive 
acts may not register on the sinews of group life in an immediate way. Forms of slow 
death and deterioration thus constitute an insidious combination that may undermine a 
group’s capacity to flourish in ways that elude the prescriptive notion of intrinsic identity 
at work in the normative understanding. In this regard, the destruction of a group may, in 
a sense, precede the arrival of physical violence. Yet, normative understanding of the 
group makes this form of destruction almost entirely illegible.  
Identity consequently produces a series of political problems, which are typically 
ignored in the politics of genocide. The priority of intrinsic identity, in particular, makes 
the recognition of novel forms of life and political violence all the more difficult. 
Moreover, the normative understanding actively intervenes in the self-creation of 
numerous political communities and introduces temporal mechanics into the politics of 
genocide that make prevention of mass violence more challenging. However, the 
normative understanding of genocide offers only one interpretation of the group. An 
alternative, possibly more productive sense, was already at work in Lemkin’s original 
writings on the concept. This sense of the group remains ungrounded by the analogy 
between murder and the destruction of the group and is audible in Lemkin’s declaration 
that genocide constituted not an unprecedented event (for Lemkin understood it had 
occurred throughout history), but an event with a terrifying precedent to undermine the 
foundations of global politics. Genocide threatened politics because it had the capacity to 
sweep up states, nations and peoples into novel processes of destruction. Indeed, Lemkin 
offered a description of the numerous forms of genocide coordinated under Nazi Europe 
and explored the open-ended nature of this violence. In this respect, what was novel 
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about genocide was not the attempt to exterminate certain forms of identity, but the way 
in which genocide swept together numerous identities in a process that exposed a 
multitude of constituencies to death. The group’s identity is, in these moments in 
Lemkin’s writing, secondary to the terrifying realization that the politics of the nation, a 
preliminary to biopolitics, shifted the terrain of violence to incorporate the destruction of 
a multitude of communities. This danger posed a hazard because, as Lemkin remarked, it 
could cross boundaries, both civil and social, and reconstitute the terms of value 
underlying political life. The call for an open-ended notion of the group thus reflects an 
awareness that the horror of genocide stems less from the importance of identity than the 
emergence of a thanatopolitical process woven into the fabric of a biopolitical age. The 
value of returning to a more open conception of the group is thus not only that it 
challenges the limits imposed on recognition or the more conservative features of 
contemporary identity politics, but also that it politicizes genocide as a form of process 
that recurs in numerous forms in global politics. This reading implies a radically different 
reading of the notion of the group. It would entail, for instance, constructing the notion of 
the group following the lines of functional interactions, non-intrinsic relationships, or 
statistical distributions would radically shift the way genocide would be thought about by 
problematizing things such as the destruction of a city, a class or a population not marked 
by the same forms static identity deployed by the normative understanding of genocide. 
In this way, genocide opens the door for remapping the terrain of contemporary political 
violence by highlighting the divergent possibilities for the formation of larger political 
identities (either marked by identity or not). A politics of genocide guided by this open 
notion of the group would decouple the link between injury, identity, and politics by 
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acknowledging the mutual constitution of difference, identity, and destructive power. The 
politics of genocide would consequently ‘become’ along with the transformations of 
groups and mechanisms of destruction. Unfortunately, the paradigm currently at work in 
the politics of genocide insists on particular forms of identity and inscribes them into 
international relations. Genocide marks an injury that becomes a site of governance and 
political power, which carelessly overwrites difference, erases many forms of mass 
violence, and often acts in complicity with destructive processes. Yet, this notion of the 
group enables genocide to be thought of as an event defined by distinct temporal and 
historical boundaries, cultural codes, and thus allows genocide to become distinct from 
politics writ large. In this way, the politics of genocide resonates with expansive 
humanitarian imaginaries that licenses intervention and non-intervention depending on 
the particular case at hand. Behind this is a bleaker process of cynicism that thinks of life 
as marked by a constitutive vulnerability and of politics as corrupt at best and lethal at 
worst. In this vein, the group becomes a site for the operation of political power to 
delegitimize states, parties, and other actors and usurp their authority in order to protect 
certain forms of identity.  
 Nonetheless, groups form a critical part of the politics of genocide by 
distinguishing the crime from other concepts. The normative understanding links the 
intelligibility of groups to specific forms of identity whether analogy, predicates, or 
resemblances and, in doing so, renders genocide apolitical. Moreover, by making injury 
constitutive of identity, the normative understanding obscures the conditions of 
possibility for the emergence of genocide and locates genocide within a strictly 
unintelligible, yet knowable outside. This permits, in effect, a series of technologies of 
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governance to ‘rescue’ societies from themselves by imposing stable governance, 
territorial partitions, or permanent security apparatuses to prevent the outbreak of 
genocide. In this context, the concept of genocide produces a form of sense that renders 
these strategies necessary. A set of implicit presuppositions thus come to guide the 
application of the concept genocide, restricting not only the groups that count, but the 
very mode of composing the relationship between groups and politics. In this sense, even 
expanding the number of groups subject to genocide misses how the articulation of the 
group distances this very entity from the set of exclusions, violences or forms of power 
that produce it. In effect, this turns genocide into a cypher that overcodes other relations, 
forms of violence, and domination in accordance with one paradigm of power. This 
process involves all kinds of de facto exceptions, cultural biases, or social provisions that 
remain productive of the form of genocide intervention. For this reason, simply 
expanding the number of groups recognized as subjects of genocide misses how the stale 
reiteration of the same formula ultimately undergirds the use of the concept in 
contemporary politics.  
 
Threshold: We Charge Genocide 
 In December 1951, William L. Patterson and Paul Robeson separately delivered 
copies of a book entitled We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the 
Negro People to a UN delegation in Paris and the UN headquarters in New York City. 
This book was a product of meticulous effort to document the systematic genocide of 
black Americans living under segregation. We Charge Genocide begins by stating its 
central contention: “out of the inhuman black ghettos of American cities, out of the 
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cotton plantations of the South, comes this record of mass slayings on the basis of race, of 
lives deliberately warped and distorted by the willful creation of conditions making for 
premature death, poverty, and disease...[an] ever-increasing violation of the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.177 The 
document continues by illustrating how various components of federal, state, and 
municipal policy violate the UNGC on the grounds of mass killing, inflicting mental 
harm, and undermining the conditions of life for members of a racial group. The petition 
also argues that under the terms of the UN Charter the United States, as a signatory of the 
UNGC, is subject to the convention and required to repeal all of its racist laws and 
procedures. Indeed, We Charge Genocide warns “the distinctive trait of this genocide is a 
cant that mouths aphorisms of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence even as it kills,” and, as such, 
the petition explicitly appeals to representatives from India, Egypt and the broader 
postcolonial world to call on the US to seek justice.178  
 The text of We Charge Genocide constitutes nothing short of a scrupulous 
description of the systematic and structural conditions of anti-black racism in the US. It 
makes explicit links between statements made by the Nazi regime and the public 
incitement to white supremacy by American lawmakers. The text amasses hundreds of 
detailed descriptions and cases of lynching and killings in mass. It also illustrates the 
coercive effect of segregation on the health and livelihood of black Americans using a 
variety of statistical and sociological metrics. We Charge Genocide likewise includes 
incredible insights on the theoretical and political problems that result from placing a 
genocidal policy at the heart of the democratic endeavor: “White supremacy at home 
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makes for colored massacres abroad. Both reveal contempt for human life in a colored 
skin. Jellied gasoline in Korea and the lynchers’ faggot at home are connected in more 
ways than that both result in death by fire. The lyncher and the atom bomb are related.”179 
We Charge Genocide connects these contemporary examples of racist violence and 
murder to centuries old legacy of slavery, structures of corporate and economic power, 
and the production of political elitism.  
 The veracity and tenacity of many of the claims of We Charge Genocide are hard 
to question. As the document indicates, ratification of the UNGC was opposed by groups 
as disparate as the American Bar Association and Ku Klux Klan on account of the 
potential for the treaty to change domestic politics. Evidence, We Charge Genocide 
contends, of the vitality of racism to the current American legal order. Indeed, even a 
separate review of the document by officials within the Justice Department found We 
Charge Genocide incredibly meticulous and convincing.180 Given its credibility, the book 
posed a serious danger to established interests on a number of fronts. For instance, if 
accepted by the UNGC, We Charge Genocide would have obvious repercussions on the 
formal policy of segregation throughout the United States. Moreover, the petition 
disrupted an American strategy at the UN to use the human rights agenda to undermine 
the credibility of the Soviet bloc. In this sense, We Charge Genocide actualized the fears 
of a set of forces committed to the status quo. As a result, the US worked to undermine 
the petition. The US embassy attempted to seize Patterson’s passport when he arrived in 
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Paris and impeded his efforts to communicate with other delegates.181 Eleanor Roosevelt, 
who was a significant figure in the promotion of the human rights agenda, vehemently 
attacked We Charge Genocide.182 Even Raphael Lemkin espoused his disagreements with 
notion that segregation constituted a form of genocide. However, the petition was 
ultimately dismissed on the grounds that We Charge Genocide demonstrated the 
existence of ‘economic’ rather than ‘racial’ genocide and, as such, was not covered by the 
terms of the UNGC.183  
 As contemporary scholars have noted, We Charge Genocide also had its limits. 
The text reproduces a Eurocentric understanding of racism and was, in fact, largely 
written with communist and economic conditions in mind.184 Nonetheless, the history of 
this document reveals several important insights into the politics of genocide and the 
legacy of the notion of the group. For example, dominant narratives about the American 
reluctance to ratify the UNGC often frame these objections in terms of a concern for 
national sovereignty. What the legacy of We Charge Genocide reveals, to the contrary, is 
the racialization of these arguments and the explicit awareness and even acceptance that 
racist policies in the US constituted a form of genocide. The fact that the US appears in 
one of the first formal indictments on the basis of genocide is likewise excluded from 
dominant histories on the subject. Moreover, the example shows that the UNGC’s 
protections achieved force of law only with implicit or constitutive exceptions in place 
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for marginalized groups.185 The normative understanding of genocide consequently 
emerges with potent limits on what forms of group life may make claims regarding the 
status of genocide. 
 However, the defeat of We Charge Genocide is equally interesting. The decision 
to disregard the case on the basis of the type of group identity (economic versus racial) 
strongly suggests a willful effort to disregard the legacies of anti-black racism. Moreover, 
it constitutes a manipulation of the terms of the normative understanding for the purposes 
of evading the implications of the UNGC. The success of this manipulation required the 
UN delegates to prioritize the different acts constitutive of genocide rather than the 
explicit racial animus behind segregation. By studying this series of actions, the UN 
could conclude that the acts of destruction constituted economic rather than racial 
genocide. The concern for the type of group was consequently displaced in favor of a 
close reading of the different acts of destruction directed against the population such as 
mass killings, inflicting mental harm, and producing conditions inimical to group life. In 
other words, faced with exemplary evidence of the ongoing genocide in the United 
States, evidence even US officials conceded was very convincing, the UN appealed to the 
destruction part of the concept to dismiss allegations about the group subject to genocide. 
The acts of destruction, the UN implicitly claimed, demonstrated that the real target of 
segregation was an economic rather than racial group and was therefore not subject to the 
protection of the UNGC. Setting aside the terrifying duplicity of this maneuver, the 
defeat of We Charge Genocide illustrates how the notion of the group emerges in relation 
to the notion of destruction and, moreover, reveals a constitutive relationship between 
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acts or processes of destruction and the groups destroyed. In the case of We Charge 
Genocide, the connection between groups and destruction was abused for the purposes of 
depoliticizing the petition and safeguarding forms of exclusion implicitly written into 
international law. Yet, this connection also opens up new grounds for rethinking the 
notion of genocide in order to counter the hegemony of the normative understanding and 
its insistence on particular forms of static identity. As the next chapter discusses, if 
destructive acts constitute the groups subject to genocide then the birth of new processes 
of destruction would force us to similarly introduce new, emergent subjects of genocide. 
The enormous effort expended to defeat We Charge Genocide illustrates the explosive 
capacity for the concept of genocide to politicize conditions in a way that threatens social 
orders at the deepest level. 
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Chapter 3: Destruction 
A significant portion of genocide scholarship and activism is dedicated to the 
undeniably important exercise of comparing different episodes of identity-based mass 
killing.186 The previous chapter demonstrates how these efforts are often oriented around 
the question of what groups or identities constitute legitimate subjects of genocide. 
However, identity is only one component of the concept of genocide and the intense 
focus on identity, while important, muddles a different part of the concept dealing with 
‘destruction.’ Indeed, the presumption that genocide denotes the fact or occurrence of 
mass killing, rather than a multifaceted process of destruction, is a product of the 
normative understanding of genocide.187 This chapter argues that the discursive reduction 
of destruction to mass killing is problematic for three reasons. First, it produces a form of 
scholarship that examines specific empirical outcomes rather than the conditions and 
practices fostering the emergence of mass violence. Second, the focus on mass killing 
excludes other notions of destruction that were previously incorporated into the discourse 
of genocide and ultimately limits our understanding of how genocide occurs. Third, this 
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interpretation conceals what I refer to as the ‘productive dimension’ of destructive 
processes. By ‘productive dimension,’ I mean the capacity of destructive processes to 
create new forms of violence and political identity. The productive dimension of 
destruction complicates the static ontology underlying the normative understanding of 
genocide.   
Historically, the primary challenge to the normative understanding of genocide 
has come in the form of scholarship on ‘cultural genocide.’ Cultural genocide theorists 
treat groups (the entities destroyed by genocide) as qualitatively different entities from 
the human beings that compose them.188 Consequently, scholars of cultural genocide 
have examined a broader array of destructive practices, such as displacement, restrictions 
on marriage, or the elimination of language, as constitutive of genocide and discussed the 
relationship between these practices and politics in greater detail. Unfortunately, the 
notion of cultural genocide has been marginalized since the creation of the UNGC and 
the subsequent rise of the normative understanding of genocide. The socio-cultural 
component of genocide has thus turned into little more than an identity-marker of group 
membership. This supports a highly restricted concept of genocide defined by the mass 
killing of individuals based on predefined identity categories, which effectively 
transforms genocide into a hate crime on a massive scale.  
Scholars of cultural genocide not only incorporate different acts into the concept, 
but also develop a more dynamic notion of genocide based on complex socio-political 
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interactions. In doing so, theorists of cultural genocide reveal how destruction, as a 
productive process, generates new mechanisms, techniques, and forms of violence.189 
Moreover, cultural genocide theorists allude to the possibility that destructive 
processes,190 through practices of otherization and securitization, can create the very 
groups they destroy.191 Despite suffering gratuitous violence, these groups often elude the 
fixed identity categories associated with genocide, and the violence directed against them 
rarely produces a widespread reaction because they are implicitly disqualified as subjects 
of genocide according to the normative understanding. Destruction thus has an equally 
potent role in how the intelligibility of the concept of genocide becomes implicated in 
contemporary politics. 
In order to describe this process, this chapter outlines the discursive history of 
‘destruction’ as part of the concept of genocide, examining how different techniques, 
rubrics and practices came to be understood as acts, modes or forms of genocide. 
Beginning with Lemkin’s exhaustive discussion of the techniques of genocide and ending 
with the now-dominant focus on mass killing, this chapter is organized into four 
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sections.192 The first section turns to Lemkin’s work and the subsequent drafts of the 
UNGC in order to explore the early thinking on destruction. This section illustrates how 
the creation of the UNGC limited the notion of destruction and set the stage for the 
appearance of the normative understanding of genocide. The second section evaluates 
two divergent trends with respect to genocide scholarship: the consolidation of a 
normative understanding of genocide that equates destruction with mass killing and a 
minor tradition revitalizing the notion of cultural genocide. This section compares the 
normative understanding’s static ontology and focus on the fact of destruction with the 
implications of cultural genocide’s dynamic ontology and emphasis on the process of 
destruction. The third section discusses several problems that result from the presumption 
that destruction simply means mass killing. In particular, it highlights how this normative 
understanding obscures the emergence of new forms of mass violence and promotes 
practices of genocide prevention that often exacerbate conflict. The final section explores 
the implications of these ontologies for the politics of genocide. In particular, it argues 
that a dynamic notion of ‘destruction’ is essential when theorizing the constitutive power 
of destruction in the politics of genocide.  
 
Lemkin and the Genocide Convention 
The notion of destruction is arguably the most important part of Lemkin’s 
formulation of genocide. Lemkin first describes genocide as “the destruction of a nation 
or of an ethnic group.”193 However, genocide could not be reduced to a single type of 
killing such “tyrannicide, homicide, infanticide [because]…genocide does not necessarily 
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mean the immediate destruction of a nation except when accomplished by mass killings 
of all members of a nation.”194 Rather, Lemkin thought genocide involved a variety of 
acts that destroy “the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves.”195 In these lines, Lemkin states plainly that mass 
killing is only one aspect or form of genocide among others.  
Lemkin also conceptualizes genocide as a type of war that extends and 
accomplishes strategic aims even in times of peace. While contemporary genocide 
scholars such as Martin Shaw and Scott Straus stress war’s relationship to genocide, they 
do so primarily to consider how genocide becomes a strategic priority in armed 
conflict.196 Lemkin’s text hints at something deeper: genocide is an innovation of the 
practice of war. For Lemkin, the insidious novelty of Nazism lay in the fact that the Nazis 
directed their campaigns against a people rather than a state. For Lemkin, this meant that 
the existing laws of war were crucially out of step with the reality of genocide. Read in 
this light, Lemkin evinces an awareness of the fluid relationship between war, genocide, 
and a multitude of practices of violence. This awareness motivated Lemkin to write such 
exhaustive descriptions of different techniques of genocide and insist on a generic 
definition of genocide that could not be reduced to a specific type of destructive act.  
Lemkin’s discussion of different techniques of destruction includes political, 
social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral forms of genocide.197 
Each of these techniques imperils different elements of group life. His description of 
physical techniques, for instance, includes practices such as racial discrimination in 
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feeding, endangering health, and mass killing.198 ‘Social techniques’ include the 
destruction of local legal and court systems or attacks on established clergy. ‘Political 
techniques ‘include limiting the creation of political parties, and ‘cultural techniques’ 
include compulsory education, exclusion from “the benefit of liberal arts studies” and 
“rigid control of…painting, drawing, sculpture, music, literature, and theatre.”199 
Techniques of destruction thus range from bodily injury to the sale of pornography. 
Lemkin also creates a list of ‘biological’ techniques of genocide that included fostering 
undernourishment, separating men and women, or forbidding marriages.200 Here, Lemkin 
extends the sense of ‘biological’ in surprising ways. Lemkin’s complete list of techniques 
suggests that his understanding of destruction is porous and open-ended, fusing elements 
of social and biological life to the body. This list is also guided more by the question of 
whether a practice jeopardizes a group’s existence than the character of a specific act 
such as racially discriminate killing. Indeed, as Claudia Card argues, Lemkin articulates a 
version of genocide as social death, which does not necessitate the death of every 
member of a group so much as the annihilation of a social world.201 
Before turning to the UNGC, it is important to consider how Lemkin situates 
genocide in the broader context of war. Early in Axis Rule he writes: “genocide is the 
antithesis of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine…[which] holds that war is directed against 
sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians.”202 He warrants this observation 
by stating: “the Germans prepared, waged, and continued a war not merely against states 
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and armies but against peoples.”203 This transformation of the object of war has a series 
of repercussions on the practice, strategy, and logistics of the Nazi campaign. In 
particular, as the goals of war detach from territorial acquisition and state power, the 
meaning of victory undergoes a modification so that winning or losing a battle no longer 
matters. Rather, the successful destruction of a people becomes the new metric for 
assessing the outcome of war regardless of how this objective is achieved. Lemkin spells 
out this new logic of war: “Because the imposition of this policy of genocide is more 
destructive for a people than injuries suffered in the actual fighting, the German people 
will be stronger than the subjugated peoples after the war even if the German army is 
defeated. In this respect genocide is a new technique of occupation aimed at winning the 
peace even though the war itself is lost.”204 For Lemkin, destruction occurs as a form of 
war, which takes the people as object and, consequently, involves a multiplicity of 
techniques, practices, and methods irreducible to traditional forms of conflict. These 
observations also help to explain why Lemkin was hesitant to endorse a static or generic 
definition of genocide because this definition would overemphasize one aspect of the 
Nazi war effort rather than looking at the broader context of a war against a people. It 
also clarifies Lemkin’s insistence on the creation of an international law prohibiting 
genocide. For Lemkin, genocide, as a form of politics, spells the end of a system of 
international law based on rights and reciprocity because it subordinates the principles of 
sovereignty to biological priorities. The creation of the UNGC, which Lemkin pursued 
until the end of his life, was supposed to rebut this possibility and restore the viability of 
an international legal framework.  
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What stands out in Lemkin’s remarks is his attentiveness to how genocide marks 
a shift in the practices of war. He identifies war’s new objects (nations, groups, people) as 
well as corresponding shifts in the practices of war (starvation, ghettoization, 
malnutrition, killing), and the priorities of war (destruction of a populace rather than 
acquisition of territory). Indeed, what Lemkin describes is that genocide constitutes a 
novel logistic of war with reverberations throughout its structure, function, and form. 
Lemkin’s insight, which few genocide scholars have discussed, is that war and genocide 
exist in a state of virtual indistinction.205 This poses a challenge to studies of armed 
conflict and genocide that subscribe to a standard accounts of armed conflict. According 
to this account, genocide is a perversion of war rather than a process co-extensive with it. 
By contrast, genocide, for Lemkin, the emergence of different techniques of destruction 
constituted a new process, which he identified as genocide. Unfortunately, the 
revolutionary significance of this insight was slowly eroded in the creation of the UNGC. 
The text of the UNGC provides a list of acts of destruction in Article 2 that, 
according to William Schabas, reflects an intention on the part of the drafters of the 
Convention to limit Lemkin’s definition of genocide to physical killing.206 Schabas 
argues that the category of ‘cultural genocide’ in particular “had hit a nerve with several 
countries who were conscious of problems with their own policies towards minority 
groups, specifically indigenous peoples and immigrants.”207 By linking genocide largely 
to direct, physical violence, many states could continue these policies while still 
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condemning genocide. Schabas’ observation is no doubt accurate, but his claim 
downplays the variations between different drafts of the UNGC. For instance, the final 
draft of the UNGC refers to mental harm, forcible transfer of children, and the creation of 
conditions inimical to group life. These references contain residues of a more expansive 
notion of destruction, which, I argue, was forceful during the drafting process.208 Indeed, 
the changes between the Secretariat draft, Ad Hoc Committee draft, and final version of 
the UNGC reveal fundamental changes in the notion of destruction from Lemkin’s 
original writings. 
The Secretariat draft divides acts of genocide into three different categories: 
physical, biological, and cultural. Physical genocide is described as acts “causing the 
death of members of a group or injuring their physical integrity” and reflects Lemkin’s 
conviction that assaults on a group could take numerous forms.209 The list of practices 
under this category includes individual executions, lack of proper housing, clothing, food 
or medical care, forced labor, excessive punishment, medical experiments, looting, denial 
of housing, and the curtailment of work. The draft also addresses acts of ‘biological 
genocide’ such as the restriction of birth by sterilization, compulsory abortion, 
segregation or obstacles to marriage. Lastly, it includes a category of cultural genocide 
that involves destroying characteristics of a group by transferring children, systematic 
exile, prohibition of national language, elimination of books or religious work, or the 
destruction of historical, religious and artistic monuments, documents or objects.210  
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The Secretariat draft follows closely from Lemkin’s work and, more importantly, 
describes a multiplicity of forms of genocide. This multiplicity admits interplay between 
the social and biological aspects of a group and considers each practice as constitutive of 
a broader crime. The criteria guiding the inclusion of an act in each case is whether or not 
the enumerated technique contributes to the destruction of group life, where life is 
understood in a broad and complex sense. The preamble to the Secretariat Draft (removed 
from later drafts) illuminates this sentiment further: “In this Convention, the word 
‘genocide’ means a criminal act directed against any one of the aforesaid groups of 
human beings, with the purpose of destroying it in whole or in part, or of preventing its 
preservation or development.”211 The framing of the Secretariat Draft suggests that the 
object of genocide extends beyond the biological life of each member of the group. In 
this sense, the Secretariat draft establishes no principle for valuing or prioritizing one 
form of destruction over another and preserves the multidimensional element of 
destruction as constitutive of genocide.  
The Ad Hoc committee’s draft of the convention alters the Secretariat’s draft in 
three ways.212 First, it eliminates the description of acts constituting the three different 
types of genocide. Mutilations, insufficient hygiene, and looting become the more 
indistinct formulation: ‘inflicting on members of the group measures or conditions.’ 
Second, the Ad Hoc draft restricts the notion of ‘cultural genocide’ by eliminating the 
article referring to the transfer of children and forced exile. A variety of practices of 
forcible population transfer and the dislocation from homeland disappear as elements of 
social life. Third, the draft marks a subtle transition from a general concern with violence 
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and privation to a more exclusive focus on mass killing by eliminating most references to 
control over the conditions of a population’s everyday life.213 This represents a shift away 
from the empirical detailing of acts of destruction toward a more constrained system of 
categorization.  
The limitations imposed on the notion of destruction become more transparent 
with the final text of the UNGC. The UNGC defines destruction largely as physical death 
and eliminates most cultural, social and other non-physical forms of destruction.214 In 
doing so, as Leo Kuper argues, colonial, imperial and communist states avoid the 
repercussions of endorsing ‘cultural’ genocide.215 However, the act of excluding these 
cultural, social and other non-physical forms of destruction is problematic not only 
because it damages our understanding of the complexity of genocide, but because it also 
implicitly legitimizes practices otherwise called into question by the Secretariat’s draft 
and Lemkin’s writings as practices of population control and management. Indeed, read 
in light of Michel Foucault’s distinction between a biopolitics that optimizes life and a 
sovereign power that takes it, the final text of the UNGC bans only the extreme exercise 
of sovereign power, opening the way for extensive optimization of life even at the cost of 
its destruction by other means.216 Indeed, the reluctance of numerous states to incorporate 
non-physical forms of destruction into the UNGC reveals how deeply these practices 
were already institutionalized as part of the backdrop of colonial population management. 
In this respect, the UNGC’s ultimate definition of genocide, in a sense, undermines the 
effort to politicize the destruction of a people by thinking this process exclusively in 
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terms of physical killing and setting aside the wayward effects of non-physical acts on the 
viability of certain forms of life. Put simply, in a biopolitical age the life or death of a 
group rarely hinges exclusively on technologies of physical killing. However, this 
remains by far the most prevalent understanding of genocide under international law.   
Another important element of the UNGC concerns the operation of sense. The 
second chapter demonstrates how the static predicates of identity detailed by the UNGC 
implicitly link group identity to biological life since the body harbors the intrinsic 
identity of a group. Here too, the priority assigned to the act of killing hinges on a sense 
that threats to biological life constitute the only threat to the viability of the group life. 
The groups under threat are, consequently, predetermined reservoirs of identity. What 
gets left out of this account of destruction is the way in which processes of destruction 
intersect with the creation of new forms of identity. Indeed, as Alexander Laban Hinton 
argues, annihilating difference is also a way of producing difference.217 The destructive 
process of genocide often produces the groups subject to destruction both because of 
discourses of otherization on the part of genocidaires and the way destructive processes 
work on a mobile, diffuse social body. The emphasis on biological destruction misses this 
constitutive dimension of destructive processes, opting instead for a static ontology that 
privileges the fact of destruction over the process of destruction and sets the stage for the 
development of the normative understanding of genocide.218  
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New Developments in Destruction 
By the start of the 1960s, due to rising concerns about the Cold War, the defeat of 
the anti-segregation movement based on genocide, the rise of self-determination 
discourse, and serious ambiguities regarding the implementation of the UNGC, the 
concept of genocide slipped out of international discourse.219 By the late 1970s, however, 
genocide had once again become a prominent political problem. Bertrand Russell and 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s highly publicized trial of the United States for genocide in the Vietnam 
War drew attention to the concept amongst the Euro-American left. At the same time, 
details of the Cultural Revolution and the publication of The Gulag Archipelago by 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, which appeared for the first time in 1973, brought to light mass 
atrocities in the Soviet Union. In the meantime, massacres (not consistently called 
genocide) in Cambodia, East Pakistan/Bangladesh, and Nigeria became subjects of 
international concern. All of a sudden anti-communist conservatives, anti-colonialist 
movements, and pro-democracy leftists found a common object of concern: genocide.  
In the US, the Vietnam War and widespread discomfort with American militarism 
instigated a moral discourse about international politics.220 This new discourse situated 
genocide in the context of a broader human rights agenda and located the UNGC and 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHDR) in the same progressive post-war 
legal moment. This continuity was a fiction. During the creation of the UNGC, Lemkin 
was openly hostile to the human rights agenda; he felt that it worked against his more 
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ambitious project of outlawing genocide.221 Nonetheless, a genocide discourse emerged 
amidst of the scandals of Vietnam, the growth of Holocaust consciousness, and public 
awareness of mass violence in Nigeria, Cambodia, and elsewhere, so human rights and 
genocide were understood as two components of a single cohesive project.222 
Consequently, acts of cultural genocide were interpreted as lesser ‘human rights 
violations’ while genocide came to be understood exclusively as mass murder.223 This 
framework established the conditions for the development of the normative 
understanding of genocide.   
Three elements of these new discourses stand out. First, genocide was recoded as 
part of a larger struggle for an ethical international order and, for the first time, opposing 
genocide became a principal way to gain moral currency in international politics.224 
Second, the growth of Holocaust consciousness in America, which began during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, became an essential reference for the politics of genocide. This 
made the Nazi genocide the standard for assessing whether acts of genocide were taking 
place.225 Third, genocide was seen as ineffective at describing the mass murders of 
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Communist states, which were principally organized around political distinctions. Indeed, 
debate emerged around the concept of ‘politicide’ as a necessary supplement to the 
UNGC.226 The discourse of state morality, the centrality of the Nazi Genocide, and the 
concern for ‘politicide’ came to define the normative understanding of genocide as mass 
killing.227  
Perhaps the exemplar of this normative understanding is RJ Rummel’s work on 
‘democide.’ Rummel’s research begins from the categorical belief that “power kills; 
absolute power kills absolutely.”228 He translates this proposition into a claim that the rate 
of murder in a given state is directly correlated with the type of government. Drawing on 
statistics of death in war and genocide, Rummel concludes that historically non-
democratic governments are responsible for the greatest amount of death. What is of 
interest in Rummel’s account, however, is his desire to innovate the concept of democide 
alongside genocide. As Rummel puts it: 
Because of such questions scholars have generalized the meaning of ‘genocide.’ In some 
cases it has been extended to include the intentional killing of people because of their 
politics or for political reasons, even though this aspect was explicitly excluded from the 
Genocide Convention. Some scholars have extended the definition of genocide to cover 
any mass murder by government. Some have stretched the concept much further, for 
example by characterizing the unintentional spread of disease to indigenous populations 
during European colonization, including that in the American West. To all these scholars, 
the critical aspect of ‘genocide’ is intentional government killing. All this is confusing. 
Both the nonkilling aspect of ‘genocide’ and the need to have a concept that covers other 
kinds of government murder have led to the following being called genocide: the denial 
of ethnic Hawaiian culture by the U.S.-run public school system in Hawai’i; 
governmental policies that let one race adopt the children of another race; African slavery 
by Whites; South African Apartheid; the murder of women by men; death squad murders 
in Guatemala; deaths in the Soviet Gulag; and of course, the Jewish Holocaust. The 
linking of such diverse acts or deaths under one label created an acute conceptual 
problem that begged for the invention of a new concept that covers and is limited to 
intentional governmental murder.229 
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Rummel’s argument is telling in two respects. First, he treats genocide as a confusing 
concept on account of its application to so many different issues. This, he surmises, 
includes absurd examples that detract from state-sanctioned mass killing. Second, 
Rummel contends state sanctioned mass murder constitutes the sole phenomenon of 
interest to genocide scholars 
Rummel’s position has been contested on a variety of grounds: he groups together 
many different political events, he attributes deaths to states that are inadvertent 
byproducts of war, and he draws a fairly arbitrary distinction between democratic, 
authoritarian and totalitarian state types. Nonetheless, his argument is important because 
of the way it contributes to the elaboration of mass killing as the exclusive act defining 
destruction and genocide. Rummel uses this definition to engage in a comparative 
assessment of historical events in order to locate the authoritarian state structures at the 
root of all political violence. This tendency is most evident in his discussion of ‘absolute 
power,’ a term he employs without discussing what constitutes power, how power 
operates, or how states exercise power.230 Rummel’s work is littered with these kinds of 
common sense and normative assertions regarding both concepts and the phenomena they 
describe. In this way, his work reproduces the three elements of the new discourse on 
genocide: employing a moral discourse on international politics (evident in his absolute 
distinctions regarding the use of violence), using Nazi mass murder as a primary 
historical referent for genocide (explicitly in his comparison of different regimes), and 
extending genocide to politically-motivated murder (implicit in the notion of democide). 
While Rummel’s argument enables him to make summary judgments regarding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 Ibid.; See also R. J. Rummel, War and Democide Never Again (Llumina Press, 2010). 
	   122 
morally corrupt character of state power, his analysis does little to explain how, why, or 
where episodes of mass killing emerge. Indeed, Rummel’s argument proceeds by giving 
epistemological priority to the fact of mass death and then tracing a common set of 
conditions, state power, that were present in all of these episodes. By doing so, Rummel 
is able to set up the democratic state as the ultimate antidote to genocide. Genocide 
consequently becomes antithetical to the nature of open, liberal, and secular societies. 
Rummels’ argument thus covers over the destructive process, which includes a 
multiplicity of techniques, in order to frame democracy as fundamentally the best form of 
government. In doing so, he sets in motion a normative understanding that actually limits 
the explanation of the destructive process producing outcomes like mass killing in order 
to ground a moral judgment on the legitimacy of different forms of state practice. While 
this argument makes sense in the context of the antistatist politics present in both anti-war 
and anti-communist milieu of the 1970s, it promotes an understanding of destruction that 
becomes more and more pernicious.231  
Indeed, the normative understanding of destruction at work in Rummel’s study 
extends to contemporary genocide scholarship. A more recent example is Manus 
Midlarsky’s The Killing Trap. Midlarsky’s study focuses on the “transition from 
genocidal behavior-the tendency to massacre some people having a particular 
ethnoreligious identity-to genocide itself wherein the mass murder is systematically 
extended to include all people with that identity.”232 He defines genocide as “the state-
sponsored systematic mass murder of innocent and helpless men, women, and children 
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denoted by a particular ethnoreligious identity.”233 Midlarsky’s project explains the 
emergence of genocide from policies of massacre by adopting a rational or strategic 
choice approach to the study of mass killing.234 According to his model, genocide occurs 
as a form of compensatory ethnoracial murder initiated by a state that perceives 
forthcoming territorial and economic losses under conditions of instability and minority 
vulnerability. He links this dynamic to great power competition, which fosters insecurity 
and leads to the territorial and economic losses that provoke massacres. Midlarsky’s 
project is an admirable effort to extend the insights of rational choice theory and 
realpolitik to the question of genocide without resorting to cliché generalizations about 
power. However, like Rummel, Midlarsky offers a comparative study of mass killing in 
order to determine which events constitute genocide.235 This leads him to the conclusion 
that only the Armenian, Nazi and Rwanda genocides qualify as genocide. Midlarsky 
offers two defenses of this claim. First, he asserts that genocide is a “matter of state 
policy.”236 Second, he stipulates that genocide occurs when “non-combatants of a 
particular ethnoreligious identity were subject to mass murder.”237 Midlarsky defends 
these assertions as a kind of common sense, stating that his definition “has the advantage 
of including only those cases that are almost universally acknowledged to be 
genocides….in contrast to partial efforts at mass murder that have other intentions.”238 
What these arguments reveal is the fact that Midlarsky’s focus on mass killing is 
not driven by an engagement with the concept of genocide or political history, but by a 
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normative understanding of the term. This amounts to an unexamined assertion rather 
than an analytically rigorous approach to the study of genocide. Two factors are 
important to consider here. First, Midlarsky’s assumption that genocide is a state-driven 
policy of massacres is unwarranted by the UNGC, Lemkin or most other writings on 
genocide. It thus derives from the new discourse on genocide that ties destruction to a 
state-centric killing. Second, Midlarsky’s analysis begins from a point of consensus and 
then proceeds to differentiate episodes of violence on this basis. This creates a kind of 
tautology: genocide is state sanctioned mass murder so the only empirical cases of 
genocide are explicit moments of state sanctioned mass murder. The circular structure of 
his argument limits Midlarsky’s ability to investigate the complex conditions producing 
episodes of mass violence, but supports a search for resemblances and similarities 
between state institutions and acts of mass killing. Furthermore, Midlarsky’s discussion 
of the strategic priority of mass murder reveals more about his assumptions regarding the 
way actors operate in the international system than about the actual discourse circulating 
in ‘genocidal states.’ For instance, in an extensive analysis, historians Götz Aly and 
Susanne Heim demonstrate that the ‘strategic priority’ of mass murder was a subject of 
contestation even within the Nazi party and was strongly underwritten by demographic 
science rather than immediate threat-based anxieties.239 If ‘strategic priorities’ are 
contestable and emergent then it calls into question much of Midlarsky’s argument. 
Nonetheless, the discourse on genocide exemplified by Midlarsky’s work pits itself 
against bureaucracies, communism, and the state apparatus. Preoccupied with bad 
leaders, regimes, and state types, which make strategic choices, the discourse converts the 
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politics of genocide into a process of installing better state structures, leaders, and, more 
generally, an agenda of state supervision on behalf of an unspecified form of political 
life. By doing so, it sets aside the messy historical circumstances under which strategic 
priorities emerge in order to create a new agenda for international politics.  
Over the past three decades, the normative understanding of genocide has been 
challenged by a minor tradition centered on the notion of cultural genocide. Against the 
subordination of destruction to mass killing, scholars of cultural genocide have expanded 
acts of genocide to include the annihilation of settlements, religious buildings, literatures, 
languages, and forced displacement.240 They have also emphasized the value of a social 
world for the maintenance and reproduction of a group.241 In addition, theorists of 
cultural genocide have criticized the state-centrism of the normative understanding. 
Societies, cultures, institutions, they argue, were capable of committing genocide long 
before the development of nation-states.242 More importantly, scholars of cultural 
destruction have explored how social relations could explain the emergence of mass 
killing and pushed the study of genocide to the point of thinking about how the process of 
destruction itself functions as a kind of social dynamic.  
Tony Barta’s work provides an important example of early work on cultural 
genocide, which highlights these dimensions of destruction. For instance, in Barta’s essay 
“Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of Australia,” cultural 
genocide complicates the notion of destruction. Barta’s argument begins with Lemkin’s 
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observation that genocide involves two phases: the destruction of an existing ‘national 
pattern’ and the imposition of a new one. In the context of Australian colonialism, Barta 
argues, genocide occurred without significant involvement from the state in either of 
these phases. Nonetheless, Australia was “subject to remorseless pressures of destruction 
inherent in the very nature of the society.”243 To see this process, Barta defends a 
“conception of genocide which embraces relations of destruction” and offers a series of 
observations in support of this method.244 First, Barta notes that the overt focus on mass 
killing overshadows the fact that “genocidal outcomes have been the result of complex 
and only obscurely discerned causes.”245 Drawing on a Marxist framework, he contends 
that social relations are constitutive of individual actions as well as larger societal 
outcomes. Destructive events such as genocide are products of social relations. Second, 
these relations emerge from cultural and social structures rather than the state, which, he 
argues, merely reflects these structures. A state institution may, according to Barta, serve 
some ultimate good but, on account of the relations of a society, still participate in the 
destruction of a group. Third, Barta accounts of a multi-layered process of destruction in 
which the benign sentiments of Australian institutions depend on the prior destruction of 
indigenous peoples by placing the colonial legacy at the heart of these social relations. 
Barta argues that genocide is folded into the foundations of Australian society. By 
focusing on outcomes, social relations and structures, Barta’s account of settler-genocide 
introduces a break from the dominant conception of genocide as a state-sponsored mass 
killing. 
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Barta’s work also documents a variety of cultural techniques of destruction that 
undermined group life. For instance, Barta describes how tax levies, land theft, and the 
spread of malnutrition contributed to the dispossession and deaths of indigenous peoples, 
a process subtended by civilizational tropes of ‘white man’s burden.’246 According to 
Barta, these acts constituted a much greater blow to indigenous livelihoods than formal 
state-sanctioned killing. Moreover, he illustrates how this longer process of dispossession 
contributed to the eruption sporadic episodes of killing principally conducted by non-
state actors and militias. Awash in ‘civilizational’ pressures, disease, occasional 
massacres, disenfranchisement, loss of ritual space and land, Aboriginal peoples endured 
a process of genocide without an explicit state-centered killing program. The founding of 
Australian society, Barta contends, was inseparable from these practices of long-term 
cultural destruction. In this regard, the creation of liberal institutions formed a capstone 
on the process by sealing political representation to an institution completely foreign to 
indigenous self-understanding.247  
Barta’s argument, while largely ignored by genocide scholars of the 1980s, makes 
two important innovations to the notion of destruction. First, it underscores the 
importance of the cultural and non-killing practices of destruction. These techniques, 
already at work in Lemkin’s notion of destruction, were essential to the elimination of 
indigenous peoples in many colonial contexts, but largely written out of genocide studies. 
Second, Barta situates social relations at the heart of destruction. Indeed, Barta’s 
argument hinges on the fact that physical violence only becomes significant in a social 
context. By emphasizing the social context, Barta illustrates how techniques of violence 
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other than killing play an equally important part in the destruction of a group. Because 
social relations implicate their destructiveness, for Barta, it is impossible to predefine the 
series of acts that constitute genocide.248 In this way, Barta’s argument also builds his 
conception of destruction on a dynamic ontology. By this I suggest that Barta thinks of 
destruction as a complex process with productive effects and numerous actants rather 
than a static form of crime. The dynamic ontology enables Barta to show how genocide 
could become foundational: constitutive of a techniques and institutions of life or, put 
differently, productive of forms of life throughout Australia. 
More recent work by Christopher Powell on the sociology of genocide develops a 
similar theme with respect to destruction. Powell begins with the observation that 
genocide has long been understood as “the very antithesis of civilization.”249 This 
presumption, he argues, obscures how genocide “either expanded the geographical scope 
of Western civilization, or deepened the extent to which it permeates society, or both.”250 
In effect, genocide is, in many cases, ‘civilizing genocide’ that derives from the 
paradoxical barbarism of the civilizing process. However, unlike Barta, Powell views the 
“object of genocide [as] the dynamic social network that sustains a collective social 
identity.”251 For Powell, ‘civilizing genocide’ emerges when political communities define 
themselves by rigid or static identity categories that necessitate the marginalization and, 
ultimately, annihilation of difference. For Powell, genocidal practices are thus a way of 
constituting identity rather than a specific set of outcomes. In this way, Powell treats 
genocide as intrinsic to the formation of social relations rather than a byproduct of 
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colonial violence. Powell’s work draws on a ‘critical relationist’ approach that examines 
genocide as a set of “processes made up of dynamic networks of social relations and 
constituted through the material practices of concrete human individuals….genocide is to 
destroy certain kinds of social figurations and that the point of the concept of genocide 
and of its criminalization its to protect these figurations.”252 The benefit of thinking in 
terms of social figurations, Powell contends, is that it thinks of groups as dynamic rather 
than static entities, which form through complex interactions between different identities, 
institutions, and forces. This understanding enables a complimentary approach to the 
study of genocide where both explicit and implicit practices of violence can be thought of 
as a uniform practice. For instance, the notion of the social figuration opens up the 
possibility of “accidental genocides,”253 a prospect, Powell argues, that requires greater 
scrutiny in contexts such as the colonization of Tasmania. Thinking of genocide as a 
process of destroying social figuration also entails the possibility that the victims of 
genocide “are, in effect, constituted through genocide.”254 In this respect, for Powell, 
genocide both produces and destroys social figurations. By doing so, he challenges the 
temporal and spatial boundaries often assumed to demarcate genocide events by 
illustrating how destructive processes take on new forms over time. 
Powell’s work extends Barta’s argument regarding the social foundation of 
genocide, but nuances the relationship between the social and the destructive. Where 
Barta’s work links the colonial foundation of Australian society to the creation of a 
dominant social structure, Powell emphasizes the dynamic rather than the outcome of the 
destructive process. Indeed, Barta, like scholars of the normative understanding, still 
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conceptualizes destruction primarily as the negation of existing social structures whereas 
Powell emphasizes both the destructive and productive dynamics of genocide. The value 
of Powell’s approach is the admission of a diversity of actors, with varying degrees of 
agency, into a social field characterized by complex interactions that generate horrific 
violence. In this regard, Powell reveals how the focus on genocide as mass killing wholly 
obscures the conditions of possibility for an act of genocide at the cost of rendering 
invisible the way in which communities, identities, and relations constitutive of genocide 
may be present in even ‘neutral’ institutions and settings. By turning the social field into 
a relational network productive of both acts of destruction and their intelligibility, Powell 
conceptualizes destruction as generative of the group’s subject to genocide and, hence, 
the crime of genocide itself. In this respect, Powell challenges the normative 
understanding of destruction reduced to mass murder by exposing the contingent nature 
of the institutions, actors, and social structure that this understanding depends on. 
Mark Levene also expands the notion of destruction, but takes the argument in a 
different direction than Powell. Levene begins with the observation that most 
comparative work in the field of genocide studies relies on a flimsy understanding of 
political violence tied to the perpetrator-victim relation. This understanding, Levene 
contends, makes genocide a radically criminal act tied to extraneous variables that 
corrupt society and locates the origins of genocide in the voluntary actions of a specific 
causative agent.255 Levene asks: “what if [this] underlying theoretical premise is itself at 
fault? That is, that it is not so much the particularly aberrant and hence isolated social 
structures and situations which are at the root of the persistence and prevalence of the 
phenomenon, but, rather, the very process of historical development out of which our 
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entire, global, political-economic system has emerged.”256 Levene’s approach dispenses 
with a focus on individual leaders or isolated social systems to examine, instead, 
overlapping political systems at multiple scales. In particular, Levene points to the 
growth of European colonialism over the last four centuries, the appearance of modern, 
utilitarian logic based on the supposed universality of science, and the formation of 
nationalism and the nation-state as social conditions underlying the expansion of 
destruction.257 
Like Barta and Powell, Levene’s work places genocide in the context of a more 
complex process of destruction. What distinguishes Levene’s approach is the way he 
links the emergence of acts of destruction to this larger, planetary-scale social system. 
While he retains a focus on killing as the most important aspect of genocide, he illustrates 
how micro-practices come to saturate macro-political systems and explains why this 
process generates the conditions for the onset of mass killing. Levene’s position intimates 
that the social foundation of genocide goes far beyond the social figurations studied by 
Powell or the colonial process described by Barta, and, instead, develops from social 
systems at the broadest levels.258 The problem with linking genocide to specific causative 
agents, according to Levene, is that genocide redress in the form of military intervention 
or state-building often exacerbates the conditions that foster identity-based violence and 
incites cycles of destruction.259 Levene’s systems approach to genocide calls for a larger 
reassessment of relationship between modern politics and the emergence of genocide. 
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Problems with Destruction 
If we simply classified events as ‘genocide’ on account of mass killing we would 
arrive at a decisively ahistorical understanding of destruction. Even the act of killing, as a 
form of destruction, changes with the context or assemblage in which it takes place.260 
These changes are part of what make determinations of genocide so difficult. Thus, part 
of the attention devoted to mass killing derives not from its ethical gravity, but from the 
dual belief that this ethical gravity establishes an objective standard for defining genocide 
and that this is fundamentally quantifiable. Mass killing becomes an event by temporally 
and spatially bounding the conditions for understanding genocide to episodes of 
spectacular violence. These boundaries, in turn, support a type of comparative history 
that assesses different episodes of mass killing in order to construct a general taxonomy 
of genocide, which treats Genghis Khan and Adolf Hitler as analogous figures.261  
The problem with this approach is not simply that historical conditions change the 
significance of the act of killing, but that the destructive process involves a dynamic 
relationship between the objects, agents, techniques and milieu of genocide. Put 
differently, the objectives of destruction develop alongside the techniques, practices, and 
exercises of destruction. By focusing purely on body counts, the normative understanding 
of genocide presumes that mass killing constitutes the only element of destruction worthy 
of serious scrutiny. Moreover, the spatial and temporal boundaries imposed on the event 
of mass killing foreclose an examination of the appearance or emergence of these 
episodes within a broader process. The various forms of social violence, abandonment, 
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and desiccation that occur across space and time in ways that break with the abrupt 
rupture or crisis of spectacular killing.262 This view is not necessary. For example, 
Lemkin asserted that killing constituted only a single technique of genocide alongside 
many biological, physical, social, economic, and cultural forms of destruction.263 In fact, 
Lemkin feared that focusing on the spectacle of mass killing might make these other 
aspects of genocide an ordinary, but nonetheless pernicious part of global politics.  
Lemkin’s concern has contemporary resonances. Take, for example, the case of 
the Basarwa as discussed in the first chapter. Physical killing constitutes almost none of 
the violence directed against this group nor, for that matter, would the Basarwan 
population appear as more than a blip in the morbidity and mortality statistics in the early 
21st century as it numbers only in the thousands. Nonetheless, the expulsion of the 
Basarwa from the CKGR undermined the reproduction of this group’s life, as did the 
prolonged exposure to poverty, malnutrition, and disease at New Xade. The confluence 
of these conditions has ‘destroyed’ the Basarwa in many capacities. Yet, genocide 
scholars would dismiss this case on the grounds that the degree of violence was not 
‘substantial.’264 In this instance, the normative understanding shapes the intelligibility of 
destruction by differentiating ‘real’ acts of genocide from ‘lesser violences.’265  
Equating destruction with mass killing also glosses over the technologies, 
institutions and assemblages that generate acts of killing. This oversight is problematic 
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because destructive technology and techniques undergo a process of transformation that 
changes the relations between bodies, peoples, and vulnerabilities. Due to this 
transformation, destructive processes often invent new methods and technologies for 
mass violence that do not resemble prior historical moments. When, for instance, Denis 
Halliday, the former United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, declared that the 
American sanctions regime was a form of genocide, he implicitly linked the starvation of 
Iraqi children to an economic practice, contesting the separation between the object of 
sanctions (Saddam Hussein’s administration) and its productive effects (civilian 
deaths).266 Halliday’s argument drew a link between a group (the Iraqi people) and a 
technique or means of destruction (trade embargoes) that differs from the traditional 
images associated with genocide. Economic sanctions represent an evolution in the 
technology of state power allegedly suited to changing the behavior of another state.267 
However, Halliday argued that the very rubrics legitimating the sanctions, such as their 
ability to attenuate damage by limiting their impact to the Hussein government, also 
made the regime accountable for its destructive effects. The problem, for Halliday, was 
that the sanctions regime legitimated itself via a claim to ‘moderation.’ By appealing to 
expert knowledge and control over their effects, the sanctions theoretically were capable 
of managing, directing, and limiting their impacts on the Iraqi population. For Halliday, 
this claim also implied that the American government controlled, and therefore was 
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responsible for, the ‘collateral damage’ of mass death. While few would likely accuse the 
Clinton administration of harboring an explicit or specific animus toward Iraqis, 
Halliday’s argument contested the normative understanding of destruction by 
highlighting a kind of ‘evolution’ of the destructive process in which sanctions produce a 
novel kind of genocide. Halliday’s discourse was consequently able to politicize the 
predicament in Iraq in a new light. 
Yet, Halliday’s argument also highlights the productive dimension of a 
destructive process. In this case, the sanctions’ devastating effect on food, medicine, and 
employment impacted a group of people whose only commonality was their status as 
subjects of the sanctions.268 Indeed, the sanctions regime did not harm all Iraqis (a 
national group) nor was it intended (discursively identified) as doing so. American policy 
was also not exclusively to blame for these consequences since the Iraqi government 
directed the remaining supply of food to the military and supporters of the Baath party. 
The group subjected to the sanctions regime was thus targeted without a pre-existing 
identity or commonality and subject to a mode of power exercised by numerous entities, 
a mode of power that managed a physically ‘non-violent,’ but nonetheless lethal form of 
politics. Without this series of interactions, the existence, let alone the destruction, of this 
new group, the victims of the sanctions regime, was unthinkable. Yet, prior to the onset 
of the second war in Iraq, nearly a million people perished. 
Many of our more common images of genocide also exclude this ‘productive’ 
dimension of destruction. For instance, Daniel Goldhagen’s contention that a form of 
cultural ‘eliminationist’ anti-Semitism embedded in German culture led to the Nazi 
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Genocide wholly obscures the productive dimensions of destructive politics.269 Indeed, 
even the invention of the gas chamber, perhaps the most prevalent example of a 
genocidal technology, involved dynamic transformation and combination of both political 
understanding and socio-technical practices.270 In the case of the former, the emergence 
of biological racism capable of differentiating and essentializing the Jewish population 
developed slowly from Galtonian race-theories gaining popularity in Europe. This 
conception differed considerably from theologically inspired forms of Judeophobia, 
which permitted the expulsion or conversion of Jewish populations. In addition, the 
technical apparatus of the gas chamber required the development of atmospheric 
engineering, the expansion of this technology in agriculture, and the emergence of an 
aesthetic fascination with industrialism. Even then, the gas chamber came into being as a 
consequence of the sudden call to accelerate the extermination process after the Nazi 
leadership realized that impending defeat on the Eastern front had scuttled any possibility 
for a resolution to the problem of lebensraum (living space) by colonial acquisition. The 
process of destruction thus underwent numerous contingent changes that altered the 
constitution of the group or groups destroyed to include Jews, Poles, dissidents, and other 
subjects who would never have otherwise have been assembled together or murdered 
using the same means.271  
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The productive dimension of destruction also evidences a capacity for destructive 
processes to invent groups that elude the static categories of the normative understanding. 
This generates a number of problems for the politics of genocide. First, it restricts the 
intelligibility of new forms of destruction, which emerge from the evolution of 
technologies of violence. Martin Coward, for instance, describes a new form of genocide, 
which he calls “urbicide,” that occurs when warfare takes the city as an object.272 Cities 
develop from the functional and synthetic connections of their inhabitants and have 
observable emergent effects. These effects indicate that cities exert force in a way that 
exceeds their constituent parts and, thus, constitute a new kind of entity. However, the 
normative understanding of genocide disqualifies cities as legitimate subjects of 
genocide, despite the fact that cities and urban spaces have increasingly been both an 
object of war and subject to novel techniques of destruction, because they lack the 
common basis of an intrinsic or essential identity.273 Destruction that cuts across racial, 
ethnic, cultural, gender, religious, or national lines, but impacts groups formed on the 
basis of geography or urban locality thus disappears from the register of genocide events 
no matter how destructive. Even in the extreme cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, acts of 
destruction that eliminated entire cities and that were deeply implicated in racial and 
nationalist discourses, many prominent genocide scholars have vehemently attacked any 
use of the concept genocide.274 Nonetheless, the example of urbicide illustrates how the 
normative understanding disqualifies many instances of mass violence from 
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consideration as part of the politics of genocide on account of the form destruction takes 
as much as the kind of subject destroyed. 
The lack of attentiveness to the ‘productive’ dimension of destruction also 
implicates the boundary between war and genocide. Indeed, the normative understanding 
of destruction depends on a stable distinction between legitimate and illegitimate warfare 
in which genocide is understood as an extreme practice that goes beyond the boundaries 
of legitimate war.275 In drawing this distinction, the normative understanding is obligated 
to search for an origin to genocide events in a disrespect for the laws of war, which are 
treated as fundamental, universal, and rational. Certain regions of the globe or types of 
military conflict are thus treated as genocide prone on account of how they wage war. 
What this division obscures is a point raised by many contemporary scholars that 
episodes of war exist in a state of indistinction with the emergence of genocide and, 
indeed, most contemporary genocide events arise during a process of waging war.276 The 
Armenian, Nazi, and Rwandan genocide all bear this fact out as genocides developing 
from within protracted processes of warfare as do episodes of destruction in numerous 
colonial contexts. Determinations of genocide thus hinge on how legitimate and 
illegitimate warfare are understood. However, if war and genocide exist as two potential 
outcomes from an underlying destructive process, which could go in a variety of 
directions, then treating these as discrete events creates an artificial division. This 
division, in turn, depoliticizes episodes of conflict that do not resonate with the images of 
the normative understanding and makes many episodes of destruction clandestine.  
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In the worst cases, this discursive link between legitimate warfare and illegitimate 
genocide actually produces incentives for identity-based killing and conditions even 
genocidaires’ understanding of their acts. For instance, in the case of Bosnia, reports of 
ethnic cleansing sparked international protest that framed the political violence as a type 
of genocide. The attention garnered by this outcry allegedly changed the way Milosevic 
directed massacres, increasingly conducting them along ethnic lines in the hopes of 
forcing NATO governments to give into his demands.277 The discourse of genocide thus 
inadvertently contributed to the production of genocide by viewing the fundamental 
threat posed by Milosevic as mass killing organized around a principle of ethnic identity 
rather than war and killing writ large. Once it became clear that the Western media was 
invested in these terms, Milosevic was able to reengineer mass killing along these lines in 
order to draw out concessions from Western states. In addition, the massacre of 
Srebrenica was also partly a byproduct of humanitarian intervention.278 Adopting the 
principles they presumed organized the action of the Serbian forces, UNPROFOR 
collected Bosnian refugees on the basis of their identity and concentrated them in one 
place. Thus, in a sense, the normative understanding organized the shape of the relief 
efforts and the violence that followed. The massacre of Srebrenica was partly a byproduct 
of humanitarianism adopting the normative image of genocide to organize relief 
efforts.279  
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 Third, the focus on mass killing ignores many mundane techniques of destruction 
that constitute genocide both prior to and during mass murder.280 The concern for mass 
killing reflects an obsession with the spectacle of sovereign power that masks the way in 
which micropolitical changes set the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the 
spectacle mass violence.281 As a result of this obsession, genocide discourse remains 
largely reactive, aimed at stopping the outbreak of mass killing, rather than working on 
broader relations of power that foster insecurity, victimization, and detachment. By 
viewing genocide as an aberration of otherwise ordinary, nonviolent, or unproblematic 
democratic politics, many humanitarian organizations transform genocide prevention into 
a kind of anti-politics that permits the often forceful restructuring of governments and 
societies. 
Lastly, the focus on mass killing presupposes a static ontology of presence. By 
this I mean the focus on mass killing not only places temporal and spatial boundaries on 
the ‘event’ of destruction, but is also invested in the fragility of a living body exposed to 
a specific form of destruction exemplified by the act of physical killing. Destruction is 
thus depicted as material force exerted on otherwise defenseless bodies in an arbitrary 
and pernicious fashion. However, an event of destruction such as genocide involves 
temporal and spatial scales that exceed this notion of presence. Consider, for instance, the 
destruction of indigenous peoples in the Americas. The arrival of the Spanish led to wars 
of conquest, enslavement, and extermination. Along with this physical violence, as well 
as cultural and religious imperialism, European colonizers brought biological agents that, 
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sometimes unknowingly, destroyed entire indigenous groups.282 The feedback loops 
between violence, assimilation, disease and the resulting famine coalesced into a 
centuries long process of annihilation that does not fit neatly into the categories of the 
normative understanding. How should we locate the ‘time’ and ‘place’ of this event? Is it 
in ‘big’ massacres?’ At the end of the 18th century when 98% of indigenous peoples had 
disappeared? How does contemporary global politics contend with a historical lineage in 
which processes of destruction preceded and gave birth to innumerable states and 
institutions? The scope of the destruction of indigenous peoples, as a process of 
productive destruction distributed across time and space, is unthinkable in the terms of 
the normative understanding, not because of an absence of empirical data, but because it 
cannot be thought exclusively in terms of mass killing.283 In this case, destruction not 
only claims the lives of numerous indigenous peoples, but fundamentally alters the 
conditions of possibility for contemporary political institutions. In this respect, the 
destructive process, distributed over centuries, becomes productive of the terms and 
forms of political relations, a productive relation typically ignored in the way we define 
national or state identity. This productive relationship puts into question not only the 
legitimacy of existing studies of genocide, which fail to inquire into destructive processes 
at this scale, but the political associations – states, institutions, and practices – that are 
often called upon to prevent genocide. Indeed, the destructive process undergone in this 
encounter exceeds traditional registers of understanding to the point that contemporary 
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geologists have offered the genocide of indigenous peoples as the definitive marker of the 
birth of the Anthropocene because the effects register at the scale of planetary ecology.284  
The virtue of attending to cultural or social forms of destruction lies in how one 
problematizes the boundaries of the ontology that underlies the normative understanding. 
Dipping into the complex layers subtending any event of destruction and the role 
destruction plays in the making of identity demonstrates not only that certain genocides 
have been denied or are not recognized as such, but the way in which complex processes 
of destructive have a constitutive role. This demonstrates a problem not only with the 
non-recognition or denial of certain genocides, but with a failure to understand the 
constitutive role in the formation of contemporary politics. Fortunately, some version of 
this insight is at the heart of Lemkin’s work on destruction and genocide and it is to his 
construction of the notion that we now turn. 
 
Reprising Destruction 
The normative understanding of genocide equates destruction with mass killing 
and devalues socio-political context. However, as theorists like Lemkin, Barta, Powell, 
and Levene demonstrate this separation isn’t easy. Mass violence emerges and takes on 
significance in a social context. By severing acts from this context, the normative 
understanding renders genocide exogenous to the social system in which it emerges. As a 
result, genocide studies constantly searches for evil, malice, perversity or irrationality, 
which can be made accountable for genocide. Consequently, it treats removing corrupt 
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leaders, engineering state structures, promoting democracy or controlling the spread and 
distribution of weapons as mechanisms to solve genocide. 
At the same time, the notion of destruction endorsed by the normative 
understanding impoverishes genocide scholarship. For Lemkin, killing was an essential 
part of genocide, but nonetheless constituted only one form of destruction. Genocide 
scholars emphasizing the ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ context of destruction have expanded his 
insight and placed the question of destruction into broader registers of time, space, and 
identity by theorizing genocide as constitutive of social relations. In this sense, the 
destruction of genocide cannot be explained simply in terms of the elimination of 
predefined groups, but as a form of production that creates both the groups subject to 
destruction and their destroyers. Put simply, genocide is both generative and a form of 
annihilation. Understanding genocide strictly in terms of mass killing not only does a 
disservice to the complexity of an event of genocide, but leads to a cycle of error 
replication by missing these prior productive moments and the imbrications of these 
moments in a larger political assemblage. The normative understanding of genocide 
centered on mass killing consequently remains stuck drawing the resemblances and 
similarities between different forms of identity, tracing again and again the same narrow 
vision of genocide in the hopes of establishing a one-size fits all political response.  
If genocide can be constitutive of political relations then it cannot be easily 
cordoned off using the standards of legitimacy and illegitimacy, identity and similarity, or 
barbarity, madness, and evil. Instead, genocide remains conceptually and theoretically 
disparate, changing with the invention of new forms of violence, inaugurating alternative 
modes of belonging and generating of relations and identities Acknowledging the 
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productive dimension of destruction entails discerning an element of horror that haunts 
contemporary politics. Social theorists allude to this element of horror when they 
conceptualize genocide as a kind of event: the emergence of a form of destruction that 
exceeds political vocabularies, inheres in many different institutions, practices, and 
identities, and recreates the social field. The notion of a destructive event employs the 
concept of genocide to observe the objective existence of a problem that exists, but offers 
no immediate solution; a problem whose productive dimensions extend to the possibility 
of engulfing and eliminating complex social entities. The social interpretation of 
destruction is valuable because it removes this sense of horror from the malice of 
individual leaders and relocates it as a complex product of social relations. Read in this 
light, genocide names not simply a new kind of crime, but a new being or an emergent 
process underway whose birth takes place from within a meshwork of political relations 
and without readily discernible causes. In contrast, the majority of genocide scholars 
attempt to domesticate the notion of destruction by viewing it exclusively as identity-
based mass killing linked to static agents and institutions. 
At stake here are two competing understandings of the politics of genocide, which 
battle over the sense of the concept and the event it names. The dominant approach views 
genocide as a crime, identifiable in different contexts, and manageable via a system of 
global governance. The sense of destruction at work here thus supports the creation of an 
international legal order dedicated to the elimination of mass killing through international 
regimes and interventions. The other approach responds to a sense of horror that develops 
from an emergent, destructive event from a thicket of plastic social relations. Genocide, 
in this sense, names the event not only as a wrong, but also as an unsettling horror of the 
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contingency of social formations, a pluralization of the conditions of genocide within 
many societies, and an ethical challenge to the soporific and spectacular images of mass 
death. As the last chapter will argue, attending to the operation of ‘sense’ in the politics 
of genocide has significant implications for the futures connected to this concept. In 
particular, destruction is subject to a ‘becoming’ that, as Lemkin argued, cannot be 
described by a stable list of acts since it constitutes a horrific process capable of 
generating modes of violence that exceed existing political vocabularies. The social 
understanding of genocide thus not only details ‘cultural techniques’ violence, but 
foregrounds this destructive event, in a process of becoming, whose implications cannot 
be described through the well-trodden pages of enumerated criteria, but through a new 
sense and language of political horror. 
 
Threshold: Mental Harm 
 Article 2 of the UNGC includes a subcategory that defines “causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group” as an act of genocide.285 Like many 
parts of the UNGC, the inclusion of this article is something of a curiosity when 
compared with traditional images of destruction such as mass killing, population 
displacement or the burning of books. Unsurprisingly, the article also poses problems for 
contemporary genocide jurisprudence because it begs the question of when and how 
mental harm approaches the level of genocide.286 Mass torture, for example, is considered 
sufficient by previous legal judgments, but lesser, allegedly indirect effects of mass 
violence almost always must show a direct physical action upon the victim. Distressing as 
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it may be for someone to live through a genocide this does not, according to dominant 
legal interpretation, constitute a form of mental harm covered by the UNGC.287 
 Mental harm appeared in the list of acts of genocide at the urging of the Chinese 
representative to the UN Ti-sun Li. Li proposed the protection out of a desire to see the 
convention prohibit acts such as the distribution of narcotics.288 For Li, the inclusion of 
mental harm in the UNGC would functionally outlaw the distribution of opium, which 
had gravely affected the health of the Chinese populace under European and Japanese 
colonialism. Unlike acts such as killing members of a group or deliberately inflicting 
conditions inimical to the group’s well-being, acts written with the European experience 
of the Nazism in mind, mental harm offers was defined by a colonial experience beyond 
the European metropole. Mental harm is also an interesting category because it 
problematizes the notion of destruction more generally. Indeed, part of what secures or 
stabilizes the definition of acts such as killing is an appeal to the notion of intent. Intent 
directs an act of mass killing and, by doing so, makes it an act of genocide. Intent, as the 
next chapter will discuss, implicitly links action, knowledge, and causality in an 
autonomous subject. This subject, in turn, authors acts of genocide. However, by 
including mental harm as an act of destruction, the UNGC alludes to a more 
indeterminate psychological, neurological, or even social form of destruction. In this 
sense, mental harm, unlike the other acts, necessitates a more complex picture of the 
causal agency underway in a process of destruction.  
 Indeed, the use of opium as a technology of colonial governance illustrates how 
the production of a specific set of social conditions constitutes a prerequisite for the 
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actualization of destruction and, moreover, how the form of ‘intent’ at play requires a 
variety of overlapping agencies. At a very simple level, the use of narcotics includes both 
a producer and a consumer such that, absent forcible digestion, narcotics elicits addiction 
as a physiological property that produces poor health (and desire for a drug) and 
undermines a person’s cognitive and political capacities. In this sense, destruction works 
by altering intent at a physiological and social level rather than outright killing members 
of a group. Yet, it also seems absurd to hold a person accountable for acts of genocide 
perpetrated by themselves. Does this imply the supplier is exclusively responsible for 
their predicament? What role does the narcotic itself play as an agent in the causal 
networks? Moreover, how do we account for the allegedly compromised mental state of 
those harmed by narcotics? At the very least these questions illustrate how the inclusion 
of mental harm as an act of destruction problematizes any easy reading of the notion of 
destruction because the chains of causality and intention become problematic, distributed, 
and even nonlinear since the demand for more drugs, the byproduct of addiction, may 
constitutes a mode of desire for greater governance and control. 
 One problem that emerges from this observation is that even the most apparently 
stable and transparent of the UNGC’s list of destructive acts fall into scandal when the 
victims of genocide not only become complicit, but actively desire substances, 
possibilities, or conditions that cause the group to undermine itself. Obviously, in the 
cases of China and Germany (where alcohol distribution was occasionally used in a 
similar capacity) this was the result of a targeted policy designed to produce these effects. 
Yet, the destructive consequences of the acts, the damage to livelihoods, neurobiology, 
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and culture articulation more broadly, emerge from a variety of conditions without the 
presence of alcohol or narcotics.  
 In this respect, destructive processes that produce mental harm are difficult to 
locate within a spectrum of intent traditionally ascribed to genocide. What if the 
production of mental harm amplifies the chances that an assemblage creates authoritarian 
power structures, which, in turn, dominate populaces? Could this spur auto-catalytic 
processes of mass violence that typically go by the name ‘cycles of violence’? Say, for 
example, conditions of colonial governance that massively impact mental health 
throughout a particular state and produce a propensity or comfort with everyday and mass 
violence? Subsequent acts of violence likewise trigger a set of traumatic reactions and 
mental harms throughout the state such that experiences of mental harm become self-
replicating and what occurs constitutes a feedback loop between neurobiological 
impairment, physical violence, social deterioration, and external calls for stewardship and 
governance of the region. Does this process constitute a series of genocidal acts or, 
because the mentally harmed become those who mentally harm, does agency get ascribed 
only to local political actors? These questions expose the problems the normative 
understanding encounters when it appeals to intent to prop up the notion of destruction 
because, in many cases, destructive processes constitute intents and desires. Ultimately, 
the inclusion of mental harm reveals how the apparently transparent legal text of the 
UNGC calls for speculation on a more complex notion of the emergence of genocidal 
acts. 
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Chapter 4: Intent 
Someone must be to blame. This much we know. Left or right, radical or centrist, 
crazy or rational, zealot or bureaucrat, capitalist or communist, fascist or facilitator, cruel 
or kind, we know someone is at the root of it all, someone is the cause of so much 
suffering. Someone must be guilty. Study after study, treatise after treatise, exhibit after 
exhibit tells us about their kind. We peer into their hideouts, survey the mechanics of 
death, scrutinize shallow graves, analyze hollow ideologies, inspect the psychology of 
perception, diagnose raging hatreds, and examine the forensics of now dusty camps. 
Whatever stone we turn over, whatever veil we remove, whatever darkness we bring to 
light, we find a reservoir of malice surging forth. Someone dwells at the heart of 
darkness. Someone must be to blame.  
Genocide, we are told, was born of this desire, a desire that takes principle form in 
relation to the notion of intent. Someone intends to commit genocide and this intention 
makes him or her into a special kind of criminal, a perpetrator, or a subject of 
genocide.289 Intent is the part of the concept of genocide that enables this determination 
by making genocide into a punitive criminal act and assigning moral responsibility to 
specific subjects. Put differently, intent is the part of the concept of genocide that enables 
genocide to be authored and for the authors of genocide to be subject to discipline. In 
order for this to happen, the notion of intent has to ground or establish the set of causal 
relations that produce genocide. These causal relations turn genocide into a punishable 
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act by pointing to the agents responsible for its occurrence. As a result, discussions of 
intent are invariably tied to larger meditations on the connections between history, 
causality, morality, punishment and political governance. These discussions facilitate the 
creation of a novel set of political procedures and institutions for punishing, trying, or 
destroying genocidists.  
Intent also helps to distinguish genocide from other categories such as crimes 
against humanity. In this sense, the type of intent involved in genocide allegedly has a 
special quality, a malefic character or dimension of radical evil proper to it. Intent thus 
not only grounds different theories of causality and punishment, but also inscribes 
genocide within a moral and theological framework for thinking about global politics. 
This framework encourages the development of exceptional forms of political 
intervention in order to address the calamitous propensity for genocide.  Ultimately, the 
notion of intent simultaneously performs several functions for the concept of genocide: it 
constitutes genocide as a distinct crime, describes the set of causal mechanisms that 
produce genocide, implicates acts of genocide in a moral framework, and supports the 
development of political responses to these intentions. In this way, the work of intent 
differs from the group or destruction parts of the concept because it attends not to the 
question of who was destroyed or how this destruction takes place, but rather why the 
event occurs and what can be done about it.  
Unfortunately, as this chapter demonstrates, the normative understanding of intent 
often supports the development of forms of preemptive or exceptional security politics, 
which legitimize managing social life in order to forestall the emergence of genocide 
prior to its occurrence. This form of management depoliticizes the historical conditions 
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and political arrangements that incite conflict and mass violence and, moreover, justifies 
a vast expansion of international political control over the periphery.290 Specifically, in 
crafting a theory of intent, the normative understanding of genocide develops a schema of 
subject formation structured around a very specific understanding of desire. This notion 
of desire allegedly underlies the actions of a genocidist and marks his or her intentions as 
those authorizing or producing acts of genocide. The desire of the genocidist 
consequently becomes the causal origin of genocide. The discovery of these desires 
creates a site or object for political intervention and opens a pathway for various 
institutions, punishments, and pedagogies to modify or deter genocidists from acting on 
their instincts. International humanitarian initiatives consequently latch onto these desires 
as rallying points for economic, military, and political intervention.   
To date, the greatest debates about intent in genocide studies largely focus on 
competing representations or accounts of these desires. Do we locate the desires 
underlying genocide, desires that generate intentions, in the individual, the psyche, a 
social structure, an ideology, and so on? While disagreement occurs over these different 
sites of causal ‘content,’ the implications of theorizing and constructing these kind of 
causal relationships have been largely ignored. As a result, genocide scholarship often 
neglects the productive effects that emerge from speaking, writing or analyzing genocide 
in these terms, that slow process of linking a series of order-words within the swirls of 
free and indirect discourse, which frames how these questions are understood in the first 
place.291 What this chapter reveals is how these discussions and discourses about intent 
are themselves the site for the formation of desire within the politics of genocide. Put 
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differently, the articulation of different theories of intent is itself a form of politics that, in 
the case of the normative understanding, works toward the development of novel forms 
of global governance. The production of knowledge about intent thus does not occur in a 
neutral fashion, but as part of a process of desiring-production that seeks to deepen the 
power and control of particular global institutions.292 The normative understanding 
extends this agenda by making desire and intent objects of political management long 
before they actualize as violence. In this way, the normative understanding endorses a 
kind of biopolitical realignment of global politics in order to manage the future in the 
name of life’s necessity. However, this development is only possible by dissecting a 
subject’s intent, treating them as distinctive objects of knowledge, and using this 
knowledge to act on the propensity for genocide.  
Three dimensions of the normative understanding of genocide are important in 
this respect. First, while there is considerable dispute about the content of intent or the 
different biological, psychological or social origins of desire, the normative 
understanding of genocide reproduces a division between the statements, expressions and 
beliefs of the subject of genocide and their actions or conduct. Put differently, in this 
discourse, regardless of what motivates the subject, the form or structure of intent 
remains the same. This structure partitions the subject of genocide into a set of 
underlying beliefs, inclinations or desires and a corresponding set of actions or behaviors. 
In short, the normative understanding splits the subject of genocide into a subject of 
enunciation and a subject of the action. The subject of enunciation provides the 
interpretive context for reading the subject of action. This reading places the causal 
origins of genocide in the desires of the subject of enunciation and interprets conduct in 
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light of these desires. In essence, the split produces a kind of ‘profile’ of the genocidist. 
This profile fills in the inevitable gaps and inconsistencies in the conduct of the 
genocidist by producing patterns and connections via an appeal to common sense. To 
construct this profile, the normative understanding draws on a set of implicit 
presuppositions about how, where, and why certain forms of desire or intent are prone to 
genocide. These presuppositions emerge from a larger set of unconscious associations 
about the history of genocide and the archetype of events like the Nazi Genocide. These 
associations, in turn, help to determine when the actions of a genocidist become 
meaningful. The examination of intentions thus searches for a similar structure of intent 
or desire at work in contemporary genocidists. These similarities support assessments 
across disparate historical moments and set up comparative genocide studies as a 
knowledge based in historical survey. The assumption behind these comparisons is that 
the interpreter of intent stands at a distance to the things they interpret and roughly 
corresponds to Nietzsche’s discussion of monumental history.293 Unsurprisingly, writing 
about genocide frequently becomes the practice of writing about great, infamous events 
and their propensity to recur in the present rather than an exercise of garnering resources 
for a present that differs from the past. The problem with these comparative studies is not 
only that they exclude ‘forgotten histories’ and ‘unknown genocides,’ but that the 
knowledge they produce becomes a resource for schematizing how genocides will take 
place in the future and building a security architecture to inhibit these developments.294  
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Second, the normative understanding of intent ascribes a special power to desire. 
In particular, it treats desire as the motive force behind the emergence of genocide. As 
such, it opens the field of desire up to a series of interventions in order to forestall the 
ultimate occurrence of genocide. These interventions take two forms: pedagogical and 
punitive. In the case of the former, specific aspects of polities such as failing institutions, 
lack of public education, poverty, religious affiliation and so on are identified as the 
sources of the social animosity underlying genocide. Scholars who focus on intent seize 
upon these aspects of societies as ripe for institution-building, civic reform, and 
strengthening democratic governance. While these efforts sound benign, they also 
overcode existing, often violently, social practices that do not fit with standard western 
notions of civic life. In the case of the later, the notion of intent enables a series of 
calculations concerning the necessary responses to deter or punish genocide by military 
and legal means. The special character of genocidal intent, in particular, underlies the call 
for the growth of international tribunal systems, the demand for a standing UN 
intervention force, and other preemptive military solutions. The theory of intent 
consequently resonates with a broader constellation of forces directed at managing 
political life in new ways. 
Third, the normative understanding of intent has an important relationship to the 
question of sovereignty. Since knowledge about intent enables the formation of 
judgments on the propensity for genocide, it facilitates new forms of political 
engagement with the future prior to its occurrence. These forms of judgment, in essence, 
determine whether or not a group’s life, which the politics of genocide holds to be sacred, 
is likely to be forfeit. In doing so, these judgments consequently justify the external 
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governance of a population in order to prevent their destruction even at the expense of 
traditional claims to political or national sovereignty. These kinds of decisions emerge 
from within a theological and moral context that governs the life of a population in the 
name of preventing its death. In this way, the normative understanding of intent plays a 
key role in legitimating a new relation to sovereignty rooted in a biopolitical discourse. 
Contemporary international institutions such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and 
the growing informal anti-genocide regime seize upon this rubric to produce new 
mechanisms of global governance. Moreover, as the chapter will later discuss in detail, 
the notion that genocide constitutes the ‘crime of crimes’ provides important clues about 
the theological character of these new forms of sovereignty and exposes how genocide 
functions in a unique fashion in contemporary political discourse.  
  However, as with other parts of the concept of genocide, intent is also 
accompanied by a ‘minor tradition’ that is replete with anomalies, paradoxes, and 
moments of creativity. Indeed, I am not the first to identify the limits of the normative 
understanding of intent. As the chapter discusses in detail, many efforts have been made 
to loosen the normative understanding’s image of intent by stressing historical 
contingencies, unconscious or unarticulated desires, and unintended consequences of 
political action as important components of genocide. Other scholars have sought to read 
genocide as a multifaceted process rather than a one-sided or pre-designed event. The 
minor tradition includes a variety of different emphases on intent, desire, and causality in 
order to contest the normative understandings exclusion of many events from the politics 
of genocide. In doing so, the minor tradition also provides resources for challenging the 
inscription of genocide within new regimes of global governmentality by pointing out the 
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complexity of various events of mass violence and the consequences of insisting on a 
strong notion of intent.  
This chapter uses a similar structure to the previous ones. The first section 
juxtaposes the notion of intent formulated by Lemkin and the UNGC. It analyzes how 
Lemkin’s version of intent, which was drawn from empirical acts mass violence as well 
as his legal background, evaluated intent and agency as implicitly distributed. In contrast, 
it shows the explicit effort in the creation of the UNGC to narrow intent to a volitional, 
willful, or explicit desire. This transition, the section argues, sets the stage for the 
development of the normative understanding. The second section explores the 
development of the normative understanding of intent and highlights the emergence of 
the minor tradition that challenges the categories of the normative understanding. 
Specifically, this section illustrates how the normative understanding restricts the notion 
of intent to a particular set of desires in both legal and academic contexts. These desires, 
in turn, support the growth of institutions designed to inhibit genocide. The third section 
more carefully engages the minor tradition by discussing the possibility of ‘unintentional’ 
or ‘negligent’ genocide. These claims work against the normative understanding, but, as 
the section illustrates, provide valuable insights into the complexity of genocidal 
processes. These insights, in turn, problematize the normative understanding’s implicit 
presuppositions. The fourth section explores the implications of the normative 
understanding of intent for contemporary humanitarian intervention and political 
structures. It turns to the examples of the non-governmental organization Genocide 
Watch and the elaboration of the R2P to show how the discussion of intent legitimizes 
the creation of new institutions of governance. The final section turns to the 
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contemporary example of Boko Haram to show the productive effects of these 
developments on geopolitics. In particular, the section reveals how intent fosters a form 
of preemptive governance based on the propensity for genocide. These modes of 
governance unfortunately draw from racist and pejorative assumptions and, consequently, 
reconstitute the populations they claim to protect as apolitical victims in need of 
stewardship, guidance, and perpetual observation. 
 
Lemkin’s Intents 
Lemkin’s development of the notion of intent is thin in comparison with his more 
substantive description of the acts constitutive of genocide. He nonetheless implicitly 
develops a notion of intent in his writings on genocide. The purpose of this section is to 
diagram Lemkin’s notion of intent by unpacking a series of statements he makes about 
law, political action, and the history of genocide. This task is more challenging than 
describing Lemkin’s notion of the group or destruction for two reasons. First, Lemkin 
often highlights overlapping political agencies at work in genocide. For example, he will 
discuss genocide occurring within the context of a colonial hierarchy and, at the same 
time, refer to the acts as a deliberate or premeditated attempt to undermine a political 
system. In each description, Lemkin presents a slightly different figuration of political 
agency. I read these statements as evidence that Lemkin does not provide a coherent 
notion of intent, but rather tries to empirically analyze the series of agencies at work in 
genocide. Second, Lemkin’s notion of intent both reproduces and breaks with classical 
legal understandings of intent. In some respects, his work resembles the contemporary 
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notion of ‘constructed intention.’295 As I will discuss in the next few pages, Lemkin 
argues the law can and should retrospectively determine whether genocide took place 
regardless of express motives. Yet, Lemkin also insists on a strong version of the 
juridical-legal subject defined by explicit, volitional, and conscious choices. The tension 
between Lemkin’s empirical descriptions of agency and his legal understanding of 
agency poses problems for any attempt to draw a unitary theory of intent from his work. 
In this sense, Lemkin’s notion of intent offers conceptual resources for the development 
of the normative understanding of genocide and, simultaneously, subtly undermines it.  
The first clue to unpacking Lemkin’s understanding of intent comes from 
exploring the links he makes between the acts he defines as genocide and the subjects he 
holds accountable for these acts. For instance, Lemkin initially characterizes genocide as 
“a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups 
themselves.”296 Here, Lemkin refers to genocide as a coordinated plan with a specific aim 
or purpose. However, he does not describe the actors or agents behind the plan nor does 
he describe how the plan comes to be coordinated. Lemkin thus appears to credit acts of 
genocide with a degree of forethought, but leaves open the exact degree of volition 
behind these acts. Lemkin’s writings frequently reproduce this duality by describing 
genocide as purposive, but without explicitly indicating who or what agency intends the 
genocide. For example, Lemkin describes “genocide [as] directed against the national 
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group.”297 Later, he states “the occupant [Germany] has elaborated a system designed to 
destroy nations according to a previously prepared plan.”298 In these instances, Lemkin 
seems to be crafting a strong concept of intent and premeditation on the part of 
genocidists. Yet, we cannot conclude from these cursory passages, as many genocide 
scholars do, that Lemkin links genocide to a strong account of intent. Lemkin certainly 
draws from the specific context of the Nazi genocide in which express planning took 
place, and even cites Mein Kampf as evidence of intent, but in many descriptions of the 
acts of genocide, Lemkin offers a subtle account of the unintended effects or lack of 
explicit oversight or control of genocidal violence. These descriptions contrast with the 
notion of genocide as a coordinated plan and, at the very least, they indicate that the 
‘coordination’ ongoing in genocide is an unintended rather than planned part of the 
violence. Indeed, one of the fascinating features of Lemkin’s writing is the absence of a 
clear description of the perpetrators of genocide beyond vague references to ‘German 
authorities,’ ‘Nazi leadership,’ or state structures. Put differently, Lemkin includes a 
multiplicity of different actors in his description of the preparation, planning, and 
execution of genocide.  
This feature of Lemkin’s thought also appears in his description of the various 
techniques of genocide. For example, Lemkin describes a set of ‘political techniques’ that 
include changing the names of signs, roads, and streets to German, shifting family names, 
attaching administrators to the government, and the creation of Nazi parties in occupied 
states.299 In his writings, this set of actions involves many different sources of authority, 
agency, and causality. The effort to reregister Poles with German names, for instance, 
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occurs as part of the explicit colonization efforts of the Generalgouvernement and takes 
place under the purview of colonial administrators. In contrast, Lemkin describes a 
process of ‘Germanization’ underway in Poland that he directly associates with Nazi 
military authority, eugenic ideology, and corrupt lawyers. Lemkin will also discuss acts 
of genocide that develop spontaneously such as episodes of sporadic killing or the 
occasional destruction of a business or community center. In these cases, Lemkin views 
the acts as broadly part of a ‘coordinated plan,’ but does not single out an authoritative 
source responsible for their development. Rather, he describes genocide as a multiphase 
process that incorporates different sites of political agency. What distinguishes genocide, 
in his thought, is that it stretches between these various acts. Read in this light, Lemkin 
describes genocide as both an intended act and as partly emergent. This distribution of 
agency and intention reflects Lemkin’s attempt to empirically document genocide by 
describing the multiplicity of acts that contribute to the destruction of the group. 
However, Lemkin also argues that each individual’s participation in the formation 
and execution of the coordinated plan constitutes a part of the crime of genocide. For 
example, Lemkin makes a strong case at the end of Axis Rule for making all participants 
in genocide liable for the crime and eliminating altogether the defense of ‘superior 
orders.’ Lemkin expresses this directly by stating “in order to prevent the invocation of 
the plea of superior orders, the liability of persons who order genocide practices, as well 
as of persons who execute such orders, should be provided expressly by the criminal 
codes of the respective countries.”300 Lemkin reasons that despite the lack of explicit 
planning each individual had the capacity to make a different decision. Moreover, he 
argues that punishing this form of participation is essential to deterring the crime of 
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genocide because it constitutes a severe penalty for thoughtlessness. In doing so, Lemkin 
evinces a desire for law and punishment to intervene and reshape the individual desires of 
genocidists. In his recommendations for the future, Lemkin again cites the need for 
international law to explicitly ban the appeal to superior orders in order to prevent the 
future commission of genocide by creating a firm policy of universally punishing all 
participants in genocide. In this argument, Lemkin appears to endorse a notion of intent 
that treats the individual as a fully autonomous decision maker and subject to 
independent legal scrutiny. In this model, intent exists not in the ‘coordination’ of a plan, 
but with the desires and actions of each participant in a genocidal process.  
Thus far, Lemkin’s account of intent sounds largely consonant with the 
contemporary categories of the normative understanding of genocide. However, this 
consonance hinges on how we interpret the Lemkin’s vision of the ‘plan.’ Indeed, 
Lemkin’s work appears at the height of the Nazi genocide and this makes his writing 
subject to the intricacies of the internationalist-functionalist debate in Holocaust studies. 
In brief, this debate centered on the question of whether or not the Final Solution was a 
premeditated or historically emergent event. Lemkin’s writings seem to fall on both sides 
of this debate at different times. For instance, his description of the German leaderships 
efforts to design the genocide emphasizes premeditation and succumbs to an 
intentionalist reading.301 At other moments, Lemkin describes the plan in functionalist 
terms as coming into being through a series of deviations and changes: “the plan of 
genocide had to be adapted to political considerations in different countries. It could not 
be implemented in full force in all the conquered states, and hence the plan varies as to 
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subject, modalities, and degree of intensity in each occupied country.”302 According to 
Lemkin’s descriptions, the plan thus includes explicit objectives and variations, 
inconsistencies, and ad hoc developments. Lemkin uses this description to assess the 
empirical emergence of the Nazi Genocide. In contrast, his appeal to the notion of the 
plan and his extension of legal culpability to all participants in the genocide develop from 
his effort to legally prohibit genocide. The intentionalist aspect of Lemkin’s account thus 
serves to ground legal judgment and punishment while the functionalist aspect describes 
the set of acts historically constitutive of genocide.  
In this regard, the notion of intent appears in two different forms in Lemkin’s 
work. In the first form, the content of intent is widely distributed to different agencies, 
authorities, and persons. This collection of different agencies coordinates the plan of 
genocide in a variety of techniques or acts. In the second form, the structure of intent 
remains the same for each participant in by constituting their participation as an 
independent participation in a premeditated crime. The two forms of intent thus enable 
Lemkin’s work to draw together the different causal agencies responsible for genocide 
and the punitive mechanisms he considers necessary to deter it. In doing so, Lemkin’s 
work establishes a new domain of knowledge about genocide that works to connect these 
two senses of intent together by relating the causal mechanisms producing genocide 
directly to the expressions of specific, punishable agents. In other words, Lemkin’s work 
establishes the distinction between the genocidist as a subject of enunciation and a 
subject of action and enables a legal apparatus to interpret the latter in terms of the 
former. This structure facilitates the formation of knowledge regarding genocide as well 
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as recommendations for ending it, but also produces a division within the study of 
genocide between emphasizing its legal implications and social dimensions. 
The division between legal and sociological interpretations of genocide and 
genocidal intent has long been a source of criticism and, in part, gave rise to the 
discipline of genocide studies.303 The division originates in Lemkin’s attempts to link the 
emergence of genocide as a new kind of social problem to a juridical solution. For the 
concept of genocide to function, intent thus has to appear in two different forms, which 
interrelate, shift, and displace one another. While most scholars focus on the limitations 
of the UNGC’s notion of intent, it is important not to overlook how Lemkin connects 
these two disparate notions of intent. In particular, Lemkin works to expand the scope of 
legal power to govern the various agencies responsible for the creation, implementation, 
and execution of a plan of genocide. The set of links formed between causal factors, 
intent, criminal liability, the powers of law, and the image of the perpetrator set the stage 
for a larger series of studies of genocide, which would form the terms of political 
discourse on this subject to the present. Lemkin’s work paved the way for the formation 
of complicity between a legal concept of genocide and the extensive deployment of 
disciplinary mechanisms designed to prevent genocide. Indeed, Lemkin envisions the 
scope or power of international law primarily as a preventative mechanism against the 
occurrence of future genocides. The production of knowledge about intent in Lemkin’s 
writings thus contribute directly to the emergence of what I call the preventionist logistic, 
which will be explored later in this chapter. In particular, Lemkin’s work places into 
connection the causal origins of genocide and the mechanisms of prevention by focusing 
on intent as the medium for working on the desire to commit genocide. Both the UNGC 
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and the subsequent development of the normative understanding largely reiterate this link 
and attempt to perfect the regimes of knowledge that explain the social determinants of 
genocide and the genocidist themselves. 
Many of the themes of Lemkin’s work find expression in the UNGC. However, 
unlike Lemkin, the UNGC does not detail the specific empirical cases or acts constitutive 
of genocide. Historically, the UNGC thus left open the question of amassing evidence of 
genocidal intent, a subject that has become a question of renewed interest following the 
creation of the Rome Statute. The final text of the UNGC uses the language of intent 
explicitly. Article II states  “genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such.”304 The notion of intent also frames several of the sub-clauses of Article II. Article 
II section (b), for instance, describes an act of genocide consisting of “serious bodily or 
mental harm” while article (c) describes acts “deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”305 
Article III of the UNGC also describes the list of punishable ‘acts’ of genocide including 
conspiracy, direct and public incitement, and complicity, all of which suggest a 
premeditated effort to destroy members of the group.306 Intent thus appears numerous 
times and in numerous forms in the final text of the UNGC.  
In contrast, the early drafts of the UNGC vary in their use of both the term and 
notion of intent. The Secretariat Draft of the Convention, for instance, describes genocide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 
305 Ibid, my emphasis. 
306 Ibid. 
	   165 
as “the intentional destruction of a group of human beings.”307 Several other drafts of the 
Convention contain no explicit reference to ‘intent,’ but instead describe genocide as an 
act “with the purpose of destroying [the group] in whole, or of preventing its preservation 
or development.”308 In this case, the word ‘purpose’ replaces intent. The difference 
between intent and purpose, as it has legally been interpreted, is subtle, but important. 
‘Purpose’ introduces a greater degree of ambiguity into the text since it implies a separate 
determination from a determination of intent. To clarify, ‘purpose’ and ‘intent’ both 
describe the directedness of an act of genocide. Nonetheless, intent references a 
conscious, volitional subject who willfully carries out a specific act whereas ‘purpose’ 
has historically referred to the ends of the act itself without necessarily describing the 
subject who initiates or engages in an act.309 The distinction between the two forms of 
intent thus reproduces the division in Lemkin’s work between the subject of enunciation 
and the subject of action. However, the final draft of the UNGC obviously prioritizes a 
strong notion of intent characterized by a volitional subject. This leaves the UNGC in a 
predicament because the notion of intent it subscribes to makes it difficult to determine 
when and if genocide is occurring. Indeed, the final draft of the UNGC endorses an 
understanding of intent that requires not just general, but ‘specific intent.’ Specific intent 
refers to an additional legal standard where the commission of a crime occurs on the basis 
of particular beliefs or motives. Specific intent is thus stronger and more difficult to 
prove than general intent. The final text of UNGC Article 2 qualifies ‘national, ethnical, 
racial, and religious’ groups with the terms ‘as such’ precisely to reinforce the standard of 
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specific intent; in fact, contemporary commentators interpret this language as an 
indication of a specific intent standard and believe that mens rea, or mental attitude of the 
perpetrator, is deeply at stake in the crime of genocide.  
The UNGC’s emphasis on specific intent actually produces a problem for 
subsequent efforts to describe or prosecute genocide because proving the perpetrator’s 
mental attitude is not easy. Moreover, the UNGC definition of genocide, in contrast to 
Lemkin’s voluminous writings, does not provide any theory or empirical analysis of 
genocide. As a result, the UNGC relies on a series of supplementary knowledges in order 
to determine whether or not specific intent was present and, consequently, whether or not 
genocide took place. The largely formal notion of intent at work in the UNGC thus finds 
a complement in behavioral theories of intention that draw from historical evidence and 
case studies in order to determine whether an act of genocide took place. In doing so, 
UNGC invisibly reproduces Lemkin’s division between the subject of enunciation and 
the subject of action. In this case, the standard of specific intent serves as a guide for 
interpreting a subject’s actions, but requires an appeal to other theories and forms of 
knowledge about genocide to ground these judgments. Nonetheless, the discrepancy 
between the specific intent standard and the various legal, scientific, and analytical 
mechanisms for describing intent problematize the determination of genocide.  
In a way, the UNGC attempts to conceal the gap between the specific intent 
standard and the empirical discussion of genocide through an appeal to sense. Indeed, as 
William Schabas argues, the drafting process of the UNGC was highly contentious and 
even contradictory on the question of intent.310 Yet, the final text of the UNGC makes 
direct reference to intent and, as described above, reinforces the deliberate, purposive 
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nature of the acts in question in several places in the text. More importantly, the UNGC 
not only defines acts of genocide by specific intent, but it also explicitly criminalizes the 
intent to commit genocide, through hate speech, political mobilization and other means, 
in later articles.311 The UNGC thus paradoxically both invokes intent to identify genocide 
and criminalizes these intents as coextensive with genocide itself. As a result, the UNGC 
folds the punitive force of law directly into the concept of intent by making the existence 
of an intention a kind of crime. Put differently, incitement or speech, which identify the 
propensity for an act of genocide, also constitute a crime of genocide according to the 
terms of the UNGC. Much like Lemkin’s use of two notions of intent, the UNGC here 
invokes two different forms of intent. In the first instance, intent emerges from a series of 
statements or expressions. In the second instance, these statements and expressions 
constitute actual acts of genocide. By both criminalizing expressions of intent as a form 
of genocide and referencing those expressions to determine when an act of genocide 
occurs, the UNGC links the purposive dimension of acts directly to an initiating subject 
in a speaking situation. The rhetoric of the genocidist consequently serves to substantiate 
the existence of genocidal intent and as an analytical device for interpreting the 
subsequent actions of a genocidist. Unfortunately, this doubling of intent makes the 
notion incredibly fragile because intent both serves as evidence of the existence of 
genocide and as an expression of genocide.  
However, this raises a new problem for the UNGC. If intent both constitutes a 
crime and is evidence of the crime then how do we define or determine intent? Indeed, 
the UNGC’s dual formulation of intent produces a paradox where discovery of intent 
would always already be discovery of a crime having occurred. Intent, which marks the 
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desire for an act, would thus be both ground for determining an event of genocide and 
genocide itself. The criminalization of intent would thus outlaw intent for an act prior to 
an acts occurrence, but the existence of the intention would be the only legal evidence of 
the existence of a act. Intent both serves to ground or identify genocide and operates as a 
form of genocide. Genocide would consequently only be identifiable either wholly prior 
to its arrival or after it had already taken place. There would be, in essence, no ongoing 
genocide, but a genocide yet to come or one already transpired.  
The only way avoid this circular structure is to invoke a structure of sense, which 
resolves the tension between the two dimensions of intent. What sense supplies is an 
interpretive backdrop within which articulations of intent become intelligible. As such, 
sense separates the two notions of intent from one another by treating them as separate 
dimensions of a subject’s belief and conduct. In many cases, genocide law scholars make 
explicit reference to the function of sense when they describe the possibility of ‘inferring’ 
intent from a series of actions. In these cases, intent emerges as a product of an 
interpretive act by a court, judge, or prosecution, which reads the actions of the 
genocidist in light of a particular regime of sense. In this context, sense provides the 
coherence of enunciations and expressions. More importantly, sense differentiates the 
acts of divining or discovering intent and the criminalization of intent as actualized in the 
conduct of the subject. Put differently, sense enables intent to be dispersed throughout the 
acts of a subject of genocide and, as a result, to both serve as the origin of genocide and 
as its criminal dimension. Sense renders the genocidists little more than their intents 
perfectly reflected in their actions. In this regard, sense resolves the tension in the 
UNGC’s formulation of intent by treating intent both as a mechanism for identifying 
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genocide and as implicit in genocidal conduct. To make this connection, sense tightens 
the connection between the subject of enunciation and the subject of action by 
interpreting both through a common rubric or frame.  
It is the expectation of coherence between intent and action, generated by sense, 
which may have given Hannah Arendt such considerable pause when she confronted the 
figure of Adolf Eichmann. Indeed, Arendt’s thesis on the banality of evil describes the 
limits of a regime of sense because in her reading Eichmann’s fundamental 
thoughtlessness, rather than malice or special intent, enabled horrible administrative 
massacres.312 Eichmann’s inability to consider the lives of others reflected, in Arendt’s 
musings, a challenge to traditional theories of evil not because Eichmann did not commit 
(and intend to commit) heinous crimes, but because he did so as a byproduct of his 
thoughtlessness rather than an insidious, volitional, and practiced racism, which typically 
characterize the normative image of the genocidist. While sense makes the character of 
intent appear seamless, Arendt discovered a deficit or hollowness in this presumption. 
Eichmann’s concern for his career, small-minded aspirations, and short-sightedness 
lacked many features of the profile of the genocidist supplied by sense (and the UNGC). 
Hence, Arendt argues that the unthought (and in this respect unintentional or perhaps 
after intentional) dimension of mass violence as crucial to its execution.313 Arendt’s 
thesis has long been the center of considerable controversy and even decades later 
scholars still attempt to rebut it by researching Eichmann’s virulent anti-Semitism.314 
These virulent rebuttals highlight how important the function of sense is to the normative 
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understanding of genocide and to the figuration of genocidist. Indeed, it is almost as if it 
is not enough that Eichmann enabled the murder of millions, he must also have a special 
desire, an intent, for such outcomes and this desire must represent the truth of an atrocity. 
The example of Eichmann illustrates how sense guides the interpretation of 
genocide by making intent both appear prior to and within conduct thereby resolving the 
tension between a notion of genocide as a volitional, conscious, and autonomous act and 
the criminalization of these intentions. In this regard, sense applies a filter to various 
behavior, statements, and actions of a genocidist. This filter enables only certain relations 
to express themselves and be understood as legitimate thereby determining the 
intelligibility of action in advance. Unfortunately, this use of this filter also produces 
‘unintelligible’ behavior, actions not readily intelligible to sense, and draws upon other 
forms of knowledge in order to account for the unintelligible portions of the criminal 
subject. In this way, sense constantly supplements itself, hiding its own gaps and 
omissions, just as it supports the paradoxical status of intent in the UNGC as both 
evidence of and commission of the crime of genocide 
More importantly, the work of sense in the UNGC aligns the notion of intent 
more closely with the normative understanding than Lemkin’s problematic formulation. 
It does so by identifying a specific kind of subject, which authorizes and can be held 
accountable for acts of genocide. By moving away from Lemkin’s focus on genocide as a 
plan and instead making intent the condition for an act of genocide, and by filtering 
‘intent’ through a particular form of sense the UNGC effectively relocates the intent for 
genocide in a particular individual, state, institution or belief. By tightening the notion of 
intent, the UNGC supports the creation of the normative understanding, which likewise 
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restricts intent to a specific set of political actors with readily identifiable desires, 
dispositions, and beliefs. However, in doing so, the UNGC also excludes the possibility 
of a more complex picture of the emergence of genocide as well as any possibility of 
‘negligent’ or ‘unintentional genocide since the very possibility of these kinds of 
genocide would call into question the structure of sense and notion of the subject that 
renders genocide criminal under the terms of the UNGC.  
 
Normative Intentions 
As previous chapters have discussed, following the ratification of the UNGC, 
genocide slipped from political discourse due to large number of shifting social 
conditions. When genocide scholars and activists rediscovered the concept decades later, 
the notion of intent underwent decisive modifications and was transformed into the 
normative understanding of genocide. The normative understanding refashioned the 
notion of intent in accordance with two distinct, but overlapping agendas: the creation of 
international legal standards and the development of robust social theories of genocide. 
Each agenda rearticulated intent in a normative fashion by extending the UNGC’s 
insistence on a specific causal agent who bears responsibility for the emergence of 
genocide. While many genocide scholars have commented on the discrepancy between 
scholarly and legal efforts to study genocide, few have noticed the continuities 
surrounding the notion of intent. Indeed, it is only recently that intent has been engaged 
critically in academic and legal domains as the case of Haiti described in chapter one 
indicates. This section briefly surveys a sample of both academic and legal examples of 
intent to illustrate how both work to consolidate the normative understanding of genocide 
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and pave the way for a politics of security, preemption, and control. The following 
sections describe several of the problems produced by the normative understanding of 
intent for the politics of genocide. 
Many scholars explicitly offer a normative understanding of intent in their 
writings. They do so in order to clearly define their field of study. In particular, these 
definitions describe the intentions of a particular causal agency that produces genocide. 
This agency takes many forms such as a leader, politician or religious figure or an 
‘objective’ structure such as a state institution or military organization. What is important 
in each case is less the content of these figures than the form that intent takes across 
different normative definitions of genocide. By this I mean the normative discourse on 
intent envisions agency as isolated to discrete bodies that can be held accountable for the 
commission of genocide regardless of the makeup of the particular agent. Changes to the 
content of intent vary significantly with shifts in the social and behavioral sciences as 
well as popular imaginaries about massacre and mass violence in contemporary politics.  
Discoveries about intent thus more often reflect particular circumstances than reimagine 
the set of social relations brought to bear by the concept of intent. Yet, these variations 
typically reinscribe the basic structure of the normative understanding of intent.  
Jack Nusan Porter provides a good example of the normative understanding of 
intent. Porter describes genocide as “the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by a 
government, a state authority, or its agents-with intent to destroy-of a racial, religious, 
tribal, ethnic, cultural, sexual, or political group.”315 Porter’s definition reproduces many 
aspects of the normative understanding and, indeed, was crafted for the express purpose 
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of developing a normative theory of genocide. In his definition, the element of intent is 
made explicit. Genocide occurs as ‘deliberate’ action and by the state, government or its 
agencies. In doing so, Porter ascribes specific causal agents, in this case the state, with 
unique responsibility for the emergence of genocide. Porter’s work then employs this 
definition to recommend a specific set of guidelines for the use of the concept of 
genocide. Interestingly, Porter calls for the expansion of the number of groups considered 
subject of genocide to include sexual, tribal and political groups.316 However, he still 
predetermines the field of study of genocide by reemphasizing a strong notion of intent 
tied to particular political agencies. Porter’s work also condemns how “the term has been 
abused by political activists…[and] even professional scholars have misused the 
concept.”317 Porter’s invocation of intent consequently serves to differentiate legitimate 
and illegitimate episodes of genocide. Here, the force of the normative understanding of 
intent is explicitly put to the purpose of restricting the use of the concept genocide. While 
Porter defends this as vital to analytical and sociological clarity, he does so without 
considering the productive effects of the discourse of genocide more broadly. 
Porter’s example is far from alone. Chalk and Jonassohn’s classic definition of 
genocide as “a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends 
to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator,”318 
goes a step further than Porter to indicate alternative sources of authority, but retains the 
same form of intent characterized by volitional, willful causal action. Other figures such 
as Steve Katz emphasize the importance of intent to an even greater degree: “the concept 
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of genocide applies only when there is an actualized intent, however successfully carried 
out, to physically destroy an entire group (as such a group is defined by the 
perpetrators).”319 Unlike Porter and Chalk and Jonassohn, Katz clarifies that actualized 
intent constitutes an exclusive or necessary criteria for defining genocide, but does not 
specify what organization or entity perpetrates genocide thereby abandoning a specific 
content, but retaining the form of intent as the causally determinate action of a discrete 
agent.  
More contemporary approaches to genocide reproduce this structure. Barbara 
Harff, for example, refers to “genocides and politicides [as] the promotion, execution, 
and or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents-or, in the 
case of civil war either of contending authorities-that are intended to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.”320 In this statement, Harff 
specifies the subject of intent to a degree further than the other authors just discussed 
because she isolates responsibility for genocide within particular elites (individuals) 
rather than state institutions. Her definition consequently supports an approach to intent 
that resonates directly with the ambitions of the UNGC to attach criminal liability to 
particular persons. In contrast, Martin Shaw defines genocide as “a form of violent social 
conflict or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social 
groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction.”321 Shaw’s notion of 
intent goes in a different direction from Harff’s insofar as it focuses on the generic 
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category of ‘armed power organizations’ and employs the broader language of ‘aim.’ 
Shaw’s work also endeavors to think perpetrator and victim groups as mutually 
constituted identities. Yet, Shaw nonetheless defines these identities by an objective 
status of what he calls ‘the structure of conflict.’ As I discussed in chapter two, the 
‘structure of conflict’ reproduces a normative understanding of genocide because it 
singles out a specific objective structure of genocide that determines the form genocide 
necessarily takes.322 In this way, Shaw offers a looser, but nonetheless restrictive account 
of genocide. If Harff represents one extreme tendency of the normative understanding, 
isolating intention and causality within the personality of a specific elite or leader, then 
Shaw represents the other end of the spectrum by emphasizing the generality of intent 
amongst a diffuse organizational structure. In these works, the category of intent enables 
scholars to differentiate the set of actors ultimately responsible for genocide. However, 
scholars who endorse the normative understanding rarely investigate the presuppositions 
they fold into the notion of intent. As a result, intent serves as a language of figuration 
that frames causal agency, but does so by endorsing an implicit set of background 
assumptions about causality, morality, and politics. These assumptions, in turn, determine 
what events appear as genocide in the first place.  
Recent legal scholars and international courts also produce a normative 
understanding of intent. For example, the creation of the Rome Statute clarified the 
definition of mens rea, the mental element of intent, applicable at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Article 30 of the Statute interprets intent in the following way: 
“where, in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; in relation to a 
consequence that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in 
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the ordinary course of events.”323 In this Article the Rome Statute identifies two different 
relationships between causality and intent. The first concerns conduct. In this case, 
genocide occurs only if the person ‘means’ to engage in conduct. The verb means 
signifies an intentional relationship to the element of conduct. In the second, the language 
of cause is explicit. Here, the Statute describes the subject as ‘aware’ of the consequences 
of an action. Like Lemkin and the UNGC, the Rome Statute thus offers two different 
formulations of intent one with respect to the subject of action and the other the subject of 
the statement. These two formulations offer a particularly rigid interpretation of intent 
because they force both conduct and knowledge to be expressly interested in the 
execution of genocide The proceedings before the ICC consequently serve largely to 
establish the knowledge, motive, and intent of a genocidist via a number of documentary 
processes. The underlying assumption is that intent manifests clearly in both the conduct 
and knowledge of a genocidist such that an obvious pattern will emerge so that it can be 
subject to legal judgment.  
The Rome Statute was not created ex nihilo, but represents a dominant trend in 
international law. The 1996 International Law Commission, for instance, describes 
genocide in the following fashion: 
The prohibited acts enumerated…are by their nature conscious, intentional or volitional 
acts which an individual could not usually commit without knowing that certain 
consequences were likely to result. These are not the types of acts that would normally 
occur by accident or even as a result of mere negligence...[A] general intent to commit 
one of the enumerated acts combined with a general awareness of the probable 
consequences of such an act is not sufficient for the crime of genocide. The definition of 
this crime requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with respect to the 
overall consequences of the prohibited act.324 
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In this statement, the International Law Commission explicitly recreates the division 
between specific and general intent by stipulating that genocide occurs not only as a 
product of ‘conscious, intentional or volitional acts,’ but with a particular state of mind. 
Specific intent differentiates genocide from the broader category of Crimes Against 
Humanity, which under the Rome Statute covers a wide variety of illicit acts without 
respect to specific intent. Thus, in both the International Law Commission and Rome 
Statute specific intent distinguishes or defines the crime of genocide. However, this 
forces legal discourse to appeal to a variety of theories of motive, causation or, in short, 
knowledge regarding the intent of the genocidist. In this respect, demands for stronger 
international legal regimes or norms find themselves dependent not only on the whims of 
the great powers, but the regimes of knowledge constituting the subject of genocide.  
Contemporary international law continues to distinguish genocide and other 
crimes on the basis of ‘intent.’ The International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) crafted the new doctrine the R2P, which has increasingly framed 
contemporary atrocity intervention. R2P makes express reference to intent in describing 
the ‘just threshold’ for international military intervention in humanitarian crises and 
makes direct reference to the intent standard.325 Other court prosecutions at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have likewise referred to intent in order to assess the 
application of charges of genocide. A broad consensus thus appears to exist on the notion 
of intent under international law. Nonetheless, the appearance of consensus is misleading 
for two reasons. First, this consensus is largely centered on terminology, but not 
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necessarily the subsequent meaning of the terms. Court systems, laws, and legal 
documents disagree about the basic features of intent. Second, genocide tribunals and 
trial processes are in their infancy. As a result, the rubrics discussed under Rome, the 
ILC, and international courts have yet to be fully developed or standardized. What unites 
these different developments is the discursive practice of invoking intent to describe 
genocide, describe casual agency, and recommend punitive measures. The law, however, 
does not offer a theory of intent. It depends on other regimes of knowledge, drawn 
primarily from social science, reporting, and non-governmental organizations, in order to 
produce a body of knowledge that substantiates a need for genocide prosecution. These 
theories supply the insights into the causal origins of an event of genocide, which then 
enable legal prosecution to continue. The legal notion of intent consequently rests upon 
theories of causal efficacy that do not originate in the law. These theories supply the 
profile for determining when acts of genocide take place. The legal notion of intent is 
thus intimately linked to social theory and both rearticulate the normative understanding 
of genocide.  
In summary, the normative understanding of intent plays an important role in 
binding the subject, as a conscious, willful agent, to a series of actions for which they 
become the causal source or originator. The notion of intent is thus critical to both legal 
and social science endeavors with respect to genocide because it facilitates the attribution 
of causal relationships and supplies the criteria for diagnosing when, where, and how 
genocide takes place as well as the application of punitive and preventative measures. In 
both cases, intent also works retroactively to assess specific statements, actions, or 
behaviors by linking a subject’s enunciations to their actions. Like Lemkin and the 
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UNGC, the normative understanding of intent reproduces these two formulations of 
intent. In doing so, they open intent and desire as a field of study and punitive 
intervention. In many respects, the entire purpose of international law is to modify this 
intention through a form of deterrence. As such, the normative understanding constitutes 
the law as a space for the governance of desire by recourse to different theories of social 
action, personality, and psychology and a variety of novel procedures for confining, 
restricting, and inhibiting these desires.  
The normative understanding of intent has three important implications for the 
politics of genocide. First, how we envision the notion of intent and the set of causal links 
between desire and action will impact what events appear as genocidal in the first place. 
These images, in turn, shape statecraft, legal reforms, and humanitarian interventions 
designed around an implicit theory of genocide. The notion of intent functions to include 
and exclude different episodes or cases of genocide and to recommend different 
responses to genocidal conduct. Second, intent becomes the place where scholars of 
genocide impart their own assumptions, experiences, or memories of events in the 
elaboration of aesthetic structure. By this I mean causal mechanisms and the knowledge 
of behavior concern particular aesthetic relations between the genocidist and the events 
they allegedly produce. The work of intent concerns equal parts a figuration of agency 
and a description of empirical or historical acts with the former serving as a frame or 
background for the later. Third, by determining the set of causal relations surrounding 
genocide, the notion of intent opens the door for a move from punishment to prevention. 
Indeed, the normative understanding of intent aspires to establish a regime of knowledge 
capable of explicating the complex relations between desire and behavior that produce 
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genocide and thereby open these relations to intervention, calibration, and attenuation in 
the hope of preemptively stopping genocide from taking place. As the next section will 
discuss, the rise of genocide prevention has been a component of these discourses from 
their inception and resonates with contemporary politics of exception and emergency. 
This discourse establishes temporal boundaries of the genocide event in such a way that it 




The normative understanding of intent promotes a vision of genocide as the 
willful, conscious act of a knowing subject bent on the annihilation of a group of people. 
This notion continues to have force and, as recently as 2007, Guenter Lewy, author of the 
famous America in Vietnam, argues “there is every reason not to ignore the role of intent 
in what is often called ‘the crime of crimes’- the destruction of an entire group of people 
or genocide. Proof of specific intent is necessary to find an individual guilty of genocide, 
and the role of intent is similarly crucial when the historian assesses an episode of mass 
death that occurred in the past.”327 Comparing the number of deaths in a genocide to an 
epidemic, Lewy continues: “to the victims [how they died] makes no difference…It does 
make a difference for the assignment of responsibility and guilt and, more importantly, 
for historical truth.”328 Lewy’s argument brings together legal and scholarly dimensions 
of the normative understanding by making a strong notion of intent a key tool for both 
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adjudicating questions of legal culpability and accurately depicting history. Lewy is not 
alone in making this argument. William Schabas explicitly repudiates the implications of 
anything but a strong notion of intent: “while the desire to extend international law to 
cover negligent behavior of governments and corporations is commendable, this becomes 
somewhat far removed from the stigmatization of genocide as the ‘crime of crimes’ for 
which the highest level of evil and malicious intent is presumed. Extending the scope of 
genocide to crimes of negligence can easily trivialize the entire concept.”329 Lewy and 
Schabas’s position reflects the most recent incarnation of the normative understanding of 
intent. Their argument privileges a distinction between acts of commission and omission, 
which aligns with the specific intent standard enumerated by the UNGC. Establishing this 
connection, according to them, is critical for using historical evidence to render discrete 
judgments on the culpability of individuals for genocide. In this argument, intent serves 
as a key mechanism in a punitive apparatus, which is supposed to deter genocide and 
render justice possible.  
The possibility of ‘negligent,’ ‘accidental,’ ‘unintentional,’ or even ‘unconscious’ 
genocide poses a serious threat to the normative understanding of genocide because it 
highlights the arbitrary character of the distinction between different acts of destruction. 
Figures like Lewy and Schabas are consequently obliged to double down on the strong 
notion of intent as a legitimate, natural, and sensible guide for parsing intentional and 
purposeful action from unintentional or negligent conduct. In making these claims, 
Schabas and Lewy also draw explicitly from the image of radical evil to explain why a 
strong notion of intent is critical to the politics of genocide. In their work, radical evil acts 
as a filter for describing the form genocide takes as a kind of crime: it defies explanation, 
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but equally supports the notion that specific, volitional entities, rather than social 
structures and processes, produce genocide. Indeed, the entire punitive response to 
genocide hinges on the figure of radical evil and is unthinkable outside of it. By drawing 
on the rubric of radical evil, Lewy and Schabas effectively transform genocide into a 
massive hate crime by making genocide distinctive purely on the malefic intent. As A. 
Dirk Moses argues this notion of intent amounts to a form of radical volunteerism that 
“can only ‘explain’ why [genocides] develop with circular logic by referring to the 
intentions of the perpetrator.”330 Genocide consequently becomes a problem of particular 
attitudes, ideologies, or beliefs extracted from historical context and deemed radically 
evil. Moreover, by locating these intentions in the individual, the normative 
understanding of intent imagines a form of genocide prosecution that would either deter 
individuals from acting on these beliefs or eliminate them altogether via ‘education’ and 
‘discipline,’ which could remove the evil elements of a genocidal society. As Moses 
contends, arguments based on a strong notion of intent develop into elaborate tautologies 
with no ability to explain the genesis of an episode of genocide. However, as the next 
section explores, the creation of moral knowledge not only produces deficits in the 
explanation of genocide, it also legitimates the development of new modes of political 
governance.  
More importantly, by emphasizing a strong notion of intent and drawing on the 
rubric of radical evil, Schabas and Lewy eliminate the possibility of accidental or 
unintentional genocides altogether. The exclusion of negligent genocide is problematic in 
two ways. First, it devalues many episodes of mass destruction, which are either 
ambiguous in nature or that occur without the obvious intention. Schabas and Lewy 
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dismiss these forms of gratuitous violence as important, but not worthy of the politics of 
genocide. Second, by overemphasizing intent, Schabas and Lewy make it more difficult 
to actually study mass violence because they neglect the variations, inconsistencies, and 
lapses in judgment that also characterize mass destruction. In other words, the strong 
notion of intent conceals the conditions of possibility for the emergence of mass 
destruction by making the event a byproduct of a single subject. In this way, Lewy and 
Schabas’s reproduction on the normative understanding excludes episodes from political 
scrutiny and recreates problematic forms of political power. 
Fortunately, the normative understanding of intent has met with significant 
criticism from a minor tradition of scholars, many of whom have become targets on 
account of their critiques of intent. Henry Huttenbach, for instance, describes genocide as 
“any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy.”331 This interpretation, which 
eliminates any reference to intent, incorporates acts of omission and commission. 
Huttenbach’s work also incorporates a much more careful attempt to describe a series of 
actions constitutive of genocide without overemphasizing the role of any one perpetrator. 
In this sense, genocide becomes a process that is both intentional and multifaceted, 
includes negligence and accidents, but also incorporates purposive action. In Lewy’s 
work, Huttenbach’s definition serves as the object of criticism precisely because 
Huttenbach makes it impossible to assign individuals historical responsibility for 
genocide by removing reference to intent.332 Put differently, Lewy seems to believe that a 
historical study of genocide is only possible using a notion of intent. The historical study 
of genocide, however, opens the question of how evidence of genocide gets amassed and 
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interpreted in the first place. As Alexander Greenwalt argues, the specific intent standard 
gives the appearance that it is easy to draw crisp distinctions between episodes of 
genocide and other forms of mass violence and thus to identify historical episodes of 
genocide. The problem, as Greenwalt succinctly puts it, is that the “purpose to destroy a 
group qua group exists on a continuum that resists analytical determination.”333 
 Taking this cue, genocide scholars have called attention to how social structures, 
matrices of power, and widespread political conditions promote attitudes, behaviors, and 
even expressions of intention. By making motive and intent the critical elements of 
genocide, they argue, the normative understanding actually produces highly problematic 
histories. For example, in an explicit rebuttal of Lewy, Tony Barta argues “the emphasis 
on intention and scope, on purposeful annihilation, has given the word [genocide] its 
terrible leading edge. It has succeeded in devaluing all other concepts of less planned 
destruction, even if the effects are the same.”334 Barta’s claim here is that Lewy has 
implicitly devalued a series of ‘lesser violences,’ which nonetheless constitute genocide 
and thereby effectively written them out of history. Barta continues that Lewy believes 
“genocide, strictly, cannot be a crime of unintended consequences; we expect it to be 
acknowledge in consciousness. In real historical relationships, however, unintended 
consequences are legion, and it is from the consequences, as well as the often muddled 
consciousness, that we have to deduce the real nature of the relationship.335 Barta’s 
argument here is both explicit and subtle. On the one hand, he contests Lewy’s 
assumption that intention provides the best lens for understanding genocide. In contrast, 
Barta argues that consequences or outcomes ought to dictate how we classify an event of 
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genocide. On the other, Barta develops a more open concept of intent in his reference to 
‘muddled consciousness’ as a state of inconsistent, often partially articulated beliefs, 
motives, or desires. For Barta, overemphasizing intentionality amounts to a form of 
historical denial since it restricts the intelligibility of the numerous events, relationships, 
and circumstances where ‘specific intent’ is lacking, but destruction takes place 
nonetheless. In a similar reply to Lewy, historian David Stannard contends that ‘intent’ 
also separates a specific action from a broader climate of attitudes, dispositions, and 
creeds. Taking issue with Lewy’s reading of indigenous genocide in the Americas, 
Stannard argues that European missionaries, by definition, sought to eliminate a form of 
otherness in their effort to assimilate or destroy indigenous cultures. The production of 
epidemics, malnutrition, and the disruption of social relations, which Lewy disqualifies as 
forms of genocide, thus have to be framed by a more complex social context. According 
to Stannard, even if European missionaries did not have contemporary scientific 
knowledge of disease transmission336 they welcomed the spread of epidemics amongst 
indigenous societies and even reference them as evidence of God’s legitimation of the 
colonial project.337  In Stannard and Barta’s rebuttals of Lewy, intent functions in a more 
complex fashion than the normative understanding and it incorporates cultural outlooks, 
social dispositions, and implicit presuppositions when thinking about both speech and 
action. Put differently, they interrogate the link between conduct, intent, and desire, 
which the strong notion of intent makes an object of transparent knowledge. They utilize 
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this link to bring social assemblages to bear on questions of intent and to reveal how the 
conditions of possibility for articulating genocidal intent depends on these relationships.  
Stannard and Barta’s point, however, is not simply that this offers a more 
historically accurate depiction of genocide, but also that it plays a critical role in what 
forms of genocide appear as actionable in the first place and, subsequently, what 
responses are available to genocide. Although neither states this explicitly, the normative 
understanding renders the majority of colonial violence unintelligible as a form of 
genocide because it removes longer processes of deprivation and destruction from 
consideration. In a much earlier essay, Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski 
describe the problem of intent in this context succinctly: 
 
The related idea that only intentional or planned massive destruction of human lives 
should be called genocide can also be a very difficult and, in our opinion, an inadequate 
notion. As such it has the tendency to gloss over structural violence which through 
various mechanisms can be equally as destructive of human life as many an intentional 
and planned program of annihilation. In addition, the presence of structural violence 
promotes the use of planned violence. The problem here lies not in the difficulty of 
demonstrating what intentionality means psychologically speaking, but rather in the 
neglect of those processes of destruction which, although massive, are so systematic and 
systemic, and that therefore appear so ‘normal’ that most individuals involved at some 
level of the process of destruction may never see the need to make an ethical decision or 
even reflect upon the consequences of their actions. What prevents people from stepping 
outside of their particular situations and from reflecting upon the consequences of their 
actions or inactions? Has society, a product of human activity, become so objectified, so 
alien to its source, that its creators feel no part of its operation feel no possibility of 
affecting its course of movement? Why is it that individuals do not seem to be able to 
reflect upon the processes that have made them anonymous actors, cogs in the system, 
and that have nudged many of them to participate in genocide?338 
 
Wallimann and Dobkowski make two important arguments in this statement. 
First, they contend that the normative understanding of intent ignores forms of structural 
violence that can be equally destructive as the rapid, volitional events, which we typically 
associate with genocide. The slower processes of structural and systematic violence 
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highlighted by figures like Barta and Stannard subsequently become much more 
important for thinking about the occurrence of genocide. Second, Wallimann and 
Dobkowski point out how this framing of intent makes spectacular violence ‘ordinary,’ 
‘normal,’ and ‘unproblematic’ so long as it does not originate in radically evil 
intentions.339 The normative understanding of intent depoliticizes human activity because 
it treats genocide (and political violence more broadly) as independent of everyday 
political routines or, put differently, as exceptional rather than integrated into many 
spheres of contemporary political life.  
Huttenbach, Barta, Stannard, and Wallimann and Dobkowski represent a small 
sample of critics who challenge the normative understanding of intent linked to the 
concept of genocide. In each case, a set of historical problems including colonial 
domination, invisible structural domination, and the complexity of mass violence 
galvanized their efforts to ‘stretch’ the notion of intent beyond the confines of the 
individual subject. In reading intent in this fashion, the minor tradition employs a 
different mode of sense, which problematizes the causal relationships traditionally 
assumed to be part of genocide as well as the set of memories, forms of evil, and styles of 
historical writing that buttress normative invocations of intent. Indeed, the minor tradition 
troubles scholars and activists who defend the normative understanding because it 
pinpoints how relations of knowledge, culpability, and belief exhibit a greater degree of 
contingency than we usually think. Critiques of this kind also jeopardize the 
unproblematic relief for genocide offered by institutions such as the ICC and R2P by 
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highlighting how many of the rubrics that legitimate these institutions develop from the 
same set of ideologies and dispositions that fostered genocide.340 The minor tradition of 
intent consequently challenges normative understanding on multiple fronts by drawing 
disparate social relations into contemporary thinking about genocide. 
This challenge has two important implications for the politics of genocide. First, 
as I have already discussed, it entails transforming the intelligibility of genocide and 
contesting the stale incarnation of the concept deployed in international legal institutions. 
The question of intelligibility conditions not only what events ‘appear’ as genocide, but 
also how we respond to these events, what forms of ethics, negotiation or justice are 
appropriate to them, and what connection events labeled genocide have to broader 
political arrangements. Because the normative understanding of genocide places all the 
emphasis on the isolated desires of an individual, it constitutes the perpetrator as an 
object of knowledge and interprets all components of a genocide in light of the 
individual’s desire. The normative understanding of intent likewise renders genocide 
prosecution incredibly difficult because the image of intent makes it almost impossible 
for any action to qualify as a kind of genocide since it lacks the degree of premeditation, 
motivation, and maliciousness the standard calls for. The intelligibility of genocide 
consequently forecloses the politicization of multiple forms of violence. 
Second, the normative understanding of intent produces representations of desire 
in order to explain a perpetrator’s intent. These representations, in turn, shape the set of 
political responses to genocide that the normative understanding endorses. While the 
minor tradition has done a wonderful job calling attention to the limits of the static 
representation of desire in the normative understanding, these critiques overlook how the 
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processes of representing desire itself constitute a form of desiring-production. By this I 
mean that the construction of different representations of desire is itself an investment of 
desire by the scholars who reiterate the normative understanding. The construction of 
representation is thus part of producing a larger assemblage in the politics of genocide 
one that seeks to produce intention as a governable site of contemporary politics and 
resonates with broader transformations in international security. In this regard, simply 
critiquing the limits of different representations of desire does not question the underlying 
ambition of the normative understanding to constitute desire as an object of political 
control. The minor tradition has thus failed to put into question the more tacit politics of 
the normative understanding. Indeed, in the process of excavating and describing the 
subject of genocide, a series of implicit presuppositions about social life, the self, and the 
nature of violence start to operate on the field of the political itself. The normative 
understanding of intent supports articulations of genocide intervention, prevention, and 
prohibition that take whole societies as a kind of biopolitical object. By doing so, the 
normative understanding legitimates a series of interventions into the social texture of a 
community in order to render it immune to genocide. In this way, the aspiration of 
knowing desire supports a new set of political efforts to find and eradicate the elements 
of genocide within societies prior to their actualization. It is this new theme in the politics 
of genocide that the next section will discuss in greater detail. 
 
The Preventionist Logistic 
The notion of intent reinforces punitive legal responses to genocide by tying the 
commission of genocidal acts to a particular subject or perpetrator. However, the politics 
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of genocide has always been accompanied by a desire to rid the world of genocide before 
it happens. In short, the politics of genocide includes what Thomas Cushman describes as 
“the ideology of preventionism.”341 By the ideology of preventionism Cushman means an 
aspiration to prevent genocide and a firm belief in the possibility that appropriate legal 
and political practices will accomplish this aim. Lemkin, for instance, articulates a desire 
for international law to deter and thereby prevent future episodes of genocide. In the past 
few decades, the ideology of preventionism has expanded and transformed in connection 
with the birth of anti-genocide NGOs and the rise of human rights consciousness. In part, 
the renewed interest in the formation of an anti-genocide regime during this period 
followed the popular coverage of the violence in Rwanda, Bosnia, and later Sudan. 
Setting aside for a moment the contested practices of representation that surround each of 
these events,342 the surge of interest in genocide generated an agenda calling for new 
forms of humanitarian intervention and, specifically, practices of genocide prevention. 
The preventionist agenda includes establishing early warning systems, garnering reliable 
indicators of the presence of genocide, and strengthening multilateral and global 
institutional measures and procedures to intervene in episodes of potential genocide. With 
the creation of the R2P, this initiative appears to have reached the apex of status quo 
global institutions, but many different NGOs such as Save Darfur, Genocide Watch, and 
Prevent Genocide Now form a critical part of this movement. Since preventionism exists 
not just as an aspiration or belief, but in the form of tangible desires, institutional 
practices, legal texts and is thus widely distributed, I think of it as a logistic that changes 
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governance in several domains. As a logistic, preventionism amends the traditional focus 
on security by linking the emergence of genocide in the future to the management of the 
political present. In this way, discussions of genocide no longer occur simply as part of 
an ideological structure or aspiration, but are folded into novel forms of governmentality. 
The growth of preventionism likewise suggests that genocide has been woven into 
the fabric of global governmentality as a crucial site for the application of international 
political power.343 While few would likely argue that stopping an ongoing genocide is not 
of the utmost ethical importance, the preventionist logistic has another ambition, one 
more deeply entwined with technologies of control: preventing genocides before they 
take place or, put simply, preemption. Cushman aptly summarizes this logic:  
through empirical and scientific observation of operationally defined cases of genocide, 
one can isolate the variables and causal mechanisms at work and predict future 
genocides. Armed with such predictions, one can take specific practical steps to intervene 
and stop genocides from occurring. The key to success is the development of political 
mechanisms or structures, which will heed the scientific understanding and possess the 
political will, which means basically the ability and the physical force necessary to 
intervene to stop genocide. This model of prevention is naturalistic, in that it assumes that 
genocide is more or less the same across time and space, and that it is predictable if we 
can isolate the variables which cause it.344 
 
The underlying premise of preventionism is that certain forms of knowledge 
unproblematically tell us about when and how cases of genocide occur as well as lend 
themselves to straightforward political interventions. While preventionism is structured 
by presuppositions about the group and destruction, intent plays a far more important role 
in this development. In particular, the body of knowledge about intent substantiates the 
propensity for genocide prior to its occurrence. This knowledge thus enables predictions, 
forecasts, and preventative efforts to forestall genocide in advance. Dominant theories of 
intent naturalize a series of binaries articulated at a global level that divide the planet into 
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areas that are ‘genocide prone’ and those which are relatively immune to genocide. By 
employing this division, preventionism not only reifies a Eurocentric account of 
responsible versus irresponsible polities, but makes it all the more difficult to understand 
the deep entanglement between ‘genocidal events’ such as Darfur and practices 
undertaken in the rest of the world.345 In this respect, preventionism constitutes less an 
ideology as a kind of logistic entwined with technologies, aspirations, and a desire to 
manage the future.346 While the aspiration of preventionism to stop mass violence seems 
like a worthy cause, the mobilization of the preventionist logistic resonates because of the 
way it taps into a variety of sentiments about the wayward, downtrodden and victimized 
nature of the global south. These sentiments more often than not end up uncritically 
supporting forms of violence, institutional patterns, and regimes that entrench rather than 
undermine political domination as the final section of this chapter will illustrate in greater 
detail. Moreover, they risk obscuring other episodes of political violence, which fail to 
‘appear’ as genocidal according to the preventionist code. Genocide prevention thus 
constitutes an important ethico-political question, yet a vexing terrain for the mobilization 
of new techniques of security and the governance of life.  
Genocide scholars such as Cushman and Dirk Moses have already subjected 
preventionism to criticism along these lines. They leverage a number of arguments 
against preventionism by showing how it ignores the unwillingness of states to stop 
genocide when they do not see doing so as in their interest, highlighting the forms of 
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moral superiority and narcissism that often accompany preventionist discourse, and 
detailing how the organizations that respond to genocide do so through cumbersome and 
occasionally compromised bureaucratic means.347 These authors also point out that 
knowledge of the causes of genocide differ from the knowledge of how to prevent 
genocide and criticize the selective account genocide preventionist organizations 
frequently endorse.  
However, preventionism remains a salient feature of the politics of genocide not 
just because of the mistaken convictions of preventionists, but as a result of the image of 
intent underlying the framework of ‘perpetrators and victims’ that preventionism draws 
upon. Intent plays a particular salient part in the account of these organizations as the 
lynchpin for successful preventionist efforts. For example, the non-governmental 
organization Genocide Watch adopts Kurt Jonassohn’s argument verbatim that “the 
emphasis on intent is important because it removes from consideration not only natural 
disasters but also those manmade disasters that took place without explicit planning. 
Many of the epidemics of communicable diseases that reached genocidal proportions, for 
example, were caused by unwitting human actions.”348 Here, intent appears simply to 
differentiate the mission of Genocide Watch from the broader work of humanitarian 
organizations combatting disease, poverty, and malnutrition. Gregory Stanton, founder 
and head of Genocide Watch, places intent in a key role in his famous pieces on the ten 
stages of genocide.349 Stanton clarifies that the purpose of his list of stages is to provide a 
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framework with which to describe genocide that is “predictable but not inexorable. At 
each stage, preventative measures can stop it. The process is not linear. Logically, later 
stages must be preceded by earlier stages. But all stages continue to operate throughout 
the process.”350 At each stage, the notion of intent orients the reader’s interpretation of 
the relationships between each subsequent stage and makes them into a site of political 
intervention. For example, Stanton writes: “because all people grow up and live in 
particular cultures, speaking particular languages, they identify some people as ‘us’ and 
others as ‘them’…’Us versus them’ can be converted by political elites desiring to gain 
or retain power into ideologies of purity, exclusion, and destruction. Regimes bent on 
genocide take great pains to classify their population.”351 In this example, Stanton 
describes the creation of identity-based dichotomies as the first stage of genocide. 
Although he admits classification must become ‘dehumanization’ before the onset of the 
genocide, the system of classification is treated as problematic in and of itself despite his 
disclaimer that it is an inevitable feature of social life. Indeed, Stanton recommends 
preventing classification by “develop[ing] universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic 
or racial divisions, that actively promote understanding, and that promote classifications 
that transcend the divisions.”352 In essence, Stanton counsels a preventative strategy that 
assists societies in the process of reducing the importance of classification despite its 
critical role in the production of identity. He ascribes power to ‘universalist institutions,’ 
presumably including Genocide Watch, which can reduce the likelihood of genocide 
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occurring. More importantly, Stanton’s ‘stages of genocide’ places elites and political 
regimes in a particularly important role and treats their ideologies, beliefs and agendas as 
the source of genocide. For Stanton, genocide does not result from robust social 
antagonisms or political conditions, but rather the specific political motives of a small 
group of people. According to Stanton’s argument, the political pressure exerted by 
international campaigns has a persuasive effect on tyrants and rogue leaders. 
Unsurprisingly, Genocide Watch publishes reports identifying different ‘accelerators’ and 
‘triggers’ for genocide, which highlight state capacities, institutional corruption, and 
leadership as well as weak democratic culture as the primary culprits in genocide.353 
Genocide prevention consequently draws upon a regime of knowledge regarding what 
makes societies genocide prone in order to establish a series of interventionist responses. 
In this way, Stanton turns genocide into a problem of undemocratic, hierarchical state 
institutions, which commit mass murder at the behest of tyrannical leaders. As such, 
prevention becomes a two pronged project involving: 1) education directed to cure 
societies of their tendencies toward antagonism and animosity and 2) explicit military 
intervention to prevent leaders from using “unchecked state power” to eliminate minority 
groups.354 By treating genocide as a result of social animosities mixed with the ‘trigger’ 
of extremism, Stanton calls for a variety of techniques for inhibiting genocide prior to its 
occurrence.  
At this point, the effort to prevent genocide starts to coincide with the preemption 
of genocide. By this I mean, genocide prevention not only seeks to isolate the cause of 
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genocide in the face of a present form of danger, but to actively ward off the possibility 
of the emergence of genocide by engineering social, cultural, and political institutions to 
make them genocide-proof. Part of the success of the recent anti-genocide agenda is thus 
a product not only of the spectacular failure of international state intervention to stop 
genocide in the 1990s, but also the resonance between the preemption of genocide and a 
host of other new security agendas concerning terrorism, ecological disaster, epidemic 
spread, and state failure.355 In the context of Genocide Watch, some of the techniques 
endorse include promoting hate speech bans, strengthening democratic and constitutional 
checks across the globe, seeking out ‘extremist terrorists’ potentially via military means, 
building multilateral coalitions for logistical and military support as well as establishing a 
standing force for genocide intervention at the UN. In many cases, the preventionist 
logistic reinforces a form of biopolitical governance that acts as a steward for entire 
continents in the name of optimizing political life.356  
While figures such as Moses and Cushman critique the limits of the preventionist 
paradigm they also understate how forceful it has become in international governance. 
Since the 2005 implementation of the R2P, the obligation to prevent genocide no longer 
resides solely with NGOs, but with a broader international community as affirmed by this 
new mandate. Certainly, the debate over the implications of the R2P with respect to state 
sovereignty is quite extensive.357 Nonetheless, the R2P articulates a clear imperative to 
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respond to genocide preemptively and calls for the elaboration of a broader regime of 
early warning systems and preventative mechanisms to stop state failure and the spread 
of violence. Barring success, the R2P thus constitutes a call to govern what Giorgio 
Agamben calls the ‘bare life’ of populations abroad using a multitude of technologies of 
governance.358 Although the R2P has been invoked in a limited number of cases in Mali, 
Libya, and Georgia, discussions spill over into a number of other contexts that have been 
linked to genocide.  
While the R2P endorses the UNGC definition of genocide, it places this definition 
in a new context, one that bolsters and strengthens international legal authority in a way 
that mirrors the desires articulated by Stanton and other preventionists.359 Moreover, 
while Stanton’s ‘stages of genocide’ admits the possibility of non-genocidal violence, the 
R2P treats genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other atrocities as 
interchangeable atrocities, which all call for greater international attention. Yet, the R2P 
report also reserves an interesting place for genocide in relation to the calls for 
preemptive political action:  
In both the broad conditions we identifies-loss of life and ethnic cleansing- we have 
described the action in question as needing to be ‘large scale’ in order to justify military 
intervention …What we do make clear, however, is that military action can be legitimate 
as an anticipatory measure in response to clear evidence of likely large scale killing. 
Without this possibility of anticipatory action, the international community would be 
placed in the morally untenable position of being required to wait until genocide begins, 
before being able to stop it.360 
 
The report continues to argue that the conditions fostering genocide include both 
deliberate actions by state agents and the conditions of state failure that would permit 
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large-scale loss of life.361 In this way, the R2P makes the state itself the site of continual 
supervision and management in order to ensure proper care of the population takes place. 
The management of the population extends the conception of political sovereignty 
beyond the boundaries of the state in order to supervise the common life of humanity 
itself as a political subject. The discourse of genocide functions as a lynchpin in this 
expansion of sovereignty as the event that grounds the new application of international 
power. Thus, while R2P broadly comments on various forms of international crime it 
reserves preemptive intervention to genocide. As such, the R2P grounds the ‘right of 
intervention’ in the propensity for genocide to occur and supports determinations of this 
propensity by referring to a regime of knowledge that details the dangers of renegade 
states and state failure.362 The concept of genocide, it seems, marks the point at which a 
new articulation of sovereignty comes into being as well as a development of a novel 
group of institutions, practices and procedures for enabling intervention on the basis of 
this sovereignty.  
In this manner, genocide slowly justifies a form of apolitical, moralistic, 
anticipatory political governance. The problem with this framework of governance is not 
only that intent (and the normative understanding of genocide more broadly) limit the 
number of events that can be recognized as genocide, but that they also shape the 
technologies used for intervention. In particular, the turn to the rubric of preemption 
rearticulates the way threat is understood and interpreted.363 Genocide consequently 
slowly moves from a question of law, where judicial and punitive power applies, to one 
of international security. Genocide risks ‘flowing across borders,’ supporting terrorism, 
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or contributing to global corruption, and poses an imminent risk of destabilizing regions 
of the globe. In this sense, the R2P and the anti-genocide regime work to stop genocide 
without recourse to juridical institutions by either destroying genocidists or working on 
desire a priori to inhibit the emergence of genocide. Part of this work on desire takes the 
form of strengthening international norms and thereby deterring states from committing 
genocide. However, the R2P also supports forms of preemptive security that actively 
police and regulate the political life in many states in the name of genocide prevention. 
Since the propensity for genocide alone justifies anticipatory action any evidence of 
intent, no matter how questionable or culturally encoded, provides ample evidence for 
international scrutiny and even military action. In this way, the R2P remaps political 
violence.  Former ‘conflicts’ and ‘wars’ suddenly become ethnic conflicts verging on 
genocide at the centerpiece of international concern. The propensity for genocide thus 
supports the development of practices of state formation, the construction of regimes, and 
securitization that link together the threat of genocide with the creation of global security 
architecture. Indeed, the risk of genocide is qualitatively different from other risks in this 
regard because it amounts to not only the death of a few vulnerable individuals, but the 
death of a specific form of life enframed, as chapter two describes, by the biological 
livelihood of a small group of people. Unlike other security threats, securitizing genocide 
constitutes a control over not just the life of a group, but their mode of dying, a form of 
control that disallows the exposure of life to certain social practices considered 
pernicious. The specter of genocide, in fact, renders the life of subject groups always 
already disposable since they are, in a sense, already exposed to a violence that renders 
them invisible. While the shape of humanitarian violence in the future is ultimately 
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uncertain, the link between the threat of genocide, the need for preemptive security, and 
the institutionalization of a global framework for rapid intervention pave the way for 
wholly reengineering societies and, unfortunately, depoliticizing a variety of links 
between the production of a global security archipelago and the production of political 
violence in the first place. 
The R2P is not the first document to note the new relationship to sovereignty at 
stake in the concept of genocide. For example, on September 4, 1998 the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rendered its first judgment and found Jean 
Kambanda, former Prime Minister of Rwanda, guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and 
crimes against humanity.364 The ICTR’s judgment, aided by Kambanda’s guilty pleas, 
was hailed as good news for international genocide jurisprudence. In addition to offering 
a milestone judgment, the ICTR decision on Kambanda introduced a new rubric for 
conceptualizing genocide, one that is perhaps more famous or more widely known than 
Kambanda’s name or his role in the Rwandan genocide. Indeed, in paragraph 16 of the 
judgment, the ICTR stated that “the Chamber is of the opinion that genocide constitutes 
the crime of crimes, which must be taken into account when deciding the sentence.”365 
While Kambanda’s crimes became a subject of infamy, the phrase associated with his 
judgment, ‘the crime of crimes,’ has also achieved a kind of fame as a trope or meme for 
discussing genocide in innumerable journalistic, scholarly, and jurisprudential contexts. 
The ‘crime of crimes’ has been the title of lectures, pamphlets, circulated in court 
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decisions, and remains the subtitle of one of the most exhaustive studies of genocide 
law.366 But what does it mean for genocide to be the ‘crime of crimes?’  
At first glance, there are a number of obvious answers to these questions. The 
phrase has a certain rhetorical and aesthetic power, a product of the redundancy of the 
word ‘crime,’ that allows it to express the magnitude and singularity of the crime of 
genocide. Genocide is not just any crime, but the worst of crimes, a crime so forceful, so 
significant that it defies categorization. The phrase could also imply that genocide 
constitutes the essence of crimes- the crime behind all other forms of crime. Alternately, 
the crime of crimes could designate the condition or template of crimes. Regardless of its 
specific meaning, the phrase has become a useful expression that easily marks the 
importance of genocide. Yet, the phrase also describes the special status of genocide vis-
a-vis other crimes. The definite article ‘the’ implies that genocide alone constitutes this 
crime of crimes. The repetition of the word crime, once in singular and once in plural 
form, also highlights a hierarchical or vertical relationship between the two different 
iterations of crime. ‘The crime’ is more fundamental or important than ‘of crimes.’ What 
is interesting about this phrase is the way it highlights the exceptional status of genocide 
in relation to the world of crimes as if genocide were a form of sovereign crime, a crime 
that extends beyond the domain of other crimes. The relationship at stake in this phrase 
thus appears to concern the connection between the concept of genocide and sovereignty. 
As the crime of crimes, genocide both constitutes a matter of sovereignty because it 
supersedes all other forms of crime. As such, genocide constitutes a sovereign exception, 
which calls for greater political attention, but also legitimizes different emergency 
responses. What the phrase ‘crime of crimes’ discloses is the inscription of a paradoxical 
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form of sovereign power in the heart of the concept of genocide. Put differently, the 
concept of genocide plays both an inscriptive and ascriptive role in the extension of 
sovereignty.  
The phrase ‘crime of crimes’ is also deeply connected with a kind of political 
theology. Indeed, the phrase reiterates the formal structure of the biblical phrase ‘king of 
kings,’ which marks the wonder of God vis-a-vis earthly kings in the Book of Daniel.367 
The relation to the phrase ‘king of kings’ underscores genocide’s relationship to 
sovereignty as a kind of secularized theological concept. Yet, the phrase ‘king of kings’ 
implies an immediately political as well as theological relationship. The notion of the 
‘crime of crimes’ similarly inscribes genocide within a politico-theological relationship 
such that the extraordinary nature of genocide supplants all other forms of crime. 
Moreover, in this phrase, genocide appears almost as the obverse of sovereign power, as 
the crime so far beyond the scope of political sovereignty as to require a new set of 
relations. The paradoxical status of genocide as the crime of crimes thus closely 
corresponds to Giorgio Agamben’s reworking of sovereignty as a topological structure 
predicated on its own exclusion.368 If genocide, as the crime of crimes, marks the outside 
of sovereignty, which is paradoxically within the grasp of sovereign power then it, by its 
very designation, would support the enumeration of a new regime of political 
sovereignty.  
In this sense, the growth of the R2P is far from alone in promoting the notion that 
genocide constitutes a new terrain of political sovereignty. Instead, the R2P and the 
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broader anti-genocide regime reflect a variety of micropolitical efforts at resolving a 
paradoxical dimension of sovereignty expressed by the concept of genocide. In this 
context, genocide grounds a kind of supra-sovereign decision that legitimizes exceptional 
techniques of governance based in the preemptive protection of group life against the 
threat of its destruction. Yet, the form of sovereignty at stake here is also deeply 
theological and driven by an assumption of the unitary importance of genocide as a form 
of crime. As such, the form of sovereignty constructed by the R2P endows itself with an 
unprecedented degree of privilege in dispensing with existing political arrangements and 
conditions in order to prevent the occurrence of genocide. Moreover, it finds itself deeply 
hostile to other theological traditions or political aspirations, which do not share the same 
conceptual framework of politics. In this regard, the R2P, and the politics of genocide 
more generally, depoliticize both the determination of genocide and the unknown dangers 
of elaborating a new formation of global governance rooted in the control of a 
population’s life or death. 
 
Intent and Preemptive Governance 
As part of their prevention efforts, Genocide Watch publishes an annual 
‘Countries at Risk’ report. The report describes the current state of genocide ongoing in 
each state using Stanton’s ten-stage scale. The report also notes a series of ‘Genocide 
Alerts’ including ‘Genocide Watch,’ ‘Genocide Warning,’ and ‘Genocide Emergency.’ 
The last of these categories is used to describe an ongoing genocide. The 2014 edition of 
the report includes states such as the DRC, Somalia, Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, 
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and Burma in the later stages of genocide.369 However, the report only includes Iraq, 
Somalia, the Central African Republic (CAR), Myanmar, and Nigeria under the category 
‘Genocide Emergency.’ Of these states the example of Nigeria is particularly fascinating. 
Genocide Watch lists Nigeria as currently in stage nine or the extermination phase of 
genocide and assigns Nigeria the status of ‘Genocide Emergency’ because of the recent 
activities of Boko Haram.370 As the report states, Boko Haram “is a genocidal criminal 
movement led by an Islamic extremist, Abubakar Shekau, who has vowed to destroy 
every Christian school in Nigeria, and to carry out terrorist attacks on Nigerian 
government police and government officials.”371 Citing the widely popularized 
kidnapping of 200 girls from a school in 2014, the report continues that Boko Haram 
“killed an estimated 2,000 people in its jihad to expand its self-declared Islamic caliphate 
in northern Nigeria, an area with a heavy Muslim population.”372 The report concludes 
that Boko Haram constitutes an immediate strategic threat to the broader Nigerian 
population.  
Genocide Watch’s discussion of Boko Haram provides a telling example of the 
expansion of global governmentality in connection with the politics of genocide. In fact, 
Genocide Watch’s assessment of the virulence of Boko Haram contains little analysis of 
the historical, political, economic or social conditions that led to Boko Haram’s 
development nor does the report detail what acts make Boko Haram comparable with the 
other states in the ‘Countries at Risk’ report such as Syria or CAR where numerous 
sources have confirmed hundreds of thousands if not millions of casualties. A cursory 
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engagement with the literature on Boko Haram illustrates that the constellation of 
poverty, colonial administration, and dispossession all fostered the development of the 
organization.373 Moreover, Boko Haram also emerges in relation to calls for 
independence from colonial and state authority. Furthermore, Genocide Watch strangely 
categorizes Boko Haram as at the stage of ‘extermination’ (one of the highest stages of 
genocide) despite documenting only a single incidence of mass violence. The inclusion of 
Boko Haram on the ‘Countries at Risk’ report thus reflects a lack of engagement with 
historical circumstances in Nigeria and an overstatement of the casualties caused by the 
group. In addition, the report neglects to consider the legitimacy of Boko Haram’s 
ongoing conflict with Nigerian security forces, which involves disputes over terrain, law, 
and civil order.  
The inclusion of Boko Haram in the ‘Countries at Risk’ report provides a good 
example of how the preventionist logistic operates. In particular, Boko Haram’s religious 
affiliation, stated objective of imposing Sharia law in Nigeria, and connection with other 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda provides sufficient evidence of their nefarious 
intentions for Genocide Watch. Read in the context of Boko Haram’s religious virulence 
and political connections, the kidnapping of 200 girls and the sacking of a single city 
transforms into evidence of a greater threat of an unknown magnitude or danger. Put 
simply, Genocide Watch reads a propensity for genocide from Boko Haram’s expressed 
intentions. Genocide Watch embraces this reading of Boko Haram because of a set of 
cultural and political assumptions that frame how they interpret intent. Specifically, 
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Genocide Watch links Boko Haram’s political rhetoric with a dominant regime of 
knowledge about terrorism and religious power in order to justify treating Boko Haram as 
one of the most dangerous entities on the planet. As Mahmood Mamdani notes, 
declarations about the threatening nature of radical Islam work particularly well in 
conjunction with humanitarian ideology because they provide an enemy that resonates 
with the broader War on Terror.374 Genocide Watch’s decision to place Boko Haram in 
the report thus hinges on a set of implicit presuppositions about the nature of political and 
religious ideology. These presuppositions, in turn, justify political action. In this way, 
Genocide Watch’s sense of the propensity for Boko Haram becomes an object of 
preemptive political governance. 
Converting Boko Haram into a subject of genocide has significant political 
effects. For Genocide Watch, the decision prompts a shift in its campaign efforts to 
include calling for intervention in Nigeria by the US and international entities. Genocide 
Watch also coordinates with other groups and issues memorandum to the state 
department and other agencies. The organization likewise makes supportive statements 
on behalf of the Nigerian government and local humanitarian initiatives. Genocide Watch 
similarly bolsters advocacy networks, funds further reports early warning systems, and 
calls for military intervention. The preventionist logistic thus runs through a full-
spectrum of political actions in order to inhibit the emergence or continuation of 
genocide. 
However, Genocide Watch is just the tip of the iceberg and its decision to include 
Boko Haram on the ‘Countries at Risk’ report offers a single sample of a larger ensemble 
of statements about this context. As the chapter discussed earlier, the mission of anti-
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genocide NGOs resonates with the broader mandate of the R2P. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a 
number of calls have been made for UN intervention in Nigeria on the basis of the R2P’s 
mandate.375 In these publications, the language of genocide appears entwined with a 
broader nexus of concerns about state failure, terrorism, and civil war. In this way, 
genocide becomes imbricated with a larger set of political stakes all of which express a 
desire for anticipatory and preemptive governance. The notion of intent, which emerges 
in relation to culturally encoded ways of understanding social practice, thus supports the 
construction of a governance agenda without the occurrence of further episodes of mass 
violence. These calls affect the international climate in powerful ways because they grab 
attention, make action seem urgent and inaction morally calamitous, and shift 
geopolitical calculations. The humanitarian repercussions of Boko Haram have, for 
instance, incited the creation of reports on the best engagement strategy for US forces 
with or without assistance from the UN, AFRICOM, and other multilateral allies.376 
While these discussions certainly do not amount to outright intervention, they shift the 
political discussion about entities like Boko Haram in important ways and have 
unintended consequences on Western orientations toward Nigerian politics, Islamic social 
movements, and the recourse to violence in humanitarian situations. More fundamentally, 
the discussion reinforces the importance of securitizing the future against the possibility 
of genocide and, in doing so, shifts expectations about the legitimacy of political action.  
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Boko Haram is far from alone in this discussion. Genocide Watch also describes 
the rise of the anti-Balaka movement in the CAR in similar terms. In this case, Genocide 
Watch likewise focuses on religious identity as the chief indicator of the propensity for 
genocide while denigrating the significance of economic and political conditions or the 
legacy of colonial administration.377 Only a few years before, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s 
Resistance Army similarly became an object of concern on the basis of genocide. In this 
context, Invisible Children’s viral video ‘Kony 2012’ supplied a gruesome and 
enormously popular image of the Lord’s Resistance Army as a genocidal machine while 
obscuring the complex political forces and colonial histories at work in Central Africa. 
Again, religious identity in connection with an image of extreme violence provided the 
immediate context for the interpretation of intent and bolstered calls for preemptive 
intervention. In both of these cases, appeals were made on the basis of the R2P for 
immediate and systematic intervention to eliminate the propensity for genocide. In 
general, this collection of examples points to the existence of a political anxiety for the 
eruption of genocidal violence in Africa. Concerns about genocide have the effect of 
generating a climate of moral panic where the possibility of genocide resonates with the 
need to streamline humanitarian governance. While few actual interventions have 
followed, the discussion ignores the role of global political governance in producing 
extant conflicts. It is also not surprising that in each context religious difference emerges 
as a key point of concern for genocide. While this certainly has to do with the legacy of 
the Nazi Genocide and its force on contemporary conceptions of genocide, it also reflects 
the broader theological auspices of the concept genocide and the way in which forms of 
religious otherness pose a threat to the cogency of a moral universe. The discourse on 
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genocide thus participates in a politico-theological legitimation of a state of exception 
with respects to entities like Boko Haram. 
Put simply, genocide works as a trump card in this context. As the ultimate 
expression of crime, groups like Genocide Watch employ the term in order to construct a 
regime of knowledge about different parts of the globe. This knowledge, in turn, justifies 
apolitical engagement with the complex origins of mass violence. Yet, the deeper 
problem concerns the nature of the decision on genocide itself. When Genocide Watch 
adds Nigeria, CAR or Uganda to the ‘Countries at Risk’ list they participate in a novel 
exercise of biopolitical governmentality where the possibility of genocide legitimates the 
intervention and management of states, regions or continents. The possibility of genocide 
has a particularly forceful role to play in this process because, as ‘the crime of crimes,’ it 
immediately calls formal sovereignty into question. However, genocide also marks the 
possibility of a group’s destruction or disappearance. This possibility, in turn, licenses 
unprecedented forms of governance because it effectively transforms entire groups into 
bare life or life devoid of political content, meaning or significance. Indeed, the startling 
fact about genocide discourse is that it marks a population as destroyed and, 
consequently, justifies any and all actions in order to save them short of massacre. Put 
differently, genocide grounds political governance in the fact of a group’s imminent 
destruction and, in doing so, creates a foundation for the application of unprecedented 
international intervention. The effects of this development are, as of now, unknown since 
the discourse of genocide and the emergence of the new mandates for international 
sovereignty are still in the process of formation. What is most troubling, however, is the 
reflex to govern the life of a group from afar in the name of their life, a process that 
	   210 
reinscribes the worst elements of colonial authority into an allegedly benevolent process. 
While the consequences of this process are emergent and thus uncertain, this reinscription 
has clear costs because it predetermines the meaning and nature of political violence. 
While early intervention may reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of mass violence, it 
also anesthetizes problematic histories of political control. Poorly informed interventions, 
in turn, exacerbate antagonisms, exclusions, and resentment. As such, the preemptive 
governance called for by groups like Genocide Watch and underwritten by the normative 
understanding of genocide have a series of unintended and unforeseeable consequences 
while establishing the right to govern a group’s collective future. 
 
Threshold: The Whitaker Report 
 In 1985, Benjamin Whitaker gave the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities his decennial update on the prevention and 
punishment of genocide. The report made a number of recommendations with respect to 
the historical survey of genocide, suggestions for interpreting and improving the UNGC, 
and proposals for strengthening international law.378 While the report was ultimately 
dismissed due to its inclusion of the Armenian Genocide in the historical survey, an 
inclusion hotly contested by the Turkish representative to the Human Rights 
Commission, the report also included a number of intriguing interpretive developments 
with respect to the UNGC. In particular, the Whitaker Report discussed the danger of 
excluding political and cultural groups from the Convention’s protection. However, the 
report also described the emergence of several new forms genocide:  
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Some members of the Sub-Commission have however proposed that the definition of 
genocide should be broadened to include cultural genocide or ‘ethnocide,’ and also 
‘ecocide’: adverse alterations, often irreparable, to the environment –for example 
through nuclear explosions, chemical weapons, serious pollution and acid rain, or 
destruction of the rain forest- which threaten the existence of entire populations, whether 
deliberately or with criminal negligence. Indigenous groups are too often the silent 
victims of such actions …Further consideration should be given to this question, 
including if there is no consensus, the possibility of formulating an optional protocol.379 
 
This paragraph of the report is interesting for two reasons. First, the paragraph includes a 
set of groups (the environment, indigenous peoples, etc.) and a set of actions (nuclear 
explosions, pollution, etc.) historically absent from the UNGC. The inclusion of these 
groups and forms of destruction likely indicates that Whitaker and the other offices of 
the report were thinking of a novel set of historical circumstances and problems, which 
required a reformulation of the notion of genocide. In this sense, the Whitaker Report 
represents a break from the problematic limits of the normative understanding.380 
 Second, the paragraph includes is notable because it includes the language of 
‘negligence.’ As this chapter discussed earlier, many genocide scholars have sought 
excluded negligence from any account of genocide because it undermines the notion of a 
perpetrating subject that authorizes and knows the consequences of its actions. To be 
negligent loosens the links between intent and conduct, thought and action, event and 
responsibility. Negligence enters into a hazier zone where lack of  knowledge, 
unconscious malice, and various social conditions contribute to the abandonment of 
forms of life or disavow the violence they produce. Indeed, negligence might constitute 
the legal language that most closely approximates the form of thoughtlessness proper to 
the banality of evil. Negligence is also intriguing because of its appearance in association 
with new groups and forms of destruction. Indeed, it is almost as if the language of 
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negligence appears at the precise moment when the Whitaker Report runs into the 
insufficiency of traditional notions of intent with respect to new modes and categories of 
destruction. The implicit argument of the report is that these too constitute forms of 
genocide, but thinking of them as intentional, volitional, and willful acts in the traditional 
sense renders the exercise meaningless.  
 What the Whitaker Report exposes is the circularity of the different parts of the 
concept of genocide, the way in which destruction, groups, and intent supplement and 
reinforce one another. Static group identity resonates with only specific forms of 
destruction, destruction takes shape with respect to particular constructions of causal 
agency and intention, intention finds support in certain forms of identity and so on. As 
the next chapter will describe, what intervenes to hold together this series of disparate 
parts, what makes the concept of genocide function, is the work of sense. More 
importantly, what the Whitaker report illustrates is the process of a new form of sense 
emerging and rearticulating the relationship between the different parts of the concept, of 
pointing to the gaps and anomalies in the normative understanding of genocide, and 
attaching the concept to new conditions and circumstances. The novelty of the Whitaker 
Report offers an insight into how the normative understanding suffocates the becoming of 
concepts and their capacity to problematize and politicize. This capacity, however, comes 
at a cost. Not only do new groups, modes of destruction, and forms of desire disappear 
from the field of political contestation, but the evolution of violence and destruction 
outpaces and eclipses the terms of the political. We literally lack the words for the 
contemporary condition because the normative understanding anchors them in a battle 
against the phantoms and monsters of the past. 
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Chapter 5: The Politics of Sense 
 When Raphael Lemkin invented the concept of genocide he introduced a new 
term into contemporary political discourse. Lemkin hoped the word would render 
intelligible the destruction of minority groups as a political problem. His aspiration was 
for genocide to become an article of law that would deter future episodes of mass 
violence and he zealously pursued this agenda.381 Toward the end of his life, Lemkin 
offered the following reflection on the power of the concept genocide: “new words are 
always created when a social phenomenon strikes at our conscience with great 
force…The growth of the phenomenon is the motivating force behind the creation of a 
new word. When people think about the new phenomenon, when they speak about it 
fervently, when they finally reach out for action in connection with this phenomenon, 
they feel they must have a name for it.”382 This statement mirrors Lemkin’s ambitions for 
the politics of genocide and, to an extent, aptly describes the engagement with genocide 
in the status quo. However, the statement is also interesting because of the relationship it 
establishes between concepts, novel phenomenon, and political activity. In this brief 
passage, Lemkin assigns a priority to the emergence of new dynamics of social life, treats 
concepts as artifacts of thought that respond to this emergence, and views concepts as 
capable of inventing new modes of action. In short, Lemkin describes a dynamic genesis 
of a problem as it is received in thought and politics. 
 What Lemkin does not describe in this statement is how concepts acquire the 
capacities to describe the world anew or produce novel forms of political action. The 
previous three chapters provided part of the answer to this question as they illustrated the 
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mechanics of the various components of the concept. Each chapter described the shifts in 
the discourse and assembly of these components of the concept in order to show the 
limits of what they could do in political discourse. This chapter, in contrast, engages 
another dimension of the question of how concepts acquire their force. If the previous 
three chapters looked to different parts of the concept then this chapter looks at the 
emergence of the concept in terms of what I, following Gilles Deleuze, call sense. Sense, 
the chapter contends, is the force that enters things into new relations to one another at a 
level prior to formal recognition. In this regard, sense is the pretext for grasping the 
novelty of an emergent phenomenon, the condition of possibility for the making of 
concepts, and the force that concepts draw upon in order to change political relations. 
Sense performs the work described in the Lemkin statement above. The basic claim of 
this chapter is that the creation of the concept of genocide responds to the sense of a new 
dynamic in politics, the emergence of novel destructive processes that materialize with 
the rise of biopolitics. This sense, as Deleuze’s work shows, includes a multiplicity of 
potential futures with respect to mass violence. Furthermore, I argue this sense of 
genocide has a special relationship to horror as a genre of political experience. The power 
of the concept of genocide is thus not, as many liberal commentators assume, bound up 
with the enforcement of international law and justice, but, to the contrary, with the 
capacity to politicize a set of contemporary political conditions.383 To do so, I contend the 
sense of genocide should be afforded degrees of freedom from the constraints of the 
normative understanding otherwise genocide may simply becomes one more crime to 
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catalogue in the order of things. Put differently, the sense of genocide, unhinged from the 
normative understanding, offers new resources for creativity and affirmation within 
contemporary politics. 
 Lemkin’s initial creation of the concept serves as the jumping off point to explore 
the politics of sense. His early writings and autobiographical reflections mark the phase 
prior to the invention of genocide where the different parts of the concept enter into 
relation with one another perhaps for the first time for him. The chapter thus begins by 
exploring how sense operates in Lemkin’s writings. From there, the dissertation turns to 
the work of Gilles Deleuze to better explicate the genesis and powers of sense. When 
applied to the concept of genocide, I contend Deleuze’s work discloses a formidable 
ability for concepts to transform political relations. In particular, genocide imparts a sense 
of horror at contemporary politics where the bonds and apparatuses that support life in a 
biopolitical age quickly and contingently convert into their thanatopolitical unmaking. 
The value of genocide consequently consists not only in naming a discrete set of episodes 
of mass violence, but in rendering intelligible an event that traverses many dimensions of 
political life. Deleuze’s work helps to excavate how concepts reveal these forces in a 
multiplicity of times and places. Moreover, Deleuze provides important insights into how 
the sense-concept relation enables the production of new values, affects, and forms of 
political intervention. The chapter uses this analysis to call for a different approach to the 
study of genocide, which remains more open with respect to the forms, identities, and 
conditions considered part of the concept. Furthermore, the chapter engages the problem 
of nihilism as it appears in the politics of genocide. Indeed, as the chapter illustrates, the 
politics of genocide and the normative understanding participate in forms of passive 
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nihilism that often promote agendas of control, technocratic management, and blame. 
These reactive developments form from an encounter with the sense of horror linked to 
genocide and produce many troubling dynamics in global politics. Reprising sense is thus 
important to revitalize the politics of genocide. In this regard, the chapter concludes by 
offering three different scenes illustrating how an openness to sense might work to 
politicize emergent destructive processes.   
 
Lemkin’s Sense 
Raphael Lemkin began writing on the destruction of minority groups when he was 
a student in law school. According to his autobiography, the event that provoked his 
interest in the matter was the assassination of Talaat Pasha, former minister of the interior 
and prime minister of the Ottoman Empire, by Soghomon Tehlirian in Berlin in 1921.384 
Lemkin closely followed Tehlirian’s trial in Germany because it posed the vexing 
question of how societies were going to punish a person for a crime when their actions 
were motivated by untold tragedy and loss of life. In Tehlirian’s case, the trial ultimately 
led to an acquittal on the basis of ‘psychological compulsion,’ but the case stayed with 
Lemkin. In his reflections on this time in his life, Lemkin wrote, “at the moment, my 
worries about the murder of the innocent became more meaningful to me. I didn’t know 
all the answers but I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be 
adopted by the world.385 This marks the first moment in Lemkin’s recollections where the 
issues of the destruction of minority groups formally became a problem for him. It is 
striking that Lemkin describes the issue as becoming meaningful, as poorly formulated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 19-20. 
385 Ibid, 20. 
	   217 
its initial stages and, above all, driven by a feeling or, put differently, a sense. It is also 
notable that Lemkin formulates his quest for a law banning this practice as an attempt to 
produce justice and right. Lemkin wrote of a need for law to stop man from “appoint[ing] 
himself to mete out justice. Will not passion sway such a form of justice and make a 
travesty of it?”386 Lemkin’s autobiography further reveals that he engaged his professors 
at law school about the question of minority rights only to be met with dismissive 
responses about sovereignty and legitimacy.  
Lemkin later described returning to the question of the destruction of minorities in 
1926 with the trial of Shalom Schwarzbard. Schwarzbard was a Jewish tailor who had 
killed Symon Petliura, the former Ukrainian minister of war, in France. Petliura was 
generally thought to be responsible for a number of massacres and pogroms targeting 
Ukrainian Jews. Just like the Tehlirian case, Schwarzbard’s trial placed the court in what 
Lemkin called a “moral dilemma…They could neither acquit Schwarzbard nor condemn 
him.”387 Also like Tehlirian, Schwarzbard was ultimately acquitted on the grounds of 
mental health. However, Lemkin, now finished with law school and beginning his own 
legal practice, defended Schwarzbard’s act as a ‘beautiful crime’ and later penned a piece 
condemning society’s immoral failure to stop the destruction of minority groups.388 
Following these events, Lemkin’s autobiography discusses his resolve to fix the problem 
of the destruction of minorities by working through his new position as deputy prosecutor 
in Warsaw. In this position, Lemkin entered into communication with lawyers, law 
professors, and politicians throughout Europe and these connections eventually resulted 
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in his first paper on crimes of barbarity and vandalism at the Madrid conference in 1933, 
which, in turn, led to the creation of the concept genocide. 
The trials of Tehlirian and Schwarzbard were not Lemkin’s first exposure to legal 
dynamics or political violence. His childhood growing up in Russia and Poland was 
marked by a virulent experience of anti-Semitism. During this time, Lemkin also 
recounted loving history and being disturbed at an early age with the spectacular violence 
of ancient regimes and empires.  In addition, the more recent history of the destruction of 
the Armenians stood out to him because, as he put it, “more than 1.2 million Armenians 
were put to death for no reason other than that they were Christians.”389 The parallels of 
these events with Lemkin’s experience with the pogroms marks much of his early 
autobiography and subsequent understanding of violence. In addition, Lemkin was keenly 
aware of the significance of legal trials (and law more generally) as interlaced with social 
anxieties, desires, and political power. Early in his autobiography, for instance, Lemkin 
described the acute public anxieties associated with the trial of a Jewish man falsely 
accused of killing a Christian child. In this case, Lemkin developed a sense that “the lives 
of millions of people depended on the vote of the jury. The axes, hammers, and guns 
were already prepared while the jury deliberated. I could not see how a situation of this 
kind could be bearable for long.”390  These details contextualize Lemkin’s interest in the 
destruction of minority life and the power of law by showing his early exposure to 
violence and legal power, events that would shape Lemkin’s ultimate vision of genocide. 
The significance of these recollections consists less in the historical details they 
reveal about Lemkin’s life and more the set of issues at work in the background when he 
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invented the concept of genocide. Indeed, one of the problems with autobiographical 
accounts is that they invariably constitute a particular take on the past, which can be 
edited, revised or unwittingly altered from the vantage of the present. In this respect, 
Lemkin’s discussion of his childhood and time as a student offers only a selected 
interpretation of the set of issues that led him to create the notion of genocide.391 
Nonetheless, these writings offer the best evidence of this early period in his thought 
since the majority of his other writings were lost in his flight from Poland. What is at 
important about these reflections is the way they describe or frame the problem that 
would ultimately become genocide as well as Lemkin’s incitements to speak about this 
issue. In this regard, Lemkin makes an interesting note that in both Tehlirian and 
Schwarzbard cases the destruction of the Armenians and Ukrainian Jews were widely 
known to the public in both Germany and France. The respective killings of Pasha and 
Petliura thus produced a political problem because everybody was aware that the murders 
were motivated by more than simple revenge. For Lemkin, this knowledge meant that 
law could not function in the normal fashion because punishing Tehlirian and 
Schwarzbard would be obscene given their experiences. The courts solved this problem 
by using mental health as a rubric to excuse the actions of both men. Yet, Lemkin also 
saw another, deeper problem at stake in these trials. In his reading, what the trials 
revealed was that the law itself was vulnerable, fragile and predicated on a contradiction. 
In Lemkin’s thinking, this contradiction developed because the men who assassinated 
Pasha and Petliura could be tried for the murder of a single individual, but Pasha and 
Petliura, who killed or were responsible for the death of millions, could not be held 
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accountable by any court.392 The excesses of revenge were, in a way, the only method 
available for pursuing justice and this method was, for Lemkin, a scandal for any system 
of law.393 Put differently, what Lemkin discovered was a gap or lacuna within the 
existing legal order. This gap permitted, in his reading, the murder of minorities in a way 
that violated the unwritten order of law. These murders were implicitly sanctioned by the 
dominant legal regime, but, at the same time, antithetical to its most basic 
presuppositions. If law considered it a moral blight when one person was murdered then 
how could the murder of an entire group, an action that surpassed the murder of an 
individual in many ways, exist beyond legal condemnation? This question, which is 
implicit in Lemkin’s text, highlights a disjuncture written into the legal order. It also 
touches upon each of the different parts of the concept genocide as it draws together 
groups as significant political entities, acts of destruction as a new kind of problem, and 
the question of responsibility and accountability for these events. It is important to note 
that this dilemma only develops into a problem at a specific historical moment because of 
a constellation of forces of violence, warfare, racism, and, more broadly, novel efforts to 
target whole populations for destruction. While Lemkin’s exposure to these events was 
primarily limited to anti-Semitism and history books, he touches upon a much deeper 
process as is evident in his condemnation of colonial occupation by Germany and 
Belgium or the Spanish conquest of the Americas. These processes of destruction had 
historical precedent, but, for Lemkin, were also suddenly the priority of states and nations 
everywhere.394 
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Nonetheless, what incites Lemkin to speak about the problem is the sudden 
realization that these problems produce a disjuncture within the law. The trials of 
Tehlirian and Schwarzbard provide the immediate context for this realization. In the 
trials, Lemkin felt it was almost as if the wrong defendants were standing in the dock or 
as if the law had been inverted in its most basic structures.395 The background of 
emergent forms of group destruction, the insufficiency of law, and the investment of 
social desire thus congealed to form a shock to Lemkin’s thought. Put differently, the 
trials constituted an aleatory moment that brought together a series of things together for 
Lemkin including the limits of law, the dynamic destruction of minority groups, and the 
legitimation of inaction. These different phenomena suddenly began to resonate for him 
as a problem that was poorly conceptualized within existing political discourse. From his 
first inkling of the connection between destruction, groups, and intent, Lemkin took 
nearly two decades to produce the notion of genocide and, on the way, passed through 
numerous iterations of the problem. I argue that Lemkin’s first comments on these trials 
disclose the emergence of a new form of sense and that it is this sense, which ultimately 
produces the concept genocide. By this I mean Lemkin’s comments reveal as intelligible 
a new problem for politics and, moreover, that this revelation occurs as a product of the 
appearance of a gap in the legal order. This gap constitutes a kind of nonsense within the 
law where the different imperatives of law and morality become paradoxical, 
disorganized, and counterintuitive. This gap makes clear the insufficiency of traditional 
registers of sense because the law’s power to govern murder fails to extend to the murder 
of groups. In Lemkin’s writings, the invention of the concept of genocide thus responds 
to this problem by suturing the law and eliminating its inconsistency or nonsense. The 
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occasion for this realization was the trials of Pasha and Petliura’s assassins. Trials where 
the defendants were, in a way, out of place and law’s capacity to render judgment on the 
atrocities against Jews and Armenians nonexistent.  
The force of this newfound sense is evident in Lemkin’s comments about the 
general awareness of the crimes of Pasha and Petliura and the fact that they illustrated the 
existence of a problem regarding the status of minority life. Lemkin’s own exposure to 
the dynamics of the pogroms also unquestionably attuned him to this sensibility since he 
was confronted with the propensity for and hazards of mass violence. More importantly, 
however, the trials serve as an assemblage that joins disparate political elements and sets 
them into new relations with one another. Thesee contingent moments, for Lemkin, 
marked the point of his realization of an event, which rippled through law, politics, and 
social relations at the deepest levels. Of course, the things assembling this event included 
numerous forces operating in the background such as legal procedures, social and cultural 
categories, newspapers, implicit forms of racism, Lemkin’s neurotic personality, and the 
explosion of processes of mass destruction to name just a few. Out of this swirling group 
of elements, Lemkin discerned the intelligibility of a disjuncture in the system of law and 
this germinal awareness, repeatedly marked out by Lemkin in his writings, was the 
incitement for the creation of genocide. At the center of the trials was, to put it 
differently, the nonsense of the laws governing what Lemkin would later describe as ‘the 
rights of existence.’ For, above all else, the trials posed the problem of how the law could 
ban the murder of an individual while licensing the destruction of entire groups. The 
problem of genocide, consequently, stretches between these two aspects, law and 
destructive events, to grasp a sense of something novel becoming intelligible for the first 
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time. This sense prompts Lemkin to create the concept of genocide in order to think the 
emergence of destructive processes as an event. It is this relationship between events, 
sense, concept, and politics, which has been largely lost in the search for a normative 
understanding of genocide. In this next section, I revisit the relationship between sense 
and politics by turning to the work of Gilles Deleuze.  
 
The Logic of Sense 
Before turning directly to Deleuze’s theory of sense, it is important to consider 
how ‘sense’ is traditionally understood in everyday vocabulary in order to clarify the 
value of thinking about politics in terms of sense. When we typically use the word ‘sense’ 
we refer to a specific faculty such as a sight, smell, or taste in order to describe how a 
body perceives a given stimulus. On other occasions, ‘sense’ refers to a vague awareness 
that something is the case, a kind of intuitive judgment of how something should be prior 
to external validation or confirmation. We also say that things ‘make sense’ when we find 
something in agreement with our faculties or our logic. In these cases, ‘sense’ expresses 
both the work of our faculties and the coherence or meaning of our ideas and perceptions. 
However, sense also implies a direction, movement or trajectory.396 The ‘sense’ of the 
river is the direction that it flows. Contemporary invocations of ‘sense’ combine the 
impression of trajectory (I sense a storm is coming), meaning (that makes sense), and 
perception (I sense cold). These different aspects of sense are crucial to the formation of 
value, but in a way that we rarely think about. To use a simple example, before you get 
into a pool, shower, or bath you probably test the temperature of the water with a finger 
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or toe. The sense of the intensive difference will dictate the value of getting into the water 
at this or that moment. Too hot or too cold makes all the difference. Moreover, you can 
express that difference to another person in exactly those terms. ‘Give me a minute. Its 
too cold.’ The entire process entails several interactive assemblages. Your bodily contact 
with the flow of water, nerve signals, habits of bathing and skin sensitivity, the 
compression of air against your larynx and teeth to forge phonetic entities, the transition 
of these phonetic entities from audible noise into syntax and semantic meaning by your 
brain, and the corresponding response on the part of your interlocutor. In Deleuze’s 
thought, the work of sense occupies multiple parts of this assemblage and the virtue of his 
theory consists in showing how sense is not reducible either to the proposition (its too 
cold), nor the phenomenology of perception (coldness), nor simply intensive difference 
(temperature), but an independent abstract, yet real entity that links these different 
dimensions together. In fact, according to Deleuze, when we say ‘we make sense’ we 
usually invoke only the most stratified meaning of the word397. In Deleuze’s thought, 
sense functions as an incorporeal, but nonetheless real entity that inhabits language, art, 
and expression, but affects the world around us. Deleuze’s work thus helps to unpack the 
powers of sense at work in the politics of genocide. It also shows how sense exceeds the 
propositions made about genocide by the normative understanding.  
Indeed, Deleuze’s insistence on the independence of sense is where his work 
diverges from most orthodox accounts of sense that tend to treat it as a byproduct of 
intersubjective communication practices.398 According to these theories, sense develops 
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from relays of signification that slowly mold into a consensus on the meaning, 
significance, and proper use of words in relation to occurrences. For these theories, sense 
grows from relatively constant way of both perceiving and speaking that derive from an 
underlying commonality in human experience. According to this model, the function of 
sense is to sanction the creation of formal rules, communicative practices, or speech 
situations that determine when and how statements and observations become 
meaningful.399 By making sense internal to human discourse, Deleuze contends that these 
theories think the condition on the basis of the conditioned.400 By this Deleuze means that 
these theories start from a consensus on the function of sense in empirical observation 
and seek out transcendental conditions of sense that resemble their empirical results. 
Unsurprisingly, such theories promote the notion of a universal language and experience. 
For Deleuze, these theories also create a tautological structure where sense originates in 
language and yet language has to appeal to sense to make meaning. This form of circular 
logic works only from a highly privileged notion of Western subjectivity, which 
predetermines what constitutes the sensible as an artifact of power.401 One of the benefits 
of Deleuze’s work, in contrast, is its emphasis on sense as a multiplicity. Sense always 
heads in multiple directions, eludes present meaning, and contributes to the birth of 
novelty. There is, consequently, no common sense or good sense that does not, according 
to Deleuze, bracket a multiplicity of senses. However, unpacking Deleuze’s account of 
sense is a complex project. Unlike Difference and Repetition or A Thousand Plateaus, 
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texts that have numerous interlocutors, there are only two sustained engagements with the 
Logic of Sense, one by Sean Bowden and the other by James Williams.402 Bowden and 
Williams provide valuable insights as they sift through the motley combination of 
Platonic idealism, Stoic ethics, linguistics, psychoanalytic theory, thermodynamics, 
Antonin Artaud, poetics, topology, and Lewis Carroll that constructs the Logic of Sense. 
For my purposes, I briefly develop several key themes in Deleuze’s writings on sense in 
order to draw crucial insights about the politics of genocide. My reading is thus 
abbreviated in relation to Bowden and Williams more expansive works, but each 
interlocutor informs my reading in subtle ways.  
Deleuze begins his project on sense by noting the division in Platonic philosophy 
between ideas as pure forms and ideas as “a pure becoming without measure, a veritable 
becoming-mad, which never rests. It moves in both directions at once. It always eludes 
the present, causing future and past, more and less, too much and not enough to coincide 
in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter.”403 The basic conceit of the Platonic tradition, 
Deleuze contends, has been a preference for the clarity of eternal forms against the mad, 
scattered, unhinged, intermingled, and rebellious ideas of becoming. To explore the 
world of mad becomings, Deleuze turns to the Stoics. According to Deleuze, Stoic 
thought recreates the Platonic division between the two kinds of ideas with a twist. In 
particular, Stoic philosophy divides ideas into a series of causes, the  actions and passions 
of bodies on one another, which Deleuze refers to as a state of affairs, and a second set of 
purely incorporeal effects. For the Stoics, causal ideas concern the capacity for bodies to 
affect and be affected. This interaction has a determinable, but ideal form. In contrast, the 
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Stoics treat the second set of ideas as incorporeal attributes of bodies in interaction.  
However, what the Stoics add, according to Deleuze, is a special capacity for the 
incorporeal idea or effect to run away from the determinate interaction of bodies.404 For, 
Deleuze argues, the incorporeal is not simply an effect of bodily interaction, but marks an 
event that traverses bodily interactions without having concrete presence within them. 
This event, in Deleuze’s reading, emerges from the interaction of bodies and establishes 
what he calls ‘quasi-causal’ relations with them. As Deleuze puts it: “it is as if events 
enjoyed an irreality which is communicated through language to the savoir and to 
persons. For personal uncertainty is not a doubt foreign to what is happening, but rather 
an objective structure of the event itself, insofar as it moves in two directions at once, and 
insofar as it fragments the subject following this double direction.”405  
To clarify his argument, Deleuze gives the example of an event like a battle. We 
typically think of battles as occurring on this or that day. In doing so, we embrace a kind 
of fiction because the battle is actually an incorporeal event that traverses the 
intermingling of bodies, the combination of human flesh, metals, guns, screams and so 
on. The event emerges through the interactions of these different bodies, but, at the same 
time, cannot properly be said to reside in any single relation or cause. The battle is 
simultaneously an effect of all of these causes and something that exerts downscale 
affects on the bodies. It is an abstract thing that does not register with our traditional way 
of thinking about occurrences.406 Deleuze pushes Stoic thought at this point by arguing 
that language has a distinctive though not exclusive capacity to express these incorporeal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Ibid, 42-43. 
405 Ibid, 3, emphasis in the original. 
406 Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2006), 5-12. 
	   228 
events. Put simply, we can talk about ‘battle’ in a way that captures a set of relationships 
that would otherwise be lost. In particular, Deleuze claims that verbs in their infinitive 
form render the becoming of this event expressible.407 Verbs like ‘to write,’ ‘to grow,’ 
and ‘to battle’ provide a glimpse of the power of an event irrespective of the specific state 
of affairs in which it takes place. Thus, according to Deleuze, Stoic thought discovers a 
power of language to render an event intelligible. 
Deleuze adds another dimension to the Stoic account of the incorporeal by 
claiming that this capacity to describe the event constitutes a form of sense. As a 
mechanism for registering the event, Deleuze maintains that sense runs in ‘two directions 
at once.’ By this Deleuze means that sense, unlike Platonic ideas, privileges the 
potentiality for things to occur in a multiplicity of ways. Language actualizes this 
capacity when it touches upon becoming. Deleuze remarks, for example, that the Lewis 
Carroll phrase ‘Alice becomes larger’ implies two relations: Alice is larger than she once 
was and smaller than she will become.408 In this expression, Alice is simultaneously 
‘becoming’ in two directions at once. Sense, as the dimension of language that expresses 
this process, marks ‘to become’ as a set of relations that exceed and elude the present 
status of Alice and disclose Alice’s potentiality to transform in both ways at once. In 
marking the event, language touches on the differential power of becoming.  
To support this claim, Deleuze poses the question how does language work? In 
brief, he answers this question by splitting language into three different dimensions, 
which he calls denotation, manifestation, and signification. Denotation refers to 
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language’s ability to indicate or reference things in the world.409 Deleuze argues 
denotation is subject to determinations of truth or falsity. The table is red not blue. 
Manifestation, in contrast, refers to the subject of speech or language as well as their set 
of beliefs or desires.410 Manifestation is the fictional ‘I’ of language who endorses this or 
that proposition. I think (believe) the table is red. Unlike denotation, manifestation points 
to the presupposition of truth or falsity or the vantage point from which one makes a 
statement. Signification refers to language’s capacity to implicate by referring to general 
concepts such as self, world, or God.411 Signification facilitates the making of a 
meaningful proposition by linking a series of denotations and manifestations to another 
set of propositions. The table is red therefore! However, signification, unlike denotation 
and manifestation, appears to supply the conditions for the determination of a true 
statement.  
The problem, for Deleuze, is that these dimensions of language produce a circular 
structure. Manifestation, for instance, draws upon a subjective ‘I,’ but that ‘I’ is always 
already a reference to a general concept or signification of the ‘I.’ Signification thus 
seems to be ‘behind’ manifestation. However, signification is only possible on the 
condition that each separate denotation or reference is true. Drawing an implication from 
one proposition to apply to another thus hinges on a further denotation that our prior 
proposition is true. You can see the evidence of this process in philosophical formulas 
that indefinitely refer to specific denotations to mark signification: 
if…then...if…then…if…then…ultimately. Denotation, in turn, relies on a particular 
position or manifestation for explicating when and how a reference occurs. Each different 
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component of language consequently presupposes the other such that no linguistic 
statement seems to ground or substantiate the other. Moreover, language runs into 
particular paradoxes such as the Russell paradox or the paradox of the Barber of Seville 
where a series of propositions produce denotations, manifestations, and significations that 
lead to paradoxical results, which can be neither true nor false.412 A similar problem 
occurs in the case of the Liar’s paradox. Consider the statement: “I am lying.” The phrase 
has the paradoxical status of being false only on the condition of its truth and true only on 
the condition of its falsity. According to Deleuze, these paradoxes disclose the 
tautological character of a theory of language based on denotation, manifestation, and 
signification.413 
To solve this problem, Deleuze argues for a fourth dimension of the propositions 
or language. This dimension Deleuze says “ought to have something unconditioned 
capable of assuring a real genesis of denotation and of the other dimensions of the 
proposition.”414 Deleuze calls this fourth dimension of the proposition ‘sense.’ To quote 
at length, Deleuze claims that sense is “the expressed of the proposition, is an 
incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which 
inheres or subsists in the proposition…[sense] merges neither with the proposition or 
with the terms of the proposition, nor with the object or with the state of affairs which the 
proposition denotes, neither with the ‘lived,’ or representation or the mental activity of 
the person who expresses herself in the proposition, nor with concepts or even signified 
essences?”415 For Deleuze, sense constitutes the dimension of a proposition that remains 
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irreducible to a state of affairs, personal belief, or a specific term, but facilitates the 
operation of the other dimensions of language. To explain this process, Deleuze draws 
upon the Stoic theory of the idea to argue that sense exists as a paradoxical, ideal, but real 
entity capable of coordinating the interaction of the different components of a 
proposition. Thus, Deleuze remarks on the complex or paradoxical dimensions of sense: 
it does not exist except in the propositions that express it, but nonetheless remains distinct 
from the proposition; it is a product of the state of affairs rather than a proposition, but 
has no existence outside of language; it expresses an event denoted by a proposition, but 
without qualifying this as an essential part of a thing or process. As may be clear by the 
description, Deleuze’s move here is to take the Stoic theory of the idea and effect and 
blend it with a material explanation for the genesis of semantic content. As Deleuze states 
sense “is exactly the boundary between propositions and things…it is in this sense that is 
an ‘event’: on the condition that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal 
realization in a state of affairs. We will not ask therefore what is the sense of the event: 
the event is sense itself.”416 In this way, sense stretches the proposition from collection of 
linguistic components into connection with a poetic world.  
As a result of its independence, Deleuze describes sense as ‘neutral’ with respect 
to the actions or passions that give rise to it.417 For example, the sense of ‘to grow’ 
remains indifferent to the objects (trees, bodies, maturity) or actions (cell division, 
lengthening, etc.) that befall it. Deleuze consequently describes sense as “strictly the 
same for propositions which are opposed from the point of view of quality, quantity, 
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relation or modality.”418 Here, Deleuze’s point is that a series of statements emerge 
within the same structure of sense. The phrases: ‘you are a liar,’ ‘you are not a liar,’ ‘you 
will be a liar,’ ‘you could be a liar,’ ‘you are a bad liar,’ all shift different denotative, 
manifested, and signified aspects of a statement, adjust slightly its semantic content, and 
may refer to any or all potential bodies or states of affairs, however, they are all spoken in 
the same sense, ‘to lie,’ that becomes in multiple directions. In this way, sense facilitates 
the expression of distinct sentiments that resonate and converge in spite of their 
difference. By making this claim, Deleuze sets up the argument that sense harbors a 
special relationship to absurdity because the neutrality of sense with respect to 
affirmation and negation enables the formation of paradoxical entities. The oft-cited 
‘square circle,’ for example, is an absurd object that nonetheless has a sense. While such 
objects violate the rules of denotation, manifestation, and signification, they nonetheless 
exist as sensible entities. Similarly, the problems posed by the Russell paradox or the 
Liar’s Paradox, which force traditional accounts of language into contradiction, pose no 
problem for sense because it has the capacity to affirm paradoxical, bidirectional, and 
absurd possibilities. Sense is a domain of language that is, strictly speaking, beyond the 
true/false division and capable of greater degrees of power than rigid, rule-based accounts 
of language. Deleuze will remark that writers like Carroll put these capacities to work in 
crafting worlds inconceivable within the rubrics of normative language.  
What enables sense to express the existence of paradoxical entities is its structure. 
With respect to this point, Deleuze argues that we typically think of language as a 
homogenous or closed system. However, even the most bare bones account of language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 Ibid, 32. 
	   233 
includes, at a minimum, two different, the signifier and the signified.419 Allegedly 
homogenous language is thus always already multiserial and emerges from a set of 
differential relations between phonemes and grammemes. Following the psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan, Deleuze argues that a “paradoxical entity” places the different series of 
language in communication with one another in spite of their difference.420 The 
‘paradoxical entity’ moves through both series, but belongs to neither and in one is a 
“mobile empty place” while in the other “an occupant without a place.” 421 Sense emerges 
as a byproduct of the series of the connections formed by the paradoxical entity.422 But 
what is the paradoxical element? Deleuze is claims that the paradoxical entity, which he 
will at different times refer to as a ‘differentiator,’ a ‘quasi-causal operator,’ or an 
‘aleatory point’ is actually a bit of nonsense. In fact, Deleuze maintains that nonsense is 
not opposed to sense since nonsense itself has a determinate sense. Rather, nonsense 
donates or produces sense. Deleuze again uses Carroll as his example to show how the 
different applications of nonsense create sense-formations. As he puts it “sense is actually 
produced by this circulation…sense is always an effect.”423 Nonsense is the thing that 
gives form to structure and, in Deleuze’s words, donates sense by rendering possible the 
convergence or connection of divergent series. Esoteric and portmanteaus do a 
particularly good job of highlighting this process. ‘Snark,’ to take Carroll’s term, brings 
divergent series together into an adjective/beast that makes no sense, but nonetheless 
enables the donation of sense.424 Snark emerges from the differential relationship 
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between numerous other linguistic elements such as ‘snake’ and ‘shark, ‘sneer’ and 
‘stark’ and so on.425 Snark express sense, but is, strictly speaking, an articulation of 
nonsense. Snark also speaks of an event or a becoming that cannot be located in either a 
state of affairs (the set of phonemes or audible tones a person might be uttering) or in the 
proposition (as a definite denotation, manifestation, or signifier), yet ‘to snark’ marks a 
novel attitude or disposition. The portmanteau snark, thus, provides a glimpse of how 
nonsense donates sense through the joining of disparate series. While the paradoxical 
element is not visible per se, snark constitutes a nonsense word that shows the production 
of sense.426   
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intensities and sensations. Sound, which forms a precursor to language in most cases, occurs as a chaotic 
jumble of pure phonetic elements. These elements are inseparable from the burps, gurgles, bangs, and 
humming of the body’s organs and the surrounding environment. What transpires, Deleuze contends, is the 
coordination of discrete elements into phonetic series. An infant, immersed in the bubbling world of noise, 
catches repetition in the cascade of sounds coming from a mother and father and begins to feel out the order 
or series that they develop. In essence, the child participates in a practice of experimentation. It is thus of 
little surprise that ‘dada’ and ‘mama,’ words composed of bare repetition of phonetic elements, which 
repeat on the condition of minimal difference, compose the most basic words most infants first learn. Once 
these utterances occur, parents and other caregivers intervene to enhance the scale and complexity of this 
utterance thereby enabling it to become repetitive and assume multiple forms. The ‘imitation’ of dominant 
language by a child, however, covers over the underlying process of ‘becoming’ that gives way to this 
possibility since the child’s receptivity to language hinges on an experimental relationship to sense. The 
genetic conditions for the formation of sense thus in no way resemble the operation of language. Rather, 
Deleuze contends these are a product of material forces (the rumblings of the body and the world of 
sonorous intensities) that have to be produced and refined by an assembly of techniques and habits. The 
operation of sense consequently is built around a contingent, paradoxical element that produces the 
intelligible (and later the significant), which has determinate structure, but emerges through a specific 
process of production. In this regard, sense also plays a crucial way in the formation of new values because 
it marks the capacity to render something intelligible such that affirmations, evaluations, and even 
judgments can take place. Language, in this respect, intrudes on our world by overcoding our ability to 
form values and articulate things. Deleuze thus views the project of remaining open to sense as crucial to 
the production of values. Indeed, sense itself is malleable. The shifts in the flow of a river, for instance, 
may alter a sense of it and, as a result, the value of living or laboring near it. However, the openness of 
sense to various forms of work also means that sense can be ‘taken care of’ in very particular ways. In this 
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If nonsense is important to sense then it poses a problem for philosophy and 
politics. Indeed, Deleuze argues the basic project of philosophy anchors itself on the twin 
foundations of ‘good sense,’ or the truthful orientation of the faculties, and ‘common 
sense,’ or the concord and agreement of the faculties. While Deleuze’s first deploys these 
terms in the Difference & Repetition, he returns to this theme throughout the Logic of 
Sense and considers in greater detail what gives rise to the notions of good and common 
sense relative to his more general theory of sense.427 In particular, Deleuze argues that the 
notion of ‘good sense’ treats sense as unidirectional, following an arrow of time from 
present to future, and, as such, functions to ground foresight and judgment.428 Common 
sense operates in a similar fashion to good sense, but grounds an object as consistent 
across the faculties. By this Deleuze means that each separate faculty recognizes in a 
sensation a uniformity that makes it possible to determine the identity of an object. 
Common sense makes it seem that “one and the same self perceives, imagines, 
remembers, knows, etc.; one and the same self breathes, sleeps, walks, and eats….It is the 
same object which I see, smell, taste, or touch; it is the same object which I perceive, 
imagine, and remember…; and, it is the same world that I breathe, awl, am awake or 
asleep in, as I move from one object to another following the laws of a determined 
system.”429 The alleged concord of the faculties erases the discordance of paradoxical 
entities, which connect the faculties in disjunctive syntheses.430 Common sense and good 
sense form a complementary relationship with respect to thought and sensation. Common 
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sense supplies the coherence, permanence, and identity that help good sense determine 
the ‘true direction’ of things whereas good sense provides common sense with the 
appearance of rightness, truth, and meaning. The two constitute a double bind that traps 
sense in the figures of identity, resemblance, and recognition.431 Moreover, good sense 
and common sense conceal the work of nonsense by treating all elements of sense as a 
priori intelligible and accounted for. If, as Deleuze contends, the production of sense 
occurs via nonsense and, in addition, sense goes in two different directions 
simultaneously (becoming), then good sense and common sense function to harness, 
limit, and strip sense of its powers. In this regard, common sense and good sense give 
social power to the division or “partition of the perceptible,” which Jacques Ranciere 
describes as the foundation of politics.432 In this way, good and common sense have a 
privileged relationship with the formation of normative knowledge because they 
constitute the preconditions within which a stale form of disagreement becomes possible.  
Good sense and common sense limit the capacity of sense to affect politics. 
Indeed, according to Deleuze, sense harbors a potential to radically shift political 
understanding because it opens up the multiplicity of events. In this regard, sense has the 
capacity to produce “incorporeal transformations” in intelligibility that have a 
transformative effect on politics.433 Put differently, invocations of sense can tap into 
systems and structures of power that otherwise remain imperceptible and make these into 
actionable entities. Common sense and good sense, in contrast, predetermine the virtue of 
particular capacities and strip sense of its ability to render intelligible the event. 
Foreclosing the event in this manner is not only counterproductive for politics, but ethics. 
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Indeed, Deleuze declares “either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and 
has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us.”434 At first glance, this 
appears like an expression of fatalism. On closer examination, the statement calls for an 
affirmation of an event and all of its capacities. Deleuze further remarks, “it wills now 
not exactly what occurs, but something in that which occurs, something yet to come 
which would be consistent with what occurs…the Event.”435 Sense thus constitutes a part 
of ethics by enhancing the receptivity to the event. Concepts also play an important role 
in these ethico-political relations. In particular, the creation of concepts, which Deleuze 
and Guattari call the task of philosophy, also concerns a practice of “becom[ing] worthy 
of the event.”436 Read in this light, concepts do not produce mental representations of the 
world, something that would submit them to regimes of common and good sense, but 
forms of sense that grapple with the implications of events, which traverse and befall us. 
Put simply, a concept is a device for expressing and relating to the event of novelty. 
Deleuze and Guattari consequently treat concepts as crucial to the discovery of new 
problems (which appear at the site of an event) and the forging of ethical relations to 
these events. In contrast to good sense and common sense, which force concepts to 
contort to predefined meanings, Deleuze and Guattari press for concepts as expressions 
of variation that enable the formation of sense and value and transform the register of the 
intelligible.437 Deleuze and Guattari go so far as to say that concepts both mark the 
philosophical project of coming to terms with an event and argue that concepts tap into 
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“pure reserve” of an event.438 The work of sense, often unconscious and unnoticed, thus 
implicates political ethics and the openness to novelty.  
In the context of the politics of genocide, as the next section argues, the danger of 
the normative understanding concerns the foreclosure of this multiplicity of sense, a 
closure that produces a form of passive nihilism. These forms of passive nihilism disable 
the creativity of the concept genocide, the multiple senses stretching forth from it, and the 
disclosure of a novel event of destructive power. In this light, the normative 
understanding remains essentially conservative, forever regressive and outmoded, and 
ultimately damaging to the capacities of the politics of genocide. The ethics proper to the 
politics of genocide is consequently an affirmation, but not in the form of a discrete 
research agenda or more moral injunctions, practices that animate publics to expand 
governance and control, but an exploration of what the sense of the concept can do even 
if this involves an exposure to the more horrific dimensions of contemporary political 
experience. 
 
The Politics of Sense 
When Lemkin coined the neologism genocide he crafted a portmanteau word. The 
word consists, as virtually any brief exposition on genocide will tell you, of two root 
words ‘cide’ from the Latin meaning to cut, destroy or kill, and genos from Greek 
meaning a race, tribe, or group.439 According to Deleuze’s argument, portmanteaus 
emerge in order to express novel forms of sense. Genocide involves exactly this effort. 
The concept links together a series of concerns regarding the status of groups, peoples, 
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minorities, and other forms of life and connects these to a series related to cutting, killing, 
and destruction. By folding these parts together and entwining disparate phenomena, the 
concept marks something that traverses both in order to articulate the problem of the 
destruction of groups. Of course, this relative simplistic account of how the term 
organizes the series covers over a vast set of underlying operations, which connect the 
two series together. Indeed, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Lemkin’s 
awareness of the problem that ultimately becomes genocide was a product of an emergent 
sensitivity to the fate of minority groups. This sense marked the convergence of several 
different developments in destructive technologies and practices, the wayward experience 
of otherness in Lemkin’s life, and his familiarity with theories of law. According to his 
autobiography, from a young age, Lemkin was aware that legal orders were 
supplemented or doubled by unwritten codes and implicit rules regarding the treatment of 
minorities. In this regard, a sense emerged from the chaotic violence and disjunctions that 
marred Lemkin’s early life and stood in stark contrast to his expectations for law and 
political order. Put differently, Lemkin’s commitment to a form of progressive or 
enlightened politics generated a sense of doubt when these commitments failed to extend 
protections to the people, things, and beliefs he cared about. In this way, sense operates 
throughout Lemkin’s texts as a nascent dimension of his exposure to the inconsistencies 
of legal order.  
The trials of Tehlirian and Schwarzbard were the aleatory events or paradoxical 
objects that transformed this sense from an imperceptible feeling into a problematic 
event. In these trials, the publics of France and Germany were, in Lemkin’s eyes, called 
to judge episodes of just vengeance. In these judgments, the conditions of minority life, 
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the background of events of group destruction, and the values of the legal order were 
brought to the forefront. Yet, in each case, the trial was a kind of sham. The defendant in 
the dock was, in Lemkin’s reading, an occupant without a proper place, wrongly accused, 
wronged in every sense of the word, even wrong in their retributive actions. In contrast, 
the law offered an empty space where judgment for Pasha and Petliura should have taken 
place. Between this person out of place and the empty space of judgment, a bit of 
nonsense emerged within the legal order. This nonsense was, as I previously described, a 
gap in the law produced by the novelty of the destruction of groups. The discovery of this 
nonsense produced numerous processes of sense-formation in Lemkin. It was the 
emergence of this sense that ultimately generated the concept genocide in order to 
articulate the problem of novel destructive events. From there, the transformation of 
genocide into law and normative understanding chipped away at the radical dimension of 
this sense by installing regimes for organizing, stratifying, and overdetermining the 
meaning of the term. In doing so, sense went from a provocative, affirmative, and 
energizing dimension of the politics of genocide to simply the recognition of yet another 
crime of international law.  
In part, Lemkin is at fault for starting this process. His training as a lawyer and his 
aspirations regarding liberal politics led him to a strategy of integrating genocide into 
international law. Throughout his later years, Lemkin was obsessed with this goal as if 
the act of outlawing genocide would spur sufficient political energy to ban the practice 
altogether. Lemkin thus evinced a now common faith that genocide emerges largely as a 
result of the inconsistent application of international law, norms, and morality. Once 
purged of these inconsistencies, the system of international jurisprudence should, the 
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argument goes, greatly reduce the outbreak of genocide. In short, if the system isn’t 
working then it just needs to be patched up. This belief, which subtends the normative 
understanding, interprets sense exclusively in the form of good and common sense. 
However, even in Lemkin’s work, the assumption that common and good sense can 
correct problematic practices amounts to more of a belief than a reality. Indeed, the sense 
of genocide includes a discovery of the constitutive incapacity of law to respond to 
destructive events that surpass it. By this I mean part of the sense Lemkin develops 
concerns the capacity for a political order to produce emergent destructive processes from 
within its own rubrics, habits, and conditions. Unfortunately, the only way that the 
progressive or liberal legal tradition thinks genocide is as an anomaly, a form of 
barbarism, or an outbreak of uncivilized behavior.440 In other words, the liberal tradition 
casts genocide as a decisively apolitical event that offends common sense and civilized 
conduct. It thus seeks to banish genocide from political practices. However, as numerous 
commentators including Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt, Donald Bloxham, and Mark 
Levene have shown, genocide emerges from within contemporary political conditions.441 
The easy division between genocide as a remote and horrific problem and the progressive 
development of international law thus rets upon an illusion regarding the sanctity of the 
Western politics.  
Moreover, in many respects, Lemkin’s work captures a sense that contemporary 
politics harbors a potential to produce emergent destructive events that rebound 
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throughout social life. While common sense and good sense attempt to eradicate this 
possibility, it is nonetheless there as a constitutive dimension of the politics of genocide. 
To clarify my point, Lemkin’s work unleashes a sense of a problematic event running 
throughout European politics at his time. This event takes on numerous forms, relations, 
and identities, but in each instance incorporates the destruction of forms of group life at 
the broadest levels. These destructive processes arise from within the commitments and 
beliefs that allegedly characterize, enhance, and improve the modern political condition. 
As chapter three noted, destructive events become productive of the very communities 
that they befall, they exceed intentions (whether individual or legal) and cut across the 
boundaries of group life and identity. The concept genocide draws these events into 
intelligibility and expresses their sense. The concept consequently has a capacity to 
politicize a set of conditions, which often produce nightmares for entire societies. This 
capacity, however, depends on the sense of genocide not being located exclusively in one 
historical moment, identity or type of violence. Indeed, the normative understanding’s 
insistence on the limits of the concept diminish these powers precisely because they 
register the event of genocide as one more orderable occurrence in the world. In contrast, 
the sense of genocide includes a capacity for political conditions to produce horrific 
events in excess of themselves or, put differently, to operate as generative conditions that 
may seem placid, but give way to nightmare. 
In this respect, the genre of horror best captures the sense at work in the politics 
of genocide. The value of thinking about politics in terms of genre is that it captures how 
a set of expectations about sense, significance, and meaning play out in social life. A 
genre thus describes how sense operates by framing our expectations in order to render 
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intelligible social relations. In particular, the genre of horror affords things a disturbing 
independence to human perception, beliefs, and aspirations. Horror marks, as Eugene 
Thacker argues, the limits of thought and understanding.442 As such, horror not only 
names unfathomable beasts or terrors, but also serves as a genre of political 
engagement.443 In the case of genocide, this genre reveals how the terms political 
discourse, including equality, freedom, the good life and so on, often produce emergent 
destructive processes that unmake entire modes of life. The genre of horror marks how 
genocide forms as a multiplicity that adapts and evolves from everyday political 
experience. Put simply, the sense of genocide renders intelligible the predicament of 
living in a biopolitical age that dissolves rapidly and auto-poetically into thanatopolitics. 
Horror constitutes genocide not simply as a problem of evil intentions, mass killing, or 
specific forms of identity, but of a liquid potential within for the politics of life to convert 
into destructive events of unprecedented scale, complexity and intensity. Moreover, it is 
this dimension of the sense of genocide that poses such a threat to the normative 
understanding. If genocide cannot be located outside the political tradition as a form of 
barbarism or inhumanity, but rather emerges from within the liberal tradition then the 
solutions offered by progressive politics are cast into doubt. The sense of genocide 
consequently poses a fundamental challenge to the consistency of contemporary 
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responses to genocide by exposing a wayward contingency underlying social 
commitments at the very moment when destructive technologies put into question life at 
the broadest levels.  
While Lemkin sought out a legal solution to destruction, the sense of genocide at 
play in his work already points to the limits of this approach. Lemkin himself alludes to 
this adaptive and evolutionary capacity of contemporary destruction, which as he states at 
one point, is like a plague or a wind and impossible to determine or predict in advance.444 
The implications of this observation are, for social scientists, theorists, religious leaders, 
victims of violence, students, and polities in general, horrific precisely because they 
indicate that the invention of genocide marks the appearance of destructive processes that 
have self-organizing powers unassailable within traditional political rubrics. Genocide 
discloses the horror that, in a biopolitical age, the very connections that foster life in the 
broadest sense may, at a whim, transform into those of destruction, that, political violence 
devours from beneath, within, and beyond the structures and parapets that support the 
articulation of politics. Following Deleuze, such an event, hailed by the concept of 
genocide, would be aliquid and monstrous, but also an altogether sensible process.  
Speculatively, we might even describe this horror as a distinct being or process, 
an ontologically real and insistent force that operates without concrete form, but 
reappears in numerous political conditions. The genre of horror captures the contingency 
of such a process because it admits the becoming of form through its very destruction or 
unmaking.445 Horror, consequently, exposes the limit where thought and understanding 
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falters with the unruliness of things, but is nonetheless caught in the process.446 In this 
regard, horror describes the conditions of life where becoming, growth, productivity and 
vitality coincide with their unmaking and destruction, where politics becomes, as 
Foucault put it, an activity where “massacres have become vital.”447 The sense of 
genocide forces a reevaluation of the investment in the politics of life since it exposes the 
capacity of this politics to slip become life’s unmaking when destructive processes of 
unprecedented scale and intensity take form and force throughout multiple channels of 
contemporary life.  
The concept genocide likewise retains the sense of horror whenever it renders 
intelligible the emergence of destructive processes of this sort. In doing so, the concept 
breaks from the series of thanatographic images and narratives that tend to characterize 
events of mass violence and instead points toward the more unsettling and traumatic 
capacity for destructive processes to suddenly arise rom within the swirling intensities of 
political life. The horror revealed by the concept genocide should thus not be confused 
with a call to political passivism or a demand that we should all live in terror. To the 
contrary, horror becomes a problem, a political condition, to be worked on, thought 
about, and reconsidered. Certainly marginalized groups, populations that live in the 
remnants of genocidal destruction, echo the impossibility of describing or ‘bearing 
witness’ to this condition since its passage takes place in a way that damages the capacity 
to communicate it. The sense of genocide remains, in this regard, incommensurable, but 
not inexpressible.448 By this I mean the sense of genocide supplies resources for calling 
into question the production of horror. In this way, sense, the offspring of the event, 
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problematizes the political condition that it expresses. If the stakes of genocide are as 
broad as I present them then it also entails envisioning another sense of political order 
with newfound commitments. Horror is productive in this fashion because it calls for a 
reassessment of the terms, attachments, and modes of belonging that safeguard politics. 
Thinking genocide in terms of horror calls into question the banality of everyday political 
presuppositions. It is precisely at this point that the normative understanding of genocide 
is the most dangerous because it undermines the capacity for this work of sense by 
insisting on the discrete, intelligible, and apolitical nature of genocide. 
In fact, nothing in this dissertation suggestions that the multitude of observations 
made by the hundreds of scholars, activists, and politicians focused on genocide are 
fundamentally incorrect, but rather that the politics of genocide their discourse produces 
limits the sensibility of genocide and banishes the possibility that genocide could be 
unthinkable from within traditional political rubrics. The sad reality is that the 
‘disagreement’ taking place around genocide revolves around relatively stale rejoinders 
about the omission of cases, the proper strategies of prevention or the best methods of 
redress rather than the challenge the sense of genocide (and the problematic event it 
engages) poses for contemporary politics. It is this challenge that reappears in all of the 
struggles over the term and, ultimately, dissuades political communities from accepting 
its standards without exceptions, disavowals, and wills-to-ignorance. It is almost as if the 
normative understanding is, as Michel Foucault eloquently put it, “waging a secret war,” 
by diminishing the degrees of power of the concept.449 In contrast, I argue that if we 
explore the sense of the concept genocide, by which I mean its manifold and multiple 
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senses, then an entire series of commitments, foundations, and pretenses would have to 
be reevaluated. Beyond the limited problematic of ‘great power hypocrisy’ or ‘human 
rights regimes,’ the sense of genocide calls into question an implicit set of values by 
exposing their arbitrary, problematic, and possibly horrific character. As a form of horror, 
the sense of genocide resets the terms of the political by posing a limit to our capacity to 
think within traditional rubrics about the relationship between the event of genocide and 
politics. The resonance of the concept, the outrage forged around it, has thus been stifled 
in advance by the normative understanding. While it would be silly to collapse entirely 
the distinctions between genocide and other modes of violence (to see all violence as 
interconnected is to make no observations about it at all), the sense-event hailed by the 
concept genocide does not yet have determinate boundaries and, as such, calls for 
conceptual, theoretical, and political experimentation rather than an appeal to legal 
reforms, academic boundaries, and a global police apparatus. This process is already 
underway in the becoming and creativity of innumerable political struggles that invoke 
genocide as a way of politicizing their condition, but is just as easily reversed and 
consolidated into a defense of the status quo. The very fact of this reversibility, which 
depends on the multiplicity of sense, illustrates that we have not yet come to terms with 
the sense of genocide and that the contestation over the concept will shape the future of 
politics to come. The basic claim of this project is that this contest requires openness to 
this event, to rethinking the process of destruction as genesis of politics, and that begins 
with concrete shifts in the distribution of sense with respect to political violence. 
Moreover, the more immediate value of reprising of sense is an engagement with the 
passive nihilism that dominates the politics of genocide. 
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Indeed, virtually any project or politics of genocide invariably confronts the 
problem of nihilism because genocide poses a challenge to the much-vaunted values of 
humanism, equality, and tolerance, with something ugly, insensible, catastrophic, or 
horrific. Doubt, remorse and terror typically follow. An entire literature on post-genocide 
life deals almost exclusively with this dilemma: how to live in a world with genocide?450 
For decades after the First and Second World Wars, legions of intellectuals, artists, 
teachers, religious leaders, and politicians grappled with the destructive aftermath of 
technological warfare, atomic development, and mass murder. Confronted with these 
events, the question of the worthlessness of values, of existence itself in late modern life, 
became a consistent theme.451 While the problem of nihilism emerged separately in many 
aspects of contemporary politics, it became a particularly important problem for the 
politics of genocide since genocide is often characterized as a problem of world-
destroying character or ultimate evil.  
Broadly speaking, two responses emerged in the politics of genocide in reaction 
to the predicament of nihilism. The first response, which I call the optimist response, 
works to restore values in the face of genocide by protecting transcendent values. The 
optimistic response endeavors to enshrine and safeguard these values against the danger 
posed by genocide. It consequently engages in what Nietzsche described as ressentiment 
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by finding a site of blame for the appearance of genocide.452 The second response, which 
I call the realist response, accepted genocide as a constitutive and condemnable part of 
politics, but laments our inability to do anything about it. The realist response largely 
conforms to the structure of what Nietzsche described as bad conscience by assuming a 
kind of perverse responsibility for genocide.453 These two responses characterize a large 
portion of the politics of genocide. Practical political solutions also fall into this structure 
by calling for the strengthening of transcendent legal, moral, and political or power with 
calls to ‘do something,’ ‘to intervene,’ ‘to make a difference,’ or to ‘never forget’ while 
the cynical presumption that nothing can be done about genocide, a perspective that often 
characterizes realist acquiesce in International Relations, amounts to a disengagement or 
abandonment of the problem of political violence. Both responses react to the sense of 
genocide as a kind of horror, the former manages this sense of horror by attempting to 
banish it from the world while the latter resolves the sense of horror by assuming 
responsibility for it. In both cases, the response succumbs to passive nihilism because it 
thinks of genocide as destructive of fundamental values, but never views the sense of 
genocide as integral to the process of creating new values.  
Indeed, just as Nietzsche argued that Christianity’s insistence on the value of 
truthfulness ultimately undermined the value of both Christian morals and truth itself, the 
call to strengthen universal morality paradoxically endorses a bellicose spirit when 
ressentiment and bad conscience become productive.454 When this occurs, the possibility 
of restoring values depends either on eliminating forms of otherness understood to be the 
true source of genocide or assuming that politics is a monstrous business and acting 
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accordingly.455 The possibility of restoring value consequently depends on a reserve of 
violence in order to promise a better future tomorrow.456 The emergence of passive 
nihilism in the politics of genocide should not come as a shock. With the discovery of 
nihilism, Nietzsche anticipated a future of disasters. As he writes in the Will to Power: 
“For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving toward a catastrophe, 
with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly violently, 
headlong like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to 
reflect.”457 For Nietzsche, nihilism was the engine driving society toward this 
catastrophe. While Nietzsche’s untimely ruminations do not expressly describe the 
emergence of genocide, they nonetheless speak to a coming disaster for both thought and 
culture writ large. Moreover, according to Nietzsche’s insights, the turn to universal or 
transcendent values may deepen the problem of nihilism and promote a greater violence 
within contemporary politics. Indeed, if passive nihilist responses to genocide work only 
on the condition of banishing some form of otherness from political consideration then 
they miss the point entirely. By getting rid of particular elements of political experience 
they provide the illusion that genocide is behind us while entrenching political conditions 
generative of forms of mass destruction. Similarly, treating genocide as a sad byproduct 
of a grim world does little but reinforce the need for cruelty and malice as parts of 
political life. Instead of opting for these responses, might it be possible, following 
Nietzsche, to work from within the nihilism produced by the sense of genocide in order to 
find the resources for more creative and affirmative political possibilities? The wager of 
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this project hangs in the response to this question since the purpose of critiquing the 
concept is, to reevaluate the concept of genocide, to give its politics new life thereby 
inventing a new value for the concept. This begs the question of what it would mean to 
find within nihilism the capacities to think otherwise and, in particular, to contest the 
foreclosure of politics quietly engendered by the normative understanding.  
For Nietzsche, the answer to the question of whether nihilism can produce new 
values is clearly an affirmative. Nihilism’s emergence takes place in relation to the 
category of truthfulness.458 The truths we cling to wear out, become idle, and fail to work 
as what Nietzsche calls the will-to-power produces new challenges. The value of 
truthfulness thus calls into question the value of other values. Eventually, thought arrives 
at the point where truth calls itself into question as a value since the conditions that 
demand it no longer make sense. According to Nietzsche, the theological and 
philosophical commitments to the value of truth paradoxically bring to light the fictitious 
nature of god, morals, law, truth, and ultimately, appearance itself. For Nietzsche, this 
revelation exposes how the various idols of Christianity remain arbitrary cultural 
constructs invested in the reproduction of power and held fast by a will to nothingness.459 
Nihilism appears as a predicament coeval with the collapse of truth as a value capable of 
preserving and safeguarding other values. Yet, what Nietzsche recovers in nihilism is the 
capacity for the production of value itself. The discovery of the valuelessness of values 
provides a clearing for making new values, which engender greater capacities for life. 
The nihilist conceit thus amounts to a declaration of joy for Nietzsche because it signals 
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an escape from ressentiment and bad conscience. Nietzsche calls this possibility an 
‘active nihilism.’460  
Nietzsche’s spirit of active nihilism has been harnessed for expanding the 
possibility of a number of incipient political projects.461 Yet, contemporary invocations of 
Nietzsche cannot simply mimic the structure of Nietzsche’s own work because the values 
in question are not the same. In the context of genocide, for example, we no longer 
dealing directly with the value of truth per se, but the problem of horrific forms of 
political destruction. The development of nihilism in this context is, as I previously 
argued, a byproduct of the sense of genocide, which calls into question the basic 
commitments of a polity to encouraging the flourishing of life. Nihilism develops when 
this sense, which operates throughout the politics of genocide, undermines the value of 
traditional forms of political engagement. Passive nihilism, however, reinforces these 
values in spite of these transformations or, put differently, maintains the same political 
institutions, terms and commitments in the face of a radically different sense. In the case 
of the politics of genocide, the fundamental problem for passive nihilist responses is their 
consistent inability to think genocide as constitutive rather than merely impactful in 
contemporary politics, as emergent from within the terms of the political rather than 
exogenous shocks to it. By this I mean that both the realist and optimistic responses share 
a conviction that genocide ruins the world and, in doing so, separate genocide from the 
world thereby making genocide extrinsic, yet forceful in contemporary politics. This 
separation legitimizes a host of problematic countermeasures, which have been detailed 
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in the previous chapters, because it makes genocide into a governable problem related to 
specific forms of difference.  
Moreover, this response also misses the becoming of genocide, which deviates 
from schemas, rules, and norms that underpin the normative understanding. In the case of 
genocide, sense harbors a darker potential for unmaking the flourishing of life. If, for 
Nietzsche, the event, the discovery of the death of god, occurs because the value of truth 
auto-poetically generates its own deconstruction, then in the case of the genocide, it is not 
an external encounter with otherness, but the attachment to politics, to community, to 
thriving that genocide marks as a horror antithetical to itself. Indeed, the sense of 
genocide entails the possibility that the highest political values, which support, nurture 
and enable the community are deeply imbricated with the worst forms of destruction that 
undermine communities at their foundation. The sense of genocide consequently 
destabilizes our belief in the structures of power that supposedly facilitate thriving in a 
biopolitical age. The advent of nihilism is thus internal to the event of genocide, but 
predicated on only a single sense, an attempt to rectify the direction (good sense) of the 
genocide event by assigning it an identity (common sense) that remains external to 
politics.462 
The normative understanding of genocide flourishes within this dominant regime 
of sense because it formulates knowledge that predetermines the significance of genocide 
as an event. The diversity of knowledge constructs surrounding genocide thus emerge as 
a discourse organized not by a common object, as I previously stated the normative 
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understanding includes multiple different debates over genocide, but because of the sense 
in which an event is spoken. Beyond the limits of this or that representation of genocide, 
this sense determines the course of the politics of genocide and the form of interventions 
offered in response to genocidal politics. The reaction to the sense of horror that emerges 
with destructive events paralyzes the normative understanding and returns in the form of 
passive forms of enjoyment, subtended by the knowledge that we are complicit in 
genocide, or, alternately, takes form in the effort to find another origin to genocide in the 
psyche, evil, or some form of otherness. In the process, an array of control technologies, 
modes of governance, and biopolitical motifs entrench themselves in the politics of 
genocide, coordinating the set of statements that can be made about genocide and when 
they become significant.  
If, however, the event the concept of genocide hails is itself a process of 
becoming, one that operates through difference and dispersion, then the static approach of 
the normative understanding is returning to the ghosts of the past and actively 
reproducing them as the specters of the present. As each chapter discusses, group life, 
destruction, and desire ‘become,’ transforming in unforeseeable fashions. As long as the 
dominant regime of sense underlying the normative understanding tethers genocide to a 
single sense then the political capacity to think and respond to destruction will be 
continually outmoded by a process of becoming What we need instead is a pluralization 
of the concept and its sense, a process underway in the minor tradition which thinks 
destructive processes as constitutive of the fabric of social relations. Indeed, the passive 
nihilism engendered by the normative understanding would, consequently, not exhaust 
our vocabularies, practices, and modes of thought, but be a signal for creativity. 
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Rethinking horror as part itself, for instance, may be more creative than the normative 
understanding and may provide avenues for challenging reactive politics.  
What this would mean for practical politics is not easy to describe. It is a 
speculative project that appears in numerous forms. There is no program for the 
multiplication of sense because, contrary to the common and good sense, we are not in 
control of sense. Sense enacts a donation of intelligibility and is itself only intelligible on 
the fringes of experience. Experiments thus take the form of aesthetic, scholarly, and 
political interventions of the minor tradition as well as the battle for expanding the 
legitimate application of concept. Many of the excerpts throughout this dissertation point 
to the valuable work of genocide scholars who stretch the concept to new domains and 
territories, or political movements that charge genocide as an alternative to the 
vocabulary of rights and freedoms and vitalize politics by linking disparate temporalities, 
speeds, histories of violence and their role in the production of the present. In these 
efforts, a multiplicity of sense unfolds. How this grapples with the normative 
understanding of genocide or the legitimation of preemptive war in the call to stop 
genocide is, as yet, undetermined. In these cases, however, the concept of genocide 
serves not only to reproduce passive nihilism, but to open up a creative potential for 
affirming a multiplicity of senses and interrupt the foreclosure of the political. Indeed, as 
Deleuze argues, resignation constitutes one of the foremost figures of ressentiment and 
nihilism. Read in this light accusations regarding the inevitable ‘failure’ of certain 
political alternatives constitute a self-defeating retreat into nihilism.463 The flimsy 
determination of a ‘good’ or ‘successful’ politics hinges on a prior regime of sense that 
could ground such a judgment. Relaxing the urge to determine the meaning of the 
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concept is thus an important practice for soliciting new forms of sense. If this seems 
untenable in the case of an emergency like genocide that too is a product of a prior 
determination of significance, the trap of a particular sense, that almost always arrives on 
the scene too late.  
Certainly, opening the concept entails risk. Concepts can serve all manner of 
nefarious and malicious purposes. Yet, the ‘success’ of the normative understanding and 
the current antigenocide regime is, at best, inconsistent and, at times, actively complicit 
with the expansion of violence and control. This is by no means to suggest there haven’t 
been vital interventions taken against acts of mass violence, atrocity and genocide, but 
rather, that these emerge not from an engagement with the normative understanding of 
genocide, but from the inspiration of sense that fosters more creative, active, and ethical 
engagements with particular political circumstances. Denouncing the ‘scourge’ of 
genocide does not, as a mode of ethical response, escape the predicament of ‘doing 
nothing,’ but it does refine the sense in which this event is understood and work on the 
set of rigid reflexes that are equally unhelpful. ‘To become worthy of the events that 
befall us,’ seems almost impossible in relation to genocide, an event that may shatter any 
sense that we want things to return eternally. Yet, to sense differently is the hallmark of 
horror and, in the case of genocide, a vital task for thinking through the contingency and 
challenge of living in biopolitical condition that all-too easily converts into 
thanatopolitics. The purpose of this project has been to explore the limits of sense and the 
normative understanding of genocide as well as the consequences it has for politics. It 
thus offers more of a speculation on how to produce a more creative politics of genocide 
than a program. In an academic context, however, this process entails experimenting with 
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the concept of genocide to see how it attaches to new problems, forces, and conditions. 
This experimentation hopefully adds a different form of intelligibility to the problems and 
supports the creation of new habits with respect to them. Part of the point of the politics 
of sense is that the effort to redesign a concept to support a specific research agenda that 
ultimately undermines the capacity of sense to politicize. In this regard, the final section 
of this project presents several experiments with the concept of genocide in order to see 
what form the multiplication of sense might take. These are not intended as final 
judgments, but rather as efforts to employ the capacities of the concept to produce a new 
set of values by linking genocide to circumstances that it is traditionally excluded from. 
In the context of producing knowledge, I believe this constitutes a repudiation of the 
limits of passive nihilism and an affirmative engagement in the politics of genocide. 
 
Senses of the Present 
Imagine a potential future. The temperature of the planet has risen many degrees 
and everywhere human and nonhuman ecologies are in disarray. States, organizations, 
and communities, which took the calm for granted, are undergoing rampant 
transformation as the basic communal, industrial, and social structures that supported life 
for years fall to pieces. The flood is slow, so slow it will feel like a surprise in spite of our 
warnings.464 Appeals to exclusionary nationalism or virulent calls for military control 
proliferate like a breeze over the now vast ocean, seeping into every political crevices and 
social fissures. As the seas rise and species die out, the question of life once again 
appears at the forefront of politics. As billions of people leave their shore-bound 
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residences, places of worship, schools, jobs or temporary abodes, a massive flight from a 
bad reality begins.  
The few states and institutions with sufficient resources and resolve may, under 
such conditions, opt to insulate themselves as best they can from planetary change by 
cementing the boundaries of their respective political communities both physically and 
ideologically.465 What happens next? In such circumstances, I find it difficult not to think 
of the importance of Primo Levi’s small text The Drowned and the Saved as strangely 
prophetic in its titular descriptions of this new planet divided by liquid zones of death and 
life. In this collection of essays, Levi includes his famous discussion of the ‘The Grey 
Zone’ as the space of moral ambiguity saturating what he calls ‘the concentrationary 
universe’. The Grey Zone, Levi writes, confronts us with a dilemma: “willingly or not we 
come to terms with power, forgetting that we are all in the ghetto, that the ghetto is 
walled in, that outside the ghetto reign the lords of death, and that close by the train is 
waiting.”466 Levi’s dark musings on the state of the camp offer a chilling indictment of 
the ethical stakes of political violence. Yet, their pertinence for the contemporary 
condition cannot be understated.  
In a world of climate-induced atrocities, the groups subject to destruction, the 
modes of destruction, and the structure of intent will undergo decisive transformation. 
Yet, as Naomi Klein has already suggested, this too constitutes a form of genocide.467 
Setting aside for a moment the complex imbrications of species life and the important 
relation between genocide and mass extinction, climate atrocities will produce new, non-
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identity based groups subject to all the old familiar forms of deprivation, exclusion, and 
violence, but also the slow death of a changing planet.468 Inaction, both in the face of 
warming and the destruction of groups, may suddenly become a kind of malice practiced 
through feigned ignorance and born out of a biopolitical pretense toward species-read 
self-preservation. Genocide, in this sense, will be fully ecological, but thoroughly 
political, materially diverse and unfathomably destructive. Such an event will have less 
affinity to the explicit regimes of genocide practiced totalitarian states and more 
connections with the slow deaths of Herero, arguably the first episodes of twentieth 
century genocide, in which the Omaheke desert performed much of ‘killing labor’ for von 
Trotha and the German colonials.469 Rather than colonial acquisition, what will occur 
might be a massive, intense retreat, scorched earth warfare, preceded by melting ice caps 
and the transformation of the polis into a policed ecology. Genocide recurs with 
difference in both settings w as biopolitics supplies novel criteria for determining what 
modes of dying are politically permissible for which peoples.  
This scenario is barely intelligible in current political discourse and only exists on 
the fringes of the genocide studies debate, the peripheral natures of these deaths mirroring 
the peripheral space climate atrocities occupy in contemporary thought about genocide.470 
Apocalyptic or not, fantastical or grimly realist, the conditions described above highlight 
the function of sense in the production of political possibility. The hegemonic 
interpretation of genocide and climate have been held apart not only because of express 
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efforts to depoliticize both problems, but also because the modes of sense enframing 
these events function according to the strictures of the normative understanding. They 
are, in other words, held apart by the very divisions, which sense makes intuitive. This 
has negative effects not only for climate change, but for the realization that genocides 
always involve control and destruction of environments.  
Yet, sense also has the capacity to shift suddenly and produce new values. The 
birth of sense, for all its care, takes place largely independent of human whimsy. Futures 
inhere in a present already passing not just as tame possibilities, but as active ingredients 
to political life. Put simply, the unruly dimension of sense intrudes on the complacent 
approaches to both of these events and renders intelligible the links between them. In 
doing so, it may be possible to incite resonances between ecocide and genocide such that 
the energy and fervor underlying the moral abhorrence of genocide implicates our 
reception to the Anthropocene. Indeed, it is not difficult to make the claim that the 
Anthropocene constitutes a form of genocide if a highly novel and negligent one. 
Ironically, recent scientific studies dating the onset of the Anthropocene have turned to 
the abrupt loss of life following Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of the new world as demarcating 
the moment when carbon emissions began to accelerate and affect the planetary 
ecosystem.471 A genocide event may thus be the condition of possibility for the 
Anthropocene just as much as the Anthropocene foments multiple genocides. This 
conclusion also shows the horror attendant in the politics of sense surrounding genocide 
for genocide, in this reading, constitutes both the horizon and origin of the present 
ecological catastrophe underway as well as being both a byproduct of human activity, 
fully independent of human choices, and an emergent unruly process. If horror names the 
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sickly genre of attachment to a world of unknowing, contingency, predation then it also 
captures the degree to which certain forms of genocide constitute the present crisis. 
Horror also calls for invention, not in the form of better technologies for managing and 
engineering the future, but in the capacities of sense. In the context of climate genocide, 
this involves both engaging the myriad of violences already underway as part of 
migration, desertification, and resource distribution as events to be taken seriously as 
instances of genocide, attempting to rethink notions such as belonging, territory, and 
identity to create space to harbor emerging groups subject to the destructive power of 
climate, relaxing the impulse to police difference and threats, and, lastly, rethinking the 
urge to control the future.472 Hopefully, such a shift in sense would also rearticulate the 
types of continuity and sharing constitutive of other being-together with other species and 
forms of life.473 Indeed, if climate change involves the formation elaboration of a grey 
zone at a planetary scale then proliferating alternative modes of sense constitute a critical 
development for enabling new challenges to the passive acquiescence of biopolitical 
abandonment already underway. 
Think of a city. The denizens come and go, walking paths, working, making 
music, selling goods, or just inhabiting space. Industries connect people and buildings, 
skylines provide horizons, agonistic relations form over land, gods, and grievances. 
Children attend schools and churches. Crimes occur. Money is made. Uneasy tension, 
enmities and senses of comradery develop. Myths swirl into a history of place told by 
tongue and sidewalk lore. Cities with traditions, cities forged from conflict, cities of 
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commerce, and cities as ecologies.474 By the ocean, in the flatlands, amidst a desert, on a 
mountain, somewhere, in the middle of nowhere, traversed by trade routes and economic 
flows, rippling with serrations, disruptions, highways, segments, and tiny pockets of 
freedom, covered in concrete and glass, tiny enclaves of mineralization solidifying the 
bonds of communal life.475 
Cities are necessarily complex assemblages. Yet, they also often have an 
identity.476 You are from Baltimore not Boston. You hail from Beirut not Barcelona. 
Cities thrive and speak multiplicity. They are equally spaces of security, exclusion, and 
destruction as fruitful opportunities for the flourishing of life and traps for the creation of 
ghettos and zones of abandonment.477 The texture of cities is too distinctive to describe in 
detail here, but the sense of the city, the whirling forces that create place and distinguish 
cities from one another are remarkable. The city is an entity, a group, whose 
materialization is every bit as real as the bells of a tower or the spires of a monument, 
whose inflection in language, habit, and disposition is notable in the statistical aggregate. 
Cities mark a social identity, but also a material one.478 They form from a series of 
synthetic encounters between the people and other entities occupying the city through the 
businesses that form, the roads you travel, the air you breathe, the places you vote, the 
graffiti you see or the playgrounds your children frequent. Cities link to one another, to 
agricultural space via innumerable corridors in land, sea, and air. The life and death of 
cities is singular.  
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In the coming decades, more people will be residents of cities than at any point in 
history.479 This process of urbanization, a product of the intensification of market 
inequities and structural adjustment, will also change the form of cities to increasingly 
emphasize the creation of massive slums. As they grow, cities also reengineer enclosures, 
spaces of confinement, and methods of securitization designed to regulate and redouble 
the traps of economic destitution. Yet, the very scale of urban spaces renders them 
inaccessible to traditional rubrics and practices of control.480 The city itself escapes, 
energized by the unprecedented flow of capital accumulation, physical deterioration, 
unintentional planning, and the improvisations of the people trying to simply live life.481 
The globe may be undergoing a rampant process of urbanization, but urbanization is 
undergoing an equally rampant process of differentiation. The mix creates a tendency 
toward the development of new measures of political violence directed against the 
ensemble of space and inhabitants, of enclaves and corridors, rather than against people 
of static identity categories.  While the old axes of exclusion such as race, sex, gender, 
and class find new purpose in urbanization, the city also generates novel battles over the 
possibilities for living (and dying) in a particular place. Paradoxically, the city emerges as 
both a novel form of life, the apparatus for confining and controlling this life, and the seat 
of various micro-practices cutting both ways. 
To say that the future of cities is complex is an understatement. However, the city 
is certainly a complex system replete with recurrent patterns, energetic inputs, entropic 
products, fluctuations, digressions, stable, periodic, and wildly chaotic states. Cities, 
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identity and practices, minerals and spaces, ghettos, slums, parks, and condominiums, 
compose and interrelate in a dynamic, open system. The ‘planetary’ process of 
urbanization, securitization, economic deregulation thus occur in connection with a 
radical potential for instability, which can either produce unprecedented growth and 
transformation of cities or their complete abandonment. Economic factors alone cannot 
account for this, much to the dismay of urban planners.482 Instead, a host of ecological, 
non-human, social, and cultural factors co-operate in the making of a city via networks, 
hierarchies, and feedback loops. Regardless, if the city is a complex system then, 
according to dynamic systems theory, it also constitutes a kind of singularity.483 The city 
‘expresses’ itself as an emergent entity distinct from the various ‘parts’ such the synthetic 
connections formed by its inhabitants, economic relations, and environmental features. 
Just like a self-organizing chemical process, at a certain threshold, the city begins to exert 
‘downscale’ effects regulating the fluctuations of these parts, promoting some and 
reducing others. The city, separate from its constituents, thus begins to operate as an 
entity with a real, differential (and measurable) effect. While the connections are direct, 
the development of city cultures, of a sense of space and belonging, no doubt develop at 
this point and reinforce the growth and differentiation of a city space. Indeed, even 
violent contests over the meaning of city-space rise against a backdrop of the city 
becoming significant as an entity in its own right.  
Moreover, if the city is distinguishable as a self-organizing entity composed by 
human and non-human constituents then the city can become the subject of an attack. 
Indeed, Martin Coward, as discussed in chapter three, has already outlined a theory of 
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urbicide as a new kind of warfare.484 Cities and dwellings have long been prime objects 
of warfare from Tripoli, to Samarkand, to Bagdad. Strategies and techniques for toppling 
cities, for militarizing cities, and for undermining the city have thus always been a part of 
warfare. The glacis, which bounds the city is itself a mechanism for slowing things down, 
a machine of war and control.485 Yet, if cities constitute distinct self-organized entities 
formed via synthetic connections and, furthermore, if we can document the effects of this 
organization not just in the history of violence, but in the everyday lives of the people 
who claim to hail from this or that place, then cities constitute a form of group life with 
degrees of power as potent and significant as race, ethnicity, religion or nationality as 
they have been traditionally conceived. The city is a group, explicitly and implicitly 
targeted for elimination and control, and subject to a distinctive set of technologies for 
achieving this destructive process from economic abandonment to atomic warfare.  
We could press this logic further. The city itself could be the entity subjected to 
genocide and the different members of the city, as its constituent parts, the bodies bearing 
the marks of such an attack. Perhaps, a process of destruction is woven into the fabric of 
urbanization just as new strategies emerge to target and destroy city spaces. If so then the 
coordinates for envisioning and responding to political violence would have to be entirely 
refashioned since the age-old images and divisions of social life would no longer be 
salient tools of protest. As the acceleration of urbanization, in terms of both scale and 
speed, continues the problems and predicaments of the city blossom while the concepts 
capable of attesting and contesting the violence of city-making and city-management 
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remain more anchored than ever to the past. Images of the ghettos of World War Two 
obscure the slow rise of multiple practices of ghettoization that dwarf those of the past.486  
Indeed, the urbanization of war, a process largely treated as responsive to exigent 
technological and economic changes, would consequently have to be reinterpreted as the 
future horizon of a genocidal politics, which redefines biopolitical categories away from 
the divisions of race and toward the mode of living of city-life. Of course, this is not to 
suggest that the prior divisions disappear, but rather that the logistics designed to wage 
war against cities now occur under a cloak of legitimacy by permanently separating them 
from the vocabularies that could express their horror. Moreover, the fostering of city life, 
a space etched out and assembled for the purposes of producing specific forms of 
flourishing, in the ancient sense of the polis as a place for the governance of life, 
transforms into a horror as the sticky, network and, indeed, the very vehicle for the 
elimination of discrete forms of life.  The duality of cities, their production as sites of 
flourishing and as vast sarcophagi, as makers of new peoples and as the object of novel 
modes of destruction, call for a reassessment of the intelligibility of the politics of 
genocide. Yet, contemporary urban war conceals the object, means, and intent of war a 
priori by standing in stark contrast to the supposed purpose, means, and subject of 
genocide.  
As a complex system, a city may abruptly transform. Just like the life of an 
individual, their existence is precarious if, in many cases, buttressed by a variety of 
social, economic, and environmental feedback loops. The problem, however, occurs not 
with the status of cities in the generic sense, but with each specific city as a singular 
historical product, as a distinctive entity. The life of Baltimore, the life of Jerusalem, the 
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life of Srebrenica. While it is difficult to describe the withering of crops or the drying up 
of jobs as techniques of genocide on account of their ‘natural’ occurrence, as a complex 
system, cities are subject to the exercise of new instruments of control that operate at 
different scales. Some of these are certainly innocuous while others expressly disregard 
the significance of city life. The question of the future, as urbanization accelerates, 
concerns how the city factors into politics. Since Aristotle the city has been the space for 
governance, for the gathering together of politically qualified life, yet today city-life takes 
off as distinctive irrespective of its allegiance to the classical image of the polis. The 
battle for the city, consequently, requires expanding the horizons of what constitutes a 
city and a mode of violence since economic deprivation or agricultural failure in city-life 
is organized, ‘natural’ disaster social and political. How to draw this line is an open, 
contestable, or political question. Is it possible the process of urbanization itself 
constitutes a form of ‘concentration’ that harbors or gives birth to genocidal fantasies or 
fascist intensities? To some, cities may register as nothing more than fungible masses of 
human capital in a profit-maximizing scheme or as nodes in an increasingly transnational 
network. Each statement might be true simultaneously, such is the nature of a complex 
system, which integrates numerous factors and can follow multiple potential pathways. In 
each scenario, however, the city expresses itself as a real, historically distinctive entity 
capable of life and death whose continuity relies on the practices of its denizens. The 
destruction of cities thus constitutes a problem thinkable in relation to the concept 
genocide, a concept that draws into relief the horror of the city as both engine, 
instrument, and place of novel forms of destruction. 
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Now, suspend yourself. Slow down. Take a breath. Contemplate for a moment. 
Breathe deep. As you draw the air into your lungs consider what it feels like for a 
moment. Depending on where you are the sensation may be odorless, sulphiric, smoky, 
fragrant, rank, or provide any of a number of other olfactory sensations. The sense 
emerges from a composition of the air, which is a mixture of different chemical elements 
such as oxygen, carbon dioxide, methane, and other trace gases, microorganisms, spores, 
and molecules. Notable amongst these elements is the higher concentration of aerosolized 
biocontaminants. Indeed, in the near future human beings (and all other breathing forms 
of life) will have the esteemed privilege of imbibing air composed by an unprecedented 
number of these elements. What few realize is that the majority of these particulates 
come from the burning of billions of tons of fecal matter from pigs, chickens, and other 
animals.487 The atmosphere is quite literally saturated with feces and, perhaps more 
unsettling, this feces dramatically alters your physiology. 
Fecal matter gets into the ecosystem as a necessary byproduct of massive 
industrial farming projects. The cumulative effect of this process has been well 
documented. The explosion of factory farming jeopardizes innumerable local and 
planetary ecologies, creates vicious antibiotic resistant bacteria, and supports 
unimaginably cruel practices all for the sake of profits. Sadly, these trends will be 
amplified as meat consumption becomes more and more a global norm, population 
growth continues, and industrial ‘development’ imperatives grow in popularity. The 
future is a blight for animal life with numerous species living purely for the sake of 
human consumption entombed in a vast factory network distributed across countries and 
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continents.488 If interventions on the climate, an abstract but real entity, are difficult to 
comprehend for many constituencies then perhaps the concrete violence done to fleshy 
animals might prompt a more immediate political response. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case.  
Indeed, genocide has long been one of the primary vocabularies for politicizing 
the mass death of animals in industrial agriculture.489 For instance, on February 22nd, 
2007 Nobel Prize winner J.M Coetzee gave a speech at the Sherman Galleries in Sydney, 
Australia. the subject of which was the relationship between human beings and non-
human animals. “It must,” Coetzee states, “be obvious there is something terribly 
wrong…wrong on a huge scale” with the human-animal relationship.490 Incisively, 
Coetzee challenged the thesis that the industrial production of animal meat constitutes an 
economic, political, biological, or demographic necessity. To the contrary, Coetzee 
argued that the horrific dangers of the industrial production line were all too clear in the 
lessons of history. These lessons “came so loud and clear that one would have thought it 
impossible to ignore. It came in the midst of the 20th century, a group of powerful and 
bloody-minded men in Germany hit on the idea of adapting the methods of the industrial 
stockyard, as pioneered and perfected in Chicago, to the slaughter or what they preferred 
to call the processing of human beings.”491 Coetzee’s argument is more than an analogy. 
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As Giorgio Agamben claims, the turn to the gas chamber and industrial killing in Nazi 
Germany drew support from the non-metaphorical link between treating Jews and others 
as non-human animals (lice) and the practice of animal extermination.492 The links 
between the two practices are causal, concrete, and figurative. Ironically, Coetzee was not 
the first winner of the Nobel Prize to indict the industrial production of meat. Isaac 
Bashevis Singer, winner of the Nobel in 1978, drew extreme criticism for comparing the 
treatment of animals to an “eternal Treblinka.”493 Of course, Singer didn’t have access to 
the statistics that Coetzee cited indicating that around 65 billion animals are killed 
annually for the purposes of human consumption, the majority in factory farms.494  
 The problem, however, is that using concepts is a tricky business. As devices 
aesthetic and political, they mark creativity in thought, but a creativity that cannot be 
easily directed. Whatever an author’s intentions words and concepts are slippery, they 
can be caught, twisted, and reversed. The call to concern for animal genocides is no 
different. For instance, consider Alec Rawls’, former editor of the Stanford Review, and 
his heated response to the animal rights activists on the ethics of factory farming. In a 
piece entitled ‘Vegetarianism is Genocide,’ Rawls points out a problem with Coetzee’s 
and Singer’s logic. According to Rawls, factory farming “support[s] the lives of millions 
more animals. Choosing to not eat and otherwise use animals necessarily eliminates the 
existence of those animals that would have been used.”495 Rawls thus counsels 
vegetarians to ‘step up to the plate’ as an ethical response to animal cruelty by supporting 
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the practices that give birth (and death) to the animal. In effect, Rawls argues that ending 
factory farming would effectively ‘abort’ animals that would otherwise be born thereby 
preemptively eliminating their life. The futurist logic that pervades these arguments 
defends the inherent ‘sanctity of all life,’ but does so, in the case of animals, even if that 
life is destined to confinement, butchery, vivisection, and consumption.496 Twisted as this 
logic may be, Rawls highlights a horrific reality that for many species, from bovines to 
corn, their life as a species hinges on their ongoing destruction by humans.497 The late 
Jacques Derrida offered a scathing critique of animal consumption pinpointing exactly 
this predicament: 
Such a subjection, whose history we are attempting to interpret can be called violence in 
the most morally neutral sense of the term…men do all they can in order to dissimulate 
this cruelty or to hide it from themselves in order to organize on a global scale the 
forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence, which some would compare to the worst 
cases of genocide (there are also animal genocides: the number of species endangered 
because of man takes one’s breath away). One should neither abuse the figure of 
genocide nor too quickly consider it explained away. It gets more complicated: the 
annihilation of certain species is index in process, but it is occurring through the 
organization and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in 
conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, outside of every 
presumed norm of a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their 
continued existence or even overpopulation. As, if for example, instead of throwing a 
people into ovens and gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided 
to organize the overproduction and ovegeneration of jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by 
means of artificial insemination, so that, being continually more numerous and better fed, 
they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the 
imposition of genetic experimentation, or extermination by gas or by fire.498 
 
Derrida’s analysis points to the complexity of thinking the human non-human animal 
relation in connection with the figure of genocide since the industrial production of meat 
actually fosters the continuity of life of many species, but does so paradoxically for the 
purposes of their death. In this moment, biopolitics and thanatopolitics enter into a zone 
of indistinction and the industrial production constitutes a making live for the purposes of 
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making die. The animal life, which exceeds any cosmopolitan, humanist, or utilitarian 
standard for ethical conduct, also pushes the limit of genocide as it has classically been 
understood-a danger that Derrida, in the above quotation, warns us about, but also pushes 
us toward. Other philosophers, such as Roberto Esposito, argue against aligning the 
destruction of animal life with genocide because, as Esposito claims, genocide requires 
“(1) that there exists a declared intention on the part of the sovereign state to kill a 
homogenous group of persons; (2) that such killing is potentially complete, that is, 
involves all its members; (3) that such a group is killed insofar as it is a group, not for 
economic or political motives, but rather because of its biological constitution.”499 Here, 
Esposito, whose work pushes on questions about the boundaries of life, community and 
immunity, adopts a strangely conservative approach to the vocabulary of genocide by 
endorsing whole-heartedly the normative understanding. Sadly, his caution also functions 
to depreciate the novelty of contemporary forms of violence, which often encourage the 
reproduction of animal life in a variety of forms, but entangles this reproduction with an 
ongoing process of destruction that impacts virtually every aspect of biological and 
cultural life from breathing to eating. This violence was unthinkable for Lemkin and 
previous generations of genocide scholars in terms of scale, longevity, and complexity.  
In this regard, the evolution, transformation or becoming of practices of 
destruction exceed the vocabularies capable of reckoning with such forces. Without 
explicit intent, billions of living beings participate in this process. The very life of the 
groups destroyed takes form and has been engineered to facilitate and reproduce this 
mode of destruction. If genocide brings with it a sense of horror then perhaps no process 
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stands out like this: the proliferating new forms of life that interlace biopolitical and 
thanatopolitics into a process constitutive of the flow of energy into organisms across the 
surface of the earth. The plasticity of destruction, the permeability of destructive events 
that constitute innumerable political, economic, social and biological layers of planetary 
life makes for an almost inescapable, unrelenting, and, for many, unlivable development. 
The destructive process has, in this sense, invented new forms of interspecies-being for 
the purpose, and only for the purpose, of wholesale slaughter in the name of life’s 
necessity. The only thing inhibiting this sense of horror from developing is a lingering 
form of human exceptionalism and the fear that equating animals with humans will 
devalue the horror of historical genocides. Both concerns, however, amount to an effort 
to police the boundaries of a concept, to disavow horror, and, more problematically, 
undermine the capacities for concepts to transform and enhance our capacities to live 
otherwise. Indeed, if the concept of genocide, a concept marked by a multiplicity of 
groups, destructions, and intents, a concept allegedly produced to describe the worst 
forms of violence and deprivation, cannot serve to describe the ongoing, continuous 
elimination of untold billions of forms-of-life then perhaps we have reached the point 
where, in a sense, we can no longer speak of genocide at all, where genocide has, 
strangely, been stripped of its sense and made into one more commonplace in the order of 
things. If so, then the politics of genocide does little more than register a violence it treats 
as altogether unremarkable and, in doing so, points to a sad horizon for politics and 
thought. 
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